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Foreword
In 2010, Sri Lanka transitioned into a middle-income country. The question now 
is how can Sri Lanka best maintain a steady economic growth rate, particularly 
through infrastructure development, to achieve both the Mahinda Chintana 
(Government Development Plan) and the Millennium Development Goals. 
Currently, Sri Lanka is 2 years into the second 10-year Mahinda Chintana. Thus, 
this report comes at a crucial time, when assessing the progress made toward 
achieving these goals is as important as figuring out the amount of financial 
resources that are needed and are feasible.
Understanding the rural-urban transformation is also crucial, because it 
impacts the use of the country’s productive resources, the ability to deliver ser-
vices, and their costs. Thus, this report provides a snapshot of these investment 
gaps and their significance for each infrastructure subsector in the context of the 
current development plan.
This report is organized as follows. Chapter 1 establishes the role of infrastruc-
ture in Sri Lanka’s economic growth. Chapter 2 explores the significance of 
urbanization, hubs, competitive exports, and dynamic cities as drivers of 
 economic growth and what this could mean for Sri Lanka’s development. 
Chapter 3 establishes the infrastructure constraints of the transport, energy, 
water and sanitation, solid waste, and telecommunications sectors. This chapter 
also establishes the investment needs, that is, “investment gaps” of these sectors. 
Chapter 4 explores the possibilities through which Sri Lanka can finance its 
infrastructure investment needs by enabling private sector involvement and 
strengthening government institutions and offers policy recommendations on 
how to close these infrastructure gaps. Chapter 5 concludes the analysis, 
 summarizing major highlights.
As Sri Lanka transitions to an upper-middle-income country, infrastructure is 
likely to significantly contribute to the country’s economy. We hope this report 
stimulates dialogue on the role of infrastructure in trade, rural-urban transition, 
and medium-term economic growth in Sri Lanka.
John Henry Stein
Sector Director
South Asia Sustainable Development
World Bank
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Overview
Sri Lanka achieved middle-income country status in January 2010, through 
steady, long-term gross domestic product (GDP) growth of about 5 percent per 
year. This growth was fueled by the adoption of a liberalization policy that was 
implemented in the late 1970s and has continued—albeit, sporadically. One 
 consequence of the reform was the change in the role the government played, 
from being a major contributor to the production of goods and services to being 
a regulator, creating space for the private sector and monitoring the outcomes for 
further reform.
The government also began to pay attention to the much neglected infrastruc-
ture. An ambitious public investment program was launched to overcome the 
infrastructural backlog, focusing on the Mahaweli power and irrigation program, 
urban development, and investment in Katunayaka Free Trade Zone. The Public 
Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka (PUCSL) was established as a multisector 
regulatory authority to expedite privatization of public utilities. This helped 
“crowd in” private investment in productive sectors of the economy. Returns to 
these investments in terms of GDP growth and employment generation would 
have increased in the absence of the draining conflict. This report argues that a 
continued push for regulatory fine-tuning to enhance the efficiency of 
 infrastructure investments would increase returns to investment. Importantly, 
the higher returns could have mitigated the need for large public investment in 
infrastructure and thus help avert the adverse fiscal consequences (including high 
indebtedness) at a time of competing expenditure demands and low revenue 
generation.
As a consequence of three decades of civil conflict, infrastructure  reconstruction 
in the northern and eastern regions is likely to take center stage. The conflict has 
come to an end. The infrastructure needs in the northern and eastern regions are 
higher than in the rest of the country, as a consequence of the conflict itself and 
the diminished access to the region. A “principle of inclusion” could be applied 
to bring those regions to the level of infrastructure services available in most of 
Sri Lanka.
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Sri Lanka’s social achievements (high literacy and good health indicators) are 
on par with or even better than its middle-income peers such as the Dominican 
Republic, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The Sri Lankan labor force is thus ready 
to work with investments that generate high-productivity employment. Sri Lanka 
could aim at becoming an upper-middle-income country in the next 15 years, as 
indicated in its vision document—the Mahinda Chintana (Government 
Development Plan). It could become a new Malaysia. However, unlike its peers 
and Malaysia, Sri Lanka has not succeeded in attracting investment to create the 
demand for its labor force with high-productivity potential. The central theme 
of this report, in concert with the Mahinda Chintana, is that with the conflict 
out of the way, infrastructure will be critical in attracting investment for 
 sustained high growth in the future. This is in line with the Mahinda Chintana’s 
“hub” concept, since agglomeration dividends become part of the “economics 
energy” that fuels the dynamism of infrastructure, commercial, and knowledge 
hubs. A “principle of connectivity” would thus enable the country to take advan-
tage of  agglomeration dividends, steering the economy toward sustained high 
economic growth.
The two principal drivers of investment for sustained high economic growth 
and productive employment are (a) international competitiveness for export-led 
growth and (b) urbanization, which facilitates productive economic activity. 
These two drivers of investment and economic growth, in turn, depend crucially 
on efficient infrastructure that shortens the international supply chain on the one 
hand and brings about agglomeration dividends on the other.
Sri Lanka’s exports (identified in revealed comparative advantage and 
 government’s own priorities) are apparel (mainly underwear, knitted goods, and 
swimwear), coconut oil, fish, information technology services, precious 
and  semiprecious stones, natural rubber and rubber-based goods (surgical 
gloves and tires), port and port-related services, and tea. The supply chain 
analysis of priority exports pinpoints the importance of modernizing infrastruc-
ture (air cargo, Colombo Port, rail and road connectivity to the ports, and 
 telecommunications) to shorten the chain, lower the costs, and increase inter-
national competitiveness.
Despite reasonable GDP growth, urbanization in Sri Lanka, at 15 percent,1 is 
well below that of its middle-income peers and the rest of South Asia. It is easy 
to conclude that the vast majority of the educated labor force of Sri Lanka has 
either left the country or lives in rural areas and small rural towns engaging in 
relatively low-productivity agriculture and service jobs. Urbanization of around 
40 percent is needed to move this workforce to higher productivity employment. 
Well-managed urbanization with proper infrastructure services will result in 
agglomeration economies in the urban centers leading to higher returns of 
 investment in manufacturing and modern services.
The Mahinda Chintana’s vision for Sri Lanka’s “Cities of the Future” is to 
 create a system of interconnected regional growth poles. With the ending of civil 
unrest, there is a strong potential for developing regional growth centers to 
complement and reinforce the positive growth contribution of the Colombo 
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metropolitan region. To this end, the government plans to develop a systematic 
network of cities linked with each other and with the rest of the world—a vision 
that requires the formation of four metro regions (MRs): 
•	 Colombo MR (Colombo metro city, Gampaha, and Kalutara) 
•	 north central MR (Anuradhapura, Dambulla, Trincomalee, and Polonnaruwa)
•	 southern MR (Hambantota) 
•	 eastern MR (Ampara and Batticoloa).
Each metro region will consist of principal cities and secondary cities. Principal 
cities will be endowed with high-quality urban services, and all cities will be 
interconnected, enabling each region to grow and evolve as an integrated 
system.
Modernizing the urban infrastructure will be the key to realizing the Mahinda 
Chintana vision for Sri Lankan cities. Much remains to be done to improve 
 public transportation, the road network, and its maintenance and traffic manage-
ment in the main cities. Furthermore, as an aspiring middle-income country that 
also wants to significantly improve its tourism sector, Sri Lanka needs to improve 
its solid waste management, sewerage, and drainage systems.
Redressing infrastructure constraints, however, cannot be piecemeal and 
 product specific. Instead, a sectorwide approach is needed. The Mahinda Chintana 
provides clear policy guidelines for the entire transport sector for  shortening the 
supply chain, thus making Sri Lankan exports more competitive, improving urban 
quality of life, and enjoying agglomeration benefits. For instance, to develop Sri 
Lanka into a dynamic maritime and aviation hub, it recommends expansion of the 
Port of Colombo, development of the Port of Hambantota, modernization of 
Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA), construction of a second international 
airport at Mattala, and modernization of 14 domestic  airports. It reaffirms the 
importance of public transport and formulates an ambitious road rehabilitation 
and development program. Based on assessments using the best available analyti-
cal tools and policy objectives of the government (the primary one being 
8  percent GDP growth), this report estimates that the annual investment needs 
for the transport sector (roads, railways, seaports, airports, and  public transport) 
range from 2.49 percent (lower bound) to 4.16 percent (upper bound) of GDP.
The efficiency of transport sector investments will be enhanced further by 
addressing priorities at the provincial level. In the Western Province, the priorities 
are electrification of railways in the Colombo metropolitan region, a rapid transit 
system in the Colombo metropolitan region, and multimodal transport access to 
BIA. The priority in the Southern and the Northern Provinces is to carry out 
multimodal transport and logistics operations studies to identify the required 
infrastructure services. For the Eastern Province, the development of aviation for 
tourism is the immediate priority; and for Uva Province, the focus is the develop-
ment of an appropriate road network to promote tourism.
Affordable and clean energy is essential for ensuring the competitiveness of 
Sri Lanka’s economy. However, the energy sector in Sri Lanka is increasingly 
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dependent on expensive and volatile petroleum imports. Thus, Sri Lanka needs 
to diversify the generation mix for more coal-fired power plants and renewable 
energy sources. With realistic targets, the energy sector will require annual invest-
ment of 1.18 to 2.17 percent of GDP. Efficiency improvements via a  cost-effective 
mix of power generation (avoiding the temptation of investing in a new refinery), 
passing the Petroleum Industry Act, and making the PUCSL fully operational to 
monitor and regulate pricing in the partially privatized distribution of petrol will 
help lower the total volume of investment in the sector.
Improved access to water and sanitation is essential to enhance the living 
conditions in Sri Lankan cities. Although well ranked compared to other South 
Asian cities, in 2011, the Economist Intelligence Unit ranked Colombo among 
the 10 least-livable cities in the world. One reason is its 90-year-old sewerage 
system that could collapse at any time. Annualized rehabilitation and replace-
ment costs and greenfield investments are estimated to be between 0.13 percent 
and 0.26 percent of GDP for Sri Lanka as a whole. The cost could be lower with 
greater efficiency in the delivery of services in rural areas and enhanced capacity 
of local authorities, improvement in collections, and better-targeted subsidies.
Urbanization and income growth significantly increase solid waste generation. 
On average, only 31 percent of the solid waste generated in Sri Lanka is collected 
by the local authorities; the rest is dumped haphazardly along streets and on 
vacant land, affecting local drainage systems and the environment. This statistic 
masks considerable variation, since collection efficiency is typically much higher 
in urban centers and rich provinces. Annual investment needed to improve solid 
waste management ranges from 0.04 percent (lower bound) to 0.31 percent 
(upper bound) of GDP.
The telecommunications sector is one of the pillars of the Sri Lankan  economy 
and a key partner in a knowledge hub. It has the potential to benefit from the 
growth of the services sector and the untapped global information and commu-
nication technology market. Deregulation and private investment have improved 
affordability and increased coverage (World Bank 2010). However, tariff wars 
and increased cost pressures have eroded profits—hence, the inability to reinvest 
in new technology and expand the network. By March 2012, close to 90 percent 
of the population had mobile phones, but large differences remained between 
rural and urban areas and across provinces. Roughly 18 percent of Sri Lanka’s 
territory is uncovered.2 Going forward, addressing telecommunication gaps 
requires reforms rather than public investment. It is also critical to identify and 
address gaps in the policy and regulatory framework that might constrain 
 private investment, by focusing on (a) clarifying the telecommunications policy, 
(b) completing the liberalization process, (c) simplifying the tax and licensing 
regimes, (d) strengthening the regulatory framework, and (e) rethinking the 
approach to universal service.
This report estimates that annual investments of 3.84 to 6.90 percent of GDP 
would be required to modernize infrastructure to sustain high GDP growth in 
this decade. Investing 6.9 percent of GDP annually in infrastructure will allow 
Sri Lanka to have, for example, a high level of connectivity comparable to that 
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of developed countries and access to water and sanitation comparable to those in 
upper-middle-income countries. The alternative of investing only 3.84  percent of 
GDP annually will yield more modest standards in terms of access and  quality of 
service. The level of investment requirements will pose a fiscal sustainability 
challenge, given the high level of public debt and low revenue generation. The 
regulatory and institutional reform for specific infrastructure sectors  discussed in 
this report will help to increase returns to investment in terms of the quantity 
and quality of services and will lower the need for total investment. This needs 
to be complemented by efforts to (a) reduce the losses of state-owned enter-
prises delivering infrastructure services to release resources for investment, 
(b) promote public-private partnerships (PPPs), (c) improve coordination among 
different tiers of government, and (d) take advantage of sectoral synergies to 
increase returns to investment.
The elimination of losses of major infrastructure state-owned enterprises 
(Sri Lanka Transport Board, Sri Lanka Railways, Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, 
Ceylon Electricity Board, and National Supply and Drainage Board) is critical. 
This was estimated at 1.74 percent of 2011 GDP and could release as much as 
23 percent of the resources that could be used to finance needed infrastructure 
investments. Cost-reflective pricing and efficiency measures such as improved 
targeting of subsidies, appropriate fuel mix, and human resource policies are 
needed to stem the state-owned enterprise losses. In addition, fine-tuning in 
some sectors would bring a much needed increase in efficiency via newer 
 technologies, better pricing mechanisms, and incentive signals to promote 
innovation.
Sri Lanka is accumulating valuable experience in executing PPPs in telecom-
munications, power generation, seaport terminals, housing, and real estate 
 development. There have been difficulties, of course, but none that have been 
insurmountable. By the standards of middle-income countries such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines, however, Sri Lanka is underserved (each country 
has about three times as many PPP projects as Sri Lanka) by this important 
source of infrastructure financing. Apart from political and macroeconomic 
 stability, what matters the most for attracting PPPs is a strong framework that 
clearly lays out the policy, legal, and institutional aspects of contracting PPPs. The 
main elements of the framework that need to be addressed include PPP institu-
tional anchor and jurisdictional clarity, needs and typologies of government 
 support, eligibility criteria, and awarding and accounting for guarantees.
A recent constitutional amendment granting greater power to lower tiers of 
government makes it all the more important to improve intragovernmental coor-
dination for improved execution of infrastructure projects. For example, solid 
waste and water and sanitation require coordination among all three tiers of 
government (that is, central, provincial, and local authorities) to benefit from 
economies of scale in engineering works. Similarly, roads, passenger bus transport, 
and electricity require coordination between the central and the provincial 
 governments. Coordination will also need to improve across infrastructure 
 sectors to enjoy the synergies that will result. Examples are coordination among 
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electricity, roads, sewerage, and telecommunication providers to lay shared 
 conduits for delivering the services.
There is remarkable evidence that infrastructure service access in Sri Lanka for 
key infrastructure like power and water and sanitation is quite inclusive. District 
analysis where data are available indicates very low Gini coefficients—adjusted 
by household spatial distribution—for power, water, and sanitation services 
(0.04, 0.01, and 0.01, respectively). Access is widespread, and the quality of these 
services in the country is generally good. Moreover, if one discounts infrastruc-
ture services such as cooking gas and  telephone landlines, the picture that 
emerges is a country where infrastructure services are generally not regressive in 
income.3 This “principle of inclusion” in the country’s infrastructure services 
planning could guide the rehabilitation and possible expansion of infrastructure 
services provision in the postconflict areas. A “principle of connectivity” could be 
used to assist in fostering economic growth in the country.
In conclusion, this report argues that better infrastructure is essential for more 
competitive exports and more livable cities that together will help achieve the 
Mahinda Chintana objective of sustained high economic growth. The required 
infrastructure investment will be substantial but can be contained to minimize 
the fiscal burden by reducing losses of state-owned enterprises, increasing PPPs, 
improving coordination across tiers of government, and taking advantage of 
potential synergies.
notes
 1. Sri Lanka has several characteristics, such as education levels, which indicate that it is 
more urbanized. In effect, the official definition of urban population changed prior to 
the 2001 census. If the official 2001 definition is expanded to include growing urban 
areas and emerging urban centers, then the urban population would account for 
40 percent of total population (Lall and Astrup 2009).
 2. See Hapugalle, Raja, and Paradi-Guilford for details.
 3. The adjusted Gini coefficient for cooking gas is 0.33 and for landlines and mobile 0.03. 
The former reflects the wide use of firewood for cooking in the country, which may 
have severe health consequences in terms of indoor air pollution (not analyzed in this 
study but a possible topic for future work).
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Introduction
Sri Lanka achieved middle-income country status in January 2010. Growth was 
fueled by the adoption of a liberalization policy that was implemented in the late 
1970s, which has continued, albeit sporadically. To continue to grow, however, 
Sri Lanka needs to pay attention to its much neglected infrastructure. Accordingly, 
Investing in Infrastructure: Harnessing Its Potential for Growth in Sri Lanka, has two 
objectives:
•	 To improve the understanding of the infrastructure sectors in Sri Lanka, 
including their current state and performance, future development needs, 
investment requirements and financing gaps, and bottlenecks to infrastructure 
development.
•	 To provide policy makers in Sri Lanka with a sound analytical basis for priori-
tizing investments and designing policy interventions that result in the 
 mobilization of funds and their effective use for future development of 
infrastructure.
Detailed and specific information can be found in the background papers listed 
in the acknowledgments and cross-referenced throughout this volume.
To achieve its objectives, this report assesses the country’s infrastructure 
endowment and performance, analyzes the contribution of infrastructure to 
 economic and spatial development, and outlines investment needs and strategic 
priorities within those established by the Mahinda Chintana.1 It provides a 
 cross-sectoral analysis of the major infrastructure crosscutting themes including 
the link between infrastructure and poverty reduction and economic growth; the 
institutional and regulatory framework; the main issues regarding planning, 
 coordination, and financing; and the role and constraints of private sector 
 participation in infrastructure financing and service provision. It identifies 
 bottlenecks to economic growth and considers policy issues to address them.
The report also provides a menu of policy instruments, targeting those that 
generate incentives for better maintenance, mitigate infrastructure-related 
 market failures, create appropriate institutional arrangements, and, where 
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feasible, promote market-based pricing. The report indicates the major gaps in 
infrastructure and hence promotes Mahinda Chintana’s overall objective of 
 promoting economic growth, increasing efficiency, and improving logistics. It also 
references international experience that is relevant to the country. The central 
theme of this report, in concert with the Mahinda Chintana, is that infrastructure 
is fundamental to Sri Lanka, attracting investment for sustained high economic 
growth in the future. This is because with proper economic management, 
 investment will flow into economic activity that strengthens Sri Lanka’s interna-
tional competitiveness.
As a consequence of 30 years of civil conflict, there are impending infrastruc-
ture issues in the northern and eastern regions. The civil conflict has ended. The 
infrastructure needs in the northern and eastern regions are higher than in the 
rest of the country as a consequence of the conflict itself and diminished access 
to the region. It is reasonable to expect that  reconstruction of infrastructure in 
the northern and eastern regions will take center stage, since it is already happen-
ing in certain areas in the eastern region.
The report starts with an overview and introduces the main findings. It 
addresses major constraints, instruments, and outcomes important to unleash the 
potential of infrastructure investments and policy fine-tuning. Chapter 1 
 discusses the infrastructure and growth nexus, given the country’s macroeco-
nomic scenario. It examines the long-term sustainability, particularly considering 
the Mahinda Chintana’s high infrastructure investment targets, and how the 
country can achieve its high economic growth targets, given its historical and 
current investment levels. It outlines what it will take for Sri Lanka to generate 
high-productivity jobs and thus sustain high economic growth for several 
decades, discussing trade and logistics, agglomeration economies, and the process 
of urbanization. This provides the foundation for a more detailed discussion in 
subsequent chapters on the role of infrastructure in the strategy for sustained 
high growth and employment generation.
Chapter 2 argues that the two principal drivers of sustained high economic 
growth and productive employment are (a) international competitiveness that 
results in export-led growth and (b) urbanization that facilitates productive 
 economic activity. These two drivers of economic growth, in turn, depend cru-
cially on efficient infrastructure that shortens the international supply chain on 
the one hand and brings about agglomeration dividends on the other. In order to 
make the case for the need to target infrastructure investment appropriately, 
Sri Lanka’s international competitiveness and urbanization are assessed in more 
detail in this chapter. This focus is closely linked with the “hub” concept 
 presented in the Mahinda Chintana.
Chapter 3 reviews key infrastructure sectors to identify the regulatory issues 
that need to be addressed and estimate the needed investment. Redressing infra-
structure constraints, however, cannot be piecemeal and product specific. Instead, 
a sectorwide approach is needed. Chapter 3 then analyzes key growth-promoting 
components of Sri Lanka’s infrastructure, including government vision and 
 targets as expressed in the Mahinda Chintana and other official documents. 
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This allows infrastructure gaps to be identified and investment needs to be esti-
mated to achieve higher growth, greater international competitiveness, more 
livable  cities, and more productive employment. It also presents infrastructure 
services in a spatial context, with respect to access and relative poverty.2
In light of the large investment requirement and high public debt and deficit, 
Chapter 4 discusses the potential of public-private partnership in infrastructure 
delivery and supportive regulatory reform. The sizable infrastructure gap in the 
context of lack of fiscal space potentially poses a challenge for fiscal sustainability. 
The regulatory and institutional reform discussed in the context of specific 
 sectors in Chapter 3 helps to increase returns to infrastructure investment in 
terms of the quantity and quality of services. Not only should this increase 
 efficiency in service delivery, but it should also help lower the need for total 
investment in infrastructure and thus help mitigate the impact of the Mahinda 
Chintana’s targets on the budget. This needs to be complemented by efforts to 
reduce the losses of state-owned enterprises delivering infrastructure services, 
promote public-private partnerships, improve coordination among different tiers 
of government, and take advantage of sectoral synergies to increase returns to 
investment.
notes
 1. The Mahinda Chintana is the government of Sri Lanka’s medium-term development 
strategy. See http://www.treasury.gov.lk/publications/mahindaChintanaVision-
2010full-eng.pdf. This report does not cover the environmental implications of invest-
ments that are being addressed in the Sri Lanka Country Environmental Analysis 
(Department of National Planning 2010).
 2. Relative poverty is the rate of poverty in each district calculated by dividing the num-
ber of poor households in each district by the number of total households in each 
district.
reference
Department of National Planning. 2010. “Mahinda Chintana: Vision for the Future, 
Development Policy Framework.” Ministry of Finance and Planning, Colombo. http://
www.treasury.gov.lk/publications/mahindaChintanaVision-2010full-eng.pdf. 
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Economic Growth and Structural 
Change: The Role of Infrastructure
Background
Historically, Sri Lanka, like other countries in the South Asia region, has 
 concentrated on developing rural areas by bringing economic growth and social 
infrastructure services to them. Yet, differently from other countries in the 
region, Sri Lanka has, at least in part, succeeded in this endeavor. As a conse-
quence, Sri Lanka is often considered a highly densely populated rural country, 
with only 15 percent (World Bank 2012) of the population in cities and 
33  percent (Department of Census and Statistics 2011) of the labor force in 
agriculture. Sri Lanka’s population is highly educated, however; and it is difficult 
to imagine that most high school and college graduates will return to the coun-
tryside to work as farmers. As indicated by British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC 2008) news, even among the poorest of the poor, the expectations are 
rapidly changing.
If, indeed, the country were rural, one would expect a greater proportion of 
gross domestic product (GDP) allotted to agriculture. Rather, Sri Lanka’s econ-
omy relies on services (58.5 percent) and manufacturing (27.8 percent; 
World Bank 2012). Spatially, the Western Province accounts for 45.1 percent 
(Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2011) of GDP and 65 percent (Department of 
Census and Statistics 2010) of industrial value added but only 28 percent of the 
population. Less than a third of Sri Lankans produce almost 60 percent of the 
country’s production; but as is apparent in this report, a large part of the country 
enjoys relatively good infrastructure and social services for its per capita income 
level. Sri Lanka seems more like a low-density urban country than a high-density 
rural one, with a per capita nominal GDP of a little over US$2,800 per year 
(World Bank 2012).
Sri Lanka has long been considered a low-income country; but when com-
pared to similar countries, it is apparent that Sri Lanka is middle income. 
Table 1.1 compares Sri Lanka to other middle-income country island nations. 
While these countries are spread around the globe, selective indicators illustrate 
c h a p t e r  1
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table 1.1 sri lanka compared to other middle-income island nations
Country
Average GDP 
growth (2004–09) 
(GNI per capital) 
(2009 PPP)
Urbanization 
(2009)
Forecasted 
urbanization 
(2030)a
Telecom access 
(per 100 people)b,c
Electricity access 
(% of population) 
(2009)
Access to 
improved 
sanitation (%) 
(2010)d
Access to 
improved 
water (%) (2010)e
Total road 
network (km)f
Vehicles 
per km 
of roadg
Paved 
roads (%) 
(2008)h
Dominican 
Republic 6.4 (8,110) 69.5 80.0 97 95.9 83 86 12,600 NA 49.4
Indonesia 5.5 (3,720) 52.6 68.9 114 64.5 54 82 476,337 38 56.9
Philippines 4.8 (4,060) 65.7 76.7 99 89.7 74 92 200,037 14 9.9
Sri Lanka 5.9 (4,720) 15.1i 21.4 104 76.6 92 91 97,286 41 81.0
Source: World Bank 2012, unless otherwise noted.
Notes: GDP = gross domestic product; GNI = gross national income; NA = not available; PPP = public-private partnership.
a. UN World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database. http://esa.un.org/unup/unup/index_panel1.html.
b. International Telecommunication Union World Telecommunications ICT Indicators 2012 Database. http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/publications/world/world.html.
c. Telecom access is defined as the number of fixed and mobile lines.
d. Improved sanitation = connection to a public sewer, a septic system, pour-flush latrine, simple pit latrine, or ventilated improved pit latrine.
e. Improved water = household connection, public standpipe, borehole, protected dug well, protected spring, rainwater collection.
f. Data from varying years: Dominican Republic: 2001, Indonesia: 2009, Philippines: 2003, Sri Lanka: 2003.
g. Data from various years: Indonesia: 2009, Philippines: 2005, Sri Lanka: 2007.
h. Data from various years: Dominican Republic: 2001, Indonesia: 2009, Philippines: 2003, Sri Lanka: 2003. 
i. Recalculated at 40 percent (according to Lall and Atrup 2009).
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how Sri Lanka is remarkably similar to them. An important difference is the low 
level of urbanization in Sri Lanka. While urbanization levels are subject to 
debate,1 a country with the general indicators of Sri Lanka tends to be more 
urbanized, especially since it is largely dependent on manufacturing and services. 
Urbanization and economic growth tend to go hand in hand in most countries, 
except in Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka has been steadily improving its service provision, regardless of 
which political party is in power. This shows continuity in its development path. 
It is difficult to find a parallel in other nations. Even more remarkable is the fact 
that this has been achieved during frequent severe internal strife. Yet, the country 
is changing. The 30-year civil war is over, and most of Sri Lanka’s neighbors have 
been enjoying rapid economic growth for many years. Import trade partners may 
soon become export trade partners, because the country has the potential to 
diversify from exporting mainly to developed countries. The need to increase 
economic growth is taking center stage in the country.
achieving short- to medium-term economic Growth: 
the role of infrastructure
Since the 1970s, Sri Lanka has established a tradition of wide-ranging liberaliza-
tion that the government may wish to continue, especially with the prospects of 
lasting peace and persistent vulnerability due to a constricted budget and fluctu-
ating prices. The waves of liberalization have established a record of effective 
reform, leading to more impressive investment, growth, and employment perfor-
mance than during the more government-regulated era. Despite these recent 
achievements, Sri Lanka has not been able to match the successes of other 
South Asian countries, such as India, even though it was ahead of them at the 
time of independence. However, Sri Lanka has outperformed these same coun-
tries in health, education, and infrastructure, especially in terms of access. These 
accomplishments have come at a steep price; they have strained the budget and 
failed to translate into productive employment opportunities, sparking two 
youth insurrections in the south and separatism in the north. The resulting 
30-year civil conflict is now at an end, and domestic optimism is at its peak. 
However, Sri Lanka still remains vulnerable. This is because fluctuating prices of 
a few key commodities, particularly oil, continued low productivity, and poor 
public sector management collectively stretch the budget, causing the economy 
to overheat at a growth rate of 6 percent per year.
The Mahinda Chintana is a medium-term development plan of the  government 
of Sri Lanka (GoSL) to promote national development, growth, and investments. 
It prioritizes infrastructure development in its calls for a growth rate of 8 percent, 
and international evidence of the positive impacts of infrastructure investments 
on medium-term economic growth is strong. Yet, this does not mean that 
 investing in physical infrastructure alone yields such positive results. Adequate 
planning that takes into account trade-offs, adjustments aimed at improved 
 efficiency, and ways of enabling private sector participation that share risks and 
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alleviate public budgets are equally or more important to Sri Lanka. For this to 
materialize, adequate institutional and regulatory frameworks need to be in place 
both to ensure service delivery and to avoid rent-seeking behavior. There is a 
need to improve the constitutional and legislative coherence of institutional 
arrangements pertaining to infrastructure sectors in light of the ongoing transi-
tion to a decentralized form of government as a result of the 13th Amendment 
to the Constitution. National policies developed through broad consultation are 
necessary for infrastructure sectors where the gestation periods of investments 
are longer than the terms of individual legislatures and administrations. They are 
absent for the majority of infrastructure sectors in Sri Lanka. The recommended 
regulatory reforms place greater weight on contracts than on oversight by 
 discretion-wielding regulatory agencies. However, even in the case of contracts, 
there is a need for interpretation and conflict resolution, a need that can, for the 
most part, be met by strengthening the existing quasi-autonomous regulator, the 
Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka (PUCSL). The structure of the PUCSL 
is sound, but it has been in operation for a relatively short period; therefore, 
much more needs to be done with regard to its capacity enhancement.
Investment in infrastructure has traditionally contributed to Sri Lanka’s 
growth. In the early period of 1948–77, there was insufficient investment in 
infrastructure. During 1956–77, it was the public sector that undertook most of 
the investment. A number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were established 
to produce manufactured goods, including steel, mining, and chemicals. The 
incentives for private investment were limited, and public investment was 
restricted by resource constraints. The overall investment rate was only 
15.7  percent (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2011) of GDP during this period. At the 
time, the East Asian Tiger economies were recording more than double this 
 figure. Following the liberalization of the economy in 1977, investment rose from 
14.4 percent of GDP in 1977 to 33.8 percent in 1980, with an average of 
27.6 percent during 1978–84. This was due to the ambitious public investment 
program accompanying reform, which paved the way to a liberalized economy.
By leveraging the current macroeconomic conditions and its position in a 
 fast-growing region, Sri Lanka can achieve the Mahinda Chintana goals. Yet, 
at the same time, the GoSL needs to properly manage the risks involved in 
moving ahead. As of 2009, Sri Lanka finds itself in a rare macroeconomic 
window of opportunity: its gross official external reserves have jumped to 
6 months of import cover (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2009), terms of trade 
have spiked to almost 25, and external debt and debt servicing have remained 
at comfortable levels. This performance is complemented by Sri Lanka’s prox-
imity to a fast-growing India and the interested eyes of investors and tourists 
since the civil conflict ended. There exist certain risks in this positive outlook, 
mainly slippage in fiscal consolidation, delays in the implementation of struc-
tural changes, an unexpected increase in prices of key imports, and weather-
related shocks. Nonetheless, if these internal and external conditions are 
coupled with the  necessary reforms, then the annual growth of 8 percent 
should be within reach.
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The key to unlocking this 8 percent growth is raising national savings by 
12 percent to 35 percent of GDP. National savings have increased markedly due 
to a sharp rise in private transfers (remittances); savings grew from an average of 
16.7 percent of GDP during 1985–96 to 22 and 23 percent during 1997–2004 
and 2005–10, respectively (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2011). This has been 
achieved despite the fact that the public sector has been dissaving continuously 
since 1988. Sri Lanka has been able to avert economic crises, thanks to exoge-
nous factors, such as the increase in remittances with the oil-price-led boom in 
the Middle East, the International Monetary Fund standby agreement, and gener-
ous support received as an early reformer. With its lower-middle-income country 
status, this concessional assistance will no longer be as forthcoming; and with 
fast-growing neighbors, its early reforms will no longer garner as much traction. 
The Sri Lankan economy must find its own balance and a new competitive edge 
by increasing the productivity of its workforce through investments in infrastruc-
ture and other reforms.
The increase in national savings can be shouldered by the public sector 
through reformed SOEs and by the private sector through enabling environ-
ments for public-private partnerships (PPPs). To avoid the economy overheating 
again, the government could foster an environment in which public expenditure 
does not crowd out private investment. To remedy this, the government could 
follow two parallel tracks. First, SOEs that act as key infrastructure providers, 
such as the Ceylon Electricity Board, Ceylon Petroleum Company, and National 
Water Supply and Drainage Board, should record a positive return on invest-
ment. At present, the government should aim to achieve this goal mainly through 
better management and expanding key parts of the physical infrastructure. 
Second, the government should pursue the option of PPPs more openly and 
comprehensively. This is because in the context of a constrained fiscal environ-
ment, with high deficits and debt levels, PPPs can play a fundamental role in 
attracting capital and entrepreneurship. Given the tight fiscal space, one of the 
main challenges is how to prioritize and target investment needs effectively.
An estimation of the total investments necessary in infrastructure sectors 
related to the Mahinda Chintana goals is important to assess Sri Lanka’s continu-
ous transformation into a manufacturing and service-oriented economy. The 
investments are substantial and will have to be met by both the public and 
 private sectors. To optimize alignment with the vision of the Mahinda Chintana, 
the sectors included in the analysis are energy, solid waste management 
(SWM), telecommunications, transportation, and water and sanitation. In all 
 sectors, except telecommunications, the estimated investment needs always rep-
resent total investment, including not only the initial capital injection but also 
subsequent maintenance. Table 1.2 shows the level of investment each sector 
requires. For example, energy investment needs for 2010–20 should be 
US$698 million to US$1.285 billion per year. In the telecommunications sector, 
public spending should be minimal, since around the world, the sector is largely 
driven and operated by the private sector. Calculations suggest that while all five 
sectors have made significant progress, access to quality infrastructure is still 
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uneven across rural, urban, and estate areas and may be particularly low in the 
war-affected provinces.
Based on the findings of this report, total annual investment needs for the four 
sectors range from US$2.27 billion to US$4.08 billion per year up to 2020, or 
3.84 to 6.90 percent of GDP. The calculations were based on government targets 
and baselines. Where these were not available, international relevant comparators 
were used. Going forward, a combination of investment in infrastructure stock 
and the implementation of supportive reforms will allow Sri Lanka to achieve the 
goals of the Mahinda Chintana. Using the most recent data, calculations combin-
ing conditions of physical infrastructure and investment patterns show that the 
transport sector (that is, connectivity) makes up almost two-thirds of this invest-
ment gap (table 1.2). The second-largest investment requirements are for the 
energy sector, followed by the water and sanitation and SWM sectors. The tele-
communications sector does not require any investment in a public-private sense, 
since it can be developed by the private sector. The estimates present a range of 
lower and upper boundaries that include essential investments and investments to 
place Sri Lanka close to high-middle-income countries in terms of infrastructure.
The impact of different infrastructure subsectors on economic growth is 
harder to quantify and, thus, to prioritize on an economic growth basis. Not only 
is this a function of the subsector itself, with direct and indirect consequences, but 
it may also vary from country to country. For example, in a country where manu-
facturing is highly dependent on water-intensive industries, access to adequate 
water supply may have a direct impact on economic growth. Alternatively, access 
to adequate water supply also has an indirect impact via morbidity and mortality 
of the country’s population and thus labor force. Even within a subsector there 
may be variants, as in the case of rural roads versus national road networks. In the 
case of Sri Lanka, while transport takes the larger share of investment needs, 
SWM is highly inadequate in the country. As international experience points out, 
if Sri Lanka is aiming to be an important tourist destination, it may be worth 
addressing SWM soon, together with priorities in transport.
Sri Lanka should move up the value chain in its exports by focusing on 
the most dynamic and high-performing exports and improving the logistical 
framework around them. Part of this strategy is to aggressively pursue increased 
table 1.2 investment needs, including operation and maintenance costs per Year by 
sector, 2010–20
Annual investment needs In US$ million As an average share of GDP, percent
Transport 1,471–2,463 2.49–4.16
Energy 698–1,285 1.18–2.17
Water and sanitation 75.5–154 0.13–0.26
Solid waste 25–182 0.04–0.31
Telecommunications Not applicable Not applicable
Total 2,269.5–4,084 3.84–6.90
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. 2011 GDP was used to calculate the average share of GDP.
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exports of key commodities, namely underwear for women and girls, fish (chilled 
and frozen), surgical gloves, and insulated wires. These commodities were chosen 
based on the analysis of Sri Lanka’s export dynamics, government priorities and 
incentives, industry performance, and revealed comparative advantage. To coun-
ter competitive pressure from other low-cost producers such as China and India 
in international markets, Sri Lanka needs to diversify and move up the value 
chain for its exports. However, the key hindrance is Sri Lanka’s poor logistical 
performance; the country ranks 81st out of 155 in the 2012 Logistics Performance 
Index (LPI), markedly below the rankings of other comparable middle-income 
countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as regional competitors 
such as China and India, but close to the Dominican Republic, which is ranked 
85th.
The failure to achieve dynamic competitiveness in Sri Lanka, unlike in the rest 
of South Asia, is embedded in the failure to move up the technology ladder in 
production systems. Figure 1.1 shows that unlike other factors, such as the ones 
described previously, and the quality of its labor supply, in which Sri Lanka com-
pares well with more dynamic East Asian and Latin American economies, on this 
indicator of international competitiveness, Sri Lanka behaves like a South Asian 
economy.
Many factors account for the weak demand for workers in  export-competitive, 
high-productivity jobs. Some are clearly embedded in a regulatory environment 
that is still perceived to be difficult for doing business (figure 1.2), suggestive of 
Figure 1.1 high-technology exports as a share of manufactured exports, 2001–10a 
percent
Source: World Bank 2012.
a. Data for Bangladesh are available for up to 2007. Thus, the percentage rate shown for Bangladesh is from 2001 to 2007. 
Data for the Republic of Korea are up to 2009. Thus, the percentage rate shown for Korea is from 2001 to 2009.
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the need to complete the reform agenda. While recognizing the importance of 
labor regulations on labor productivity, detailed analysis of this issue is being 
addressed elsewhere (World Bank 2011; World Bank forthcoming).
The analysis of the logistics sector highlights that the bottlenecks lie more in 
the services associated with logistics than in the physical infrastructure, as dis-
cussed in detail in chapter 2. This lagging in terms of quality is evident through 
an inefficient integration into international supply chains, an increasingly pres-
sured port, problematic roads and railways, and time-consuming customs sys-
tems. The country needs to ensure efficient integration of the international 
supply chains with the often simpler domestic component, so as to curb the 
increasing cost or delivery time. In this regard, greater use of air freight— 
especially for higher-value goods—should only be the beginning of offering 
options such as inventory management and freight forwarding. The Colombo 
port has also been able to attract significant container transshipment traffic but 
should now maintain its competitive position through the capability to provide 
quick turnaround times for vessels and containers.
In addition, Sri Lanka should move quickly to improve trucking and other 
services that remain unusually underdeveloped, given the short distances and 
limited effects of congestion. The government should also consider improving its 
extensive railway network, because the travel times are too long despite the short 
distances, thus failing to provide any efficient transfer between the railhead and 
the factory. Finally, while Sri Lankan customs authorities have partially updated 
their document processing systems with electronic filing, this and other options 
remain limited because they are mainly offered to Board of Investment affiliates, 
Figure 1.2 ease of Doing Business, 2011 (by rank)
Source: World Bank 2012.
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producing overall slow adoption. To further facilitate trade, the government 
could also establish a free trade zone and logistics hub to complement the con-
tainer port, taking the next step in modern port development. In this manner, 
Sri Lanka can target key areas of its logistical and transportation network while 
also evolving its systems and processes for more efficient operation. This would 
be much in line with the Mahinda Chintana’s goal of creating a transport hub in 
the country.
Tourism also suffers from road congestion and low travel speeds. Though the 
distances between tourist sites are relatively short, the travel times are 
 comparable to India. This may not be a major problem for the development of 
tourism for now, but it will become one as Sri Lanka gears up to realize the full 
potential of tourism in tourism destinations farther from Colombo. As the 
 eastern and northern provinces open up to foreign visitors, the ability of tour-
ism to contribute to Sri Lanka’s economic growth should greatly increase. 
The country already has the natural capital, the human capital, and the social 
capital through culture and traditions, which act as a magnet for tourists from 
around the world. Improvements in infrastructure services will only facilitate 
this process.
A historically overvalued exchange rate has also undermined Sri Lanka’s 
 competitiveness. The exchange rate has been under constant pressure because 
of persistent inflation differentials between Sri Lanka and its major competi-
tors and trading partners. Much of the pressure may be traced back to the 
impact of the budget deficit on aggregate demand. The rupee has often been 
overvalued, because the authorities have tended to use the exchange rate as 
an inflation anchor, thereby undermining competitiveness. Sri Lanka has not 
been able to offset this with an industrial policy offering subsidies due to a lack 
of fiscal space. More recently, an overvalued exchange rate has also been 
favored to facilitate debt repayment, which has become a major burden on the 
budget.
achieving medium- to long-term economic Growth: 
the role of infrastructure
In terms of composition of GDP, Sri Lanka stopped behaving like a South Asian 
economy in the mid-1990s. As illustrated in figure 1.3, there has been a  structural 
transformation of the economy, particularly during the postliberalization years. 
The share of the agricultural sector declined from 30.7 percent of GDP in 1977 
to 12.1 percent in 2011 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2011). The services sector 
increased from 40.6 to 58.5 percent during the same period. While the share of 
the industrial sector remained broadly similar, there has been a shift from inef-
ficient production of import substitutes to globally competitive exports. This is 
reflected in the sharp increase in the share of manufacturing exports in industrial 
production.
Rising shares of services and manufacturing in an economy generally 
accompany urbanization. Figure 1.4 presents a simple conceptual framework 
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Figure 1.3 sectoral shares in GDp, 1980–2011
Source: World Bank 2012.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
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that links urbanization, agglomerations, high-productivity jobs, and economic 
growth to infrastructure services. All factors influence one another in a virtu-
ous cycle, and infrastructure services are inputs to the different quadrants and 
to the virtuous cycle, as a whole. A few things should be noted. Urbanization 
and agglomerations are not the same. In effect, urbanization is a physical con-
cept, while agglomeration is an economic one. People may take advantage of 
agglomerations even if they do not live in cities per se if different ways to 
 connect and exchange information are available (for example, telecommunica-
tions, information  technology [IT]). This is already seen in the countryside of 
Sri Lanka, given its highly educated population and connectivity via mobile 
phones and Internet. Nonetheless, the face-to-face exchange of information 
is also important because it allows labor and production to learn from each 
other and apply technological advances. In this sense, urbanization facilitates 
agglomerations that enable highly productive jobs and economic growth. 
Agglomeration economies also help create internationally connected 
 cities, concentrating on production and facilitating economic growth. As else-
where in the world, agglomeration economies are present in Sri Lanka, even if 
the country is underurbanized.2 Yet, if the Mahinda Chintana’s hub con-
cept is to reach its full potential, agglomeration economies need to be further 
stimulated.
Agglomeration economies attract migrants to urban areas. Yet, it cannot be 
oversold. Migration itself can be seen as a market force/flow that, left to its 
own devices, will be largely dependent on individual choices. The combination 
of both flows (agglomeration and migration) can have a profound influence on 
the  pattern of use of natural resources and the environment, and of 
 infrastructure services, which in turn may influence migration and agglomera-
tion and ultimately the prospects for high-productivity jobs and economic 
growth. All these flows are linked to the four forms of capitals that compose 
the foundation for sustainable development: (a) man-made capital, (b) natural 
capital, (c) social capital, and (d) human capital. For instance, migration from 
rural areas and the resulting urbanization can directly or indirectly impact the 
stocks of man-made capital (for example, factories, urban infrastructure), 
natural capital (for example, watersheds, airsheds, and land), social capital 
(for example, firms and communities), and human capital (for example, the 
 qualification of the labor force), which in turn may impact the degrees of 
substitutability among the different forms of capital through factors such as 
technological change.
While Sri Lanka is a low-density urban country, or “underurbanized,” it 
should manage its urbanization process in such a way that maximizes the 
public benefits of agglomerations while mitigating its public costs, primarily 
congestion, pollution, and crime. Taking advantage of the underurbanization 
and of its  well-prepared labor force would allow the country to sustain high 
rates of economic growth in the long term. Fine-tuning economic manage-
ment and public investment to  create high-productivity jobs in the modern 
manufacturing and services sectors would allow the country to take full 
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advantage of its existing endowments. This is discussed in detail in the 
next chapter. Manufacturing’s share in GDP has been constant for 
the last three decades; and while the sector has high potential for generating 
plentiful high-productivity jobs, it has yet to deliver on its potential. This 
would mean  moving up in the value chain, as discussed. On services, the 
prospects seem to continue on the growth path of its share of GDP, as the 
sector is beginning to splinter into modern high-productivity services and will 
require infrastructure investment to allow them to grow and create more 
 high-productivity jobs.
concluding remarks
Sri Lanka has invested heavily in strengthening the supply side of the 
labor market via exceptional achievements in education, health, and, to a cer-
tain extent, access to some infrastructure services. These types of policies 
are referred to as “spatially blind” (World Bank 2009). Over the years, they 
have produced a capable labor force that has not been fully utilized in the 
country. Its  qualifications, coupled with the conflict that plagued the country 
for decades, led part of this labor supply to look for employment elsewhere. 
This, in turn, increased Sri Lanka’s reliance on remittances, which fueled final 
consumption.
The challenge for achieving high-middle-income status in the next genera-
tion lies in how to use its human, natural, man-made, and social forms of capi-
tal in a sustainable manner. Spatially blind policies have created quality 
human capital. Sri Lanka is also endowed with pristine beaches and land-
scapes, wildlife and national parks, cities that are still not severely degraded by 
pollution and overpopulation, and cultural wealth and diversity. These form 
the primary basis of its wealth. Using its human, natural, and social capital 
efficiently and sustainably and improving its man-made capital are an impor-
tant part of the equation to achieving high-middle-income status in the next 
decade.
Policy fine-tuning to increase private sector participation in the Sri Lankan 
economy and encourage investments and export orientation is a powerful 
policy tool for strengthening the demand side. Such change has been sporadic, 
but there is strong evidence that the economy has responded well to eco-
nomic reform complemented by investment in infrastructure. The end of civil 
war presents an opportunity to refocus on policy fine-tuning but also to 
 facilitate investing in infrastructure to strengthen the impact of the change in 
terms of high-productivity employment generation, agglomerations, and eco-
nomic growth. Given the high public debt and deficit and low revenue 
 generation, innovative approaches will be needed to accelerate infrastruc-
ture investment. Table 1.3 provides a summary of the challenges and sug-
gested solutions proposed in each of the background papers that form the 
basis of this report.
Economic Growth and Structural Change: The Role of Infrastructure 23
Investing in Infrastructure • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9927-9
table 1.3 summary of challenges and suggested solutions by sector or issue
Sector or issue Challenges Solutions
Macroeconomics 
(SM)
• Vulnerability to fluctuations of key 
commodity prices, for example, oil
• Low levels of productivity in the public sector
• Private investment crowded out by public 
expenditure
• Dependence on exogenous factors to 
address fiscal imbalances.
• Leverage the benefits of being located in a 
fast-growing region
• Reform SOEs to increase profitability
• Attract private investment to fund the 10% 
national savings increase
• Raise national savings to 35% to achieve 8% 
growth rate.
Planning and 
governance (SM)
• Capping of public investment at its current 
level (6–7 percent of GDP)
• Improved sector policies, regulation, 
institutional development, and capacity 
building and coordination, and better 
targeted or elimination of fiscal subsidies
• Institutional arrangements in infrastructure 
sectors lack clarity.
• Prioritization based on economic returns, MDG 
and Mahinda Chintana targets, more private 
participation, reduction in the losses of SOEs, 
export/trade and logistics, and demand/
urbanization
• Broad-based consultation on national policies
• Improve coherence of constitutional and 
legislative arrangements for the 13th 
constitutional amendment
• PUCSL should assume contract interpretation 
and conflict resolution role
• Increase independence of regulatory 
authorities, especially for bus and 
telecommunications sector.
Public-private 
partnerships (SM)
• PPP framework lacks coherence, clarity, and 
transparency
• There is limited coordination and unclear 
jurisdiction
• The processes and procedures are 
complicated.
• Clear regulatory environment, policy 
statement, and guidelines
• Better interagency coordination
• Human and institutional capacity requires 
improvement.
Trade and logistics 
(SM)
• Competitive pressure from international 
low-cost producers
• Poor integration of international and 
domestic supply chains
• Cumbersome document processing and 
customs procedures
• Poor logistical performance.
• Diversify into higher-value-added 
manufacturing
• Move up the value chain in key exports
• Fully computerize document processing and 
other customs procedures
• Improve logistical services, focusing on air 
freight, trucking, and port services.
Urbanization (ML) • Low and stagnant urbanization
• Urbanization is concentrated around 
Colombo
• Low quality of services in small towns.
• Adopt a demand-driven strategy, recognizing 
agglomeration potential
• Provide universal access to essential services 
through “spatially blind” policies
• Improve tax collection and regulation schemes.
Transport (SML) • No multimodal transport system
• Bandaranaike International Airport lacks a 
domestic terminal
• Road network is in poor condition
• Roads are highly congested.
• Establish agency for intermodal concerns
• Establish lead transport ministry
• Improve traffic management and control.
Energy (SML) • High dependence on oil
• Difficult to obtain future coal financing
• Hydropower largely exploited
• High levels of indoor pollution, especially 
in poor areas
• PUCSL operational in power but not in 
petroleum.
• Diversification of power generation mix
• Unbundle functions of Ceylon Electricity Board 
and restructure its long-term debt
• Enhance efficiency on the supply and demand 
side
• Render PUCSL fully operational
• Establish energy planning and policy analysis 
function of Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy 
Authority.
table continues next page
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notes
 1. Urbanization was recalculated at 40 percent when the definition of urban areas was 
expanded to include growing urban areas and emerging urban centers (Lall and 
Astrup 2009). Yet, the Western Province has about 28 percent of the country’s popu-
lation, and not all of it is located in urban areas. It is unlikely that other urban areas 
can explain the difference between the official and recalculated figure of urbaniza-
tion. More important, however, is that given the country’s indicators (for example, 
education level), one would expect urbanization comparable to the countries listed in 
table 1.1.
 2. The literature on economic geography is vast and novel, including Fujita and Thisse 
(2002) and World Bank (2009).
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table 1.3 summary of challenges and suggested solutions by sector or issue (continued)
Sector or issue Challenges Solutions
Water and sanitation 
(SM)
• Inadequate institutional and technical 
support in rural areas
• Large financial losses due to nonrevenue 
water, uncollected revenue, and tariffs 
below cost
• Block tariffs and subsidies fail to reach the 
poor.
• PUCSL needs a clear mandate for the sector
• Revision of institutional arrangements for the 
sector is needed
• Revision of tariff structure and better targeting 
of subsidies is needed.
Solid waste 
management 
(SML)
• Poor fiscal health of local authorities
• High waste collection inefficiency
• Inadequate disposal due to lack of sanitary 
landfills
• Limited public and political support.
• Create local SWM departments with heads and 
budgetary line items
• Improve management of existing resources
• Establish committees to develop regional 
landfills
• Introduce cost-recovery mechanisms and cross 
subsidies.
Telecommunications 
(SM)
• Mobile phone penetration lags behind 
other middle-income countries
• Access to Internet services is limited
• Large digital divide (urban-rural; Western 
Province-rest of country).
• Simplify taxation and licensing regimes
• Create a transparent mechanism for the regular 
review of interconnection regimes
• Develop Internet access in rural areas and 
improve domestic backbone connectivity.
Note: S = short run; M = medium run; L = long run; GDP = gross domestic product; MDG = Millennium Development Goal; PPP = public-private 
partnership; PUCSL = the Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka; SOEs = state-owned enterprises; SWM = solid waste management.
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The Hub Concept, Competitive Export, 
and Dynamic Cities as Drivers of High 
Economic Growth
The challenge for achieving high-middle-income status in the next generation as 
implied by the Mahinda Chintana’s hub concept lies in how to efficiently and 
sustainably use Sri Lanka’s existing assets—its human, man-made, natural, and 
social capital. Spatially blind policies (including infrastructure) have created 
quality human capital; yet, domestic markets are unable to fully absorb it. 
Sri Lanka is also endowed with pristine beaches and landscapes, wildlife and 
national parks, cities that are still not severely degraded by pollution and over-
population, and cultural wealth and diversity; yet, the country is still to take off 
as a major tourist destination. This diverse capital foundation forms the core of 
the country’s wealth. Using its human, natural, and social capital efficiently and 
sustainably and improving its man-made capital are an important part of the 
equation to achieving high-middle-income status in the next decade.
Achieving the Mahinda Chintana’s goals depends on improving the infrastruc-
ture (Department of National Planning 2010). This is well recognized by the 
Mahinda Chintana’s hub concept that focuses on naval, aviation, energy, com-
mercial, and knowledge hubs. The Mahinda Chintana has a chapter devoted to 
the transportation hub. As indicated in figure 1.4 in chapter 1, infrastructure 
services, particularly those that improve connectivity through better transport, 
power, and communications (typical network infrastructures), play center stage 
in the nexus of urbanization, agglomeration, high-productivity jobs, and eco-
nomic growth. This includes local, regional, and international connectivity. 
Sri Lanka needs greater emphasis on operating, maintaining, integrating, and 
planning infrastructure assets to support high-value-added exports and facilitate 
urbanization. Investments should reflect consideration for their role in integrated 
service delivery. This is discussed in more detail in the next two chapters, which 
cover infrastructure cross-sectoral issues, specific infrastructure subsectors, plan-
ning, and regulations.
c h a p t e r  2
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The two principal drivers of sustained high economic growth and productive 
employment are (a) international competitiveness that results in export-led 
growth and (b) urbanization that facilitates productive economic activity. It is 
argued that these two drivers of economic growth, in turn, depend crucially on 
efficient infrastructure that shortens the international supply chain, on the one 
hand, and brings about agglomeration dividends, on the other. Supporting 
export-led growth means enabling private enterprises to compete at higher levels 
of the product value chain. This requires significant improvements in the provi-
sion of infrastructure services, not simply investments in new infrastructure 
assets. Moreover, to realize the Mahinda Chintana’s vision of capitalizing on 
regional economic opportunities and developing cities as commercial and 
regional hubs for growth, the country will likely experience rapid urbanization. 
While agglomeration economies do not necessarily depend on physical  proximity, 
Sri Lanka needs better infrastructure to support urbanization and agglomeration 
economies. Urbanization near 40 percent can facilitate a shift toward higher 
productivity employment but only with supporting infrastructure services. This 
chapter focuses specifically on these medium- and long-term drivers that are 
likely to facilitate long-term sustained economic growth.
trade and logistics
Trade Competitiveness, Services, and Logistics
Sri Lanka’s exports face a crucial challenge. Increasingly, countries trade in stages 
of production or along supply chains that compel movement up the supply chain 
toward higher-value-added activities in order to stave off competition from labor-
abundant economies such as China and India. This report argues that retaining a 
fluid comparative advantage requires modern and efficient logistics including 
trade-facilitating infrastructure. The discussion in this section is organized to iden-
tify the emerging export priorities in Sri Lanka and the logistics and infrastructure 
improvements needed to realize the growth potential of the priority activities.
Several methods were used to assess the trade and logistics in Sri Lanka. The 
methodology employed to identify export priorities and infrastructure needs 
takes into consideration several factors such as Sri Lanka’s export dynamics, the 
government of Sri Lanka’s (GoSL’s) export priorities and the incentives regime 
supporting these priorities, and a review of Sri Lanka’s industry performance and 
priorities indicated by revealed comparative advantage of the country’s exports. 
The approaches are then combined into a simple ranking of export activities. 
Another filter used in identifying priority activities is the likely threat from com-
peting economies. Sri Lanka’s trade logistics and infrastructure are then evaluated 
in the light of export potential of priority sectors.
Assessment of Competiveness
A ranking of dynamic exports is done employing the International Trade Centre’s 
Trade Map framework.1 The analysis allows categorization of Sri Lankan manu-
facture as champions (dynamic exports whose share is rising in an expanding 
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world market), niche products (whose share is growing in a stable world market), 
underachievers (whose share is declining in a growing world market), and losers 
(whose world market for these products is declining). The two right-hand-side 
quadrants of figure 2.1 provide the champion and niche exports of Sri Lanka: 
underwear, gloves and mittens, tea, several rubber-based products (natural rub-
ber, tires and inner tubes, surgical gloves), and diamond cutting; and there has 
been rapid recent growth in modern services (shipping, telecommunications, and 
computer and information).
Government priorities and incentives yield results different from those dis-
cussed previously. The GoSL emphasizes export diversification to reduce overreli-
ance on a few products and the move toward high-value-added products through 
branding and segmenting (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2008, 2009). The priority 
sectors presented in the 2011–15 Exports Development Board Strategic Plan are 
listed in table 2.1 and described in more detail subsequently. This selection 
reflects the views and objectives of the core institutions, most notably the Export 
Development Board and the Board of Investment (BOI)2 (see Chan and Sieber 
for a discussion of the incentives offered to the government priority sectors).
An industry review yields yet another result. Another list of priorities has 
been compiled based on output and productivity measures of both tradable 
and nontradable sectors.3 These products constitute 90 percent of the total 
industrial output and include several commodity groups already discussed in 
the previous sections.
Figure 2.1 international trade centre’s trade map Framework applied to sri lanka manufacturing
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Finally, revealed comparative advantage is another methodology used by the 
World Bank to identify priority exports. It uses the World Bank’s World Integrated 
Trade Solution (WITS) software and measures how large the share of tea, for 
example, is in Sri Lanka’s exports relative to the share of tea exports in total 
world trade. If this ratio is bigger than 1, it means that Sri Lanka is exporting a 
larger share of tea than the rest of the world and, thus, has a revealed compara-
tive advantage in the production of tea.
Unsurprisingly, Sri Lanka has the largest revealed comparative advantage in 
the production of coconut fibers and waste, tea, and copra. Tea has moved from 
third place in 2004 to first in 2009. The export potential in the tire subsector is 
also as substantial as the production of precious and semiprecious stones and 
apparel. Knitted and crocheted underwear and brassieres have been able to con-
siderably increase their competitiveness, whereas shirts and blouses for both men 
and women have lost out, almost halving their revealed comparative advantage. 
Despite their small average export share, spices and animal feed are also included 
in the priority list.4
Summary of Sector Priorities
The four rankings can be combined to get an overall ranking of export priorities. 
The index for the overall ranking simply adds up to the highest ranking of each 
approach. The priority export activities are deemed to be those that have an 
aggregate score of 4 or 3. Table 2.2 summarizes the results. Apparel (mainly 
underwear, knitted goods, and swimwear), coconut oil, fish, information technol-
ogy (IT) and IT-enabled services, precious and semiprecious stones, natural rub-
ber, and rubber-based goods (surgical gloves and tires), port and port-related 
services, and tea reveal themselves to be the priority export activities.
Sri Lankan producers should move away from low-value-added activities that 
put them in direct competition with other low-cost producers, such as China, 
Bangladesh, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Vietnam. The data show 
that Sri Lanka has been losing its competitive advantage in low-value apparel 
products. It is thus crucial that manufacturing diversify into higher-value-added 
table 2.1 priority sectors Based on Government priorities
Rank Sector
1 Apparel
2 Tea
3 Rubber and rubber-based products
4 Diamonds, gems, and jewelry
5 ICT/BPO/KPO
6 Food and other beverages
7 Spices and allied products
Source: Sri Lanka Exports Development Board October 2010.
Note: BPO = business process outsourcing; ICT = information and communication technology; KPO = knowledge process 
outsourcing.
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table 2.2 sector prioritization screening
Export 
dynamics
Govt. 
priorities
 Industry 
review
Revealed 
comparative 
advantage Count
Brassieres, corsets, and so on 1 1 1 1 4
Gloves, mittens, and mitts (knitted or crocheted) 1 1 1 1 4
Swimwear 1 1 1 1 4
Tea 1 1 1 1 4
Tires and inner tubes 1 1 1 1 4
Underwear and nightwear, women’s or girls’ 1 1 1 1 4
Animal fat, vegetable oils, partly processed, 
including coconut oil 1 1 1 3
Fish (frozen, excluding fillets) 1 1 1 3
Hard rubber, and so on 1 1 1 3
IT and IT-enabled services 1 1 1 3
Natural rubber, excluding latex 1 1 1 3
Other pneumatic tires 1 1 1 3
Port-related services 1 1 1 3
Precious or semiprecious stones 1 1 1 3
Suits, dresses, skirts, and so on, women’s or girls’ 
(knit) 1 1 1 3
Surgical gloves 1 1 1 3
Trousers, shorts, women’s or girls’ (textiles) 1 1 1 3
T-shirts, singlets, and other vests (knit) 1 1 1 3
Underwear, nightwear, and so on, men’s or boys’ 
(knit) 1 1 1 3
Animal feed (bran, sharps, other residuals) 1 1 2
Coconut fiber or waste 1 1 2
Copra 1 1 2
Diamonds, excluding industrial 1 1 2
Fruits and nuts 1 1 2
Industrial diamonds 1 1 2
Manufacture of ceramics 1 1 2
Spices (except pepper and pimento) 1 1 2
Vegetables 1 1 2
Casting of metals 1 1
Domestic transport 1 1
Floriculture 1 1
Flour of wheat or of meslin 1 1
Insulated wire, and so on 1 1
Manufacture of tobacco products 1 1
Manufacture of basic iron and steel 1 1
Manufacture of beverages 1 1
Manufacture of dairy products 1 1
Manufacture of electronic motors, generators, 
and so on 1 1
Manufacture of other chemical products, 
mainly fertilizer 1 1
table continues next page
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products such as insulated wires and electrical parts and that the GoSL also 
 support service sectors, such as transportation-related services (port and airport) 
and tourism. In particular, the last two subsectors (in conjunction with IT and 
IT-enabled services) have the potential to transform Sri Lanka into an export-led, 
service-based economy. Any investments in the infrastructure and logistic ser-
vices needed to develop these sectors should be prioritized in any medium-term 
development program.5
Rising Share of Services and Sustained High Growth
Services are splitting into traditional and modern. The case for services as the 
new engine of growth rests on the view that services are splintering into two 
types. Traditional services are characterized by low technology and low produc-
tivity. High-technology, “information age” services have high productivity and 
still do not fully tap international demand (Bhagwati 1984a, 1984b, 1987). 
Modern services thus are tradable and enjoy the agglomeration effects  previously 
associated with tradable goods only. This requires a better understanding of 
what constitutes modern services and their role in the economies of South Asia.
Recently, Sri Lanka outperformed other South Asian countries in the provi-
sion of modern services (World Bank 2009a, 2009b). Modern services comprise 
banking, insurance, financial, and communication-related services (Ghani 
2010). Traditional services comprise trade, hotels and restaurants, personal, cul-
tural and recreational, community and social, transportation, storage,  real-estate 
dwelling, and government and public administration services. Using this com-
position of traditional and modern services, during 2000–06, Sri Lanka outper-
formed the rest of South Asia, as illustrated in table 2.3. It experienced a much 
higher growth rate in modern services compared to traditional services.
Exporting Services and Some Challenges6
Services have an important role in raising the overall productivity level and wages 
in the economy and, thus, contribute to sustained high growth. Yet, impediments 
table 2.2 sector prioritization screening (continued)
Export 
dynamics
Govt. 
priorities
 Industry 
review
Revealed 
comparative 
advantage Count
Manufacture of plastic products 1 1
Manufacture of structural metal products, tanks, 
and so on 1 1
Parts, electric panels, and so on 1 1
Printed matter 1 1
Sawmilling and planning of wood 1 1
Tourism 1 1
Wholesale and retail 1 1
Source: Chan and Sieber.
Note: IT = information technology.
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to the growth of modern services will have to be removed and their capacity to 
generate jobs will need to be enhanced. For example, the likely determinants of 
success in computer and business services are the quality of infrastructure (elec-
trification, availability of the Internet and its bandwidth, telephony), education 
(secondary and tertiary workers), and facility with the English language.7 With a 
large number of broadband and telephone subscribers, a high rate of electrifica-
tion, and a large number of English speakers, Sri Lanka is comfortably positioned 
to do well in export of computer and business services. Table 2.4 shows that 
Sri Lanka outperforms the rest of South Asia on Internet bandwidth and comes 
second to Pakistan in international call traffic; however, when compared to 
Malaysia and Thailand, Sri Lanka lags behind when it comes to Internet band-
width and the information and communication technology price basket. The 
literature8 also identifies better integration of areas with low productivity and 
traditional skills with those that have higher productivity and modern skills as 
key for change. This will require removing impediments in the mobility of labor 
and capital among regions. To take advantage of global trade in services, Sri Lanka 
should take a more proactive, forward-looking stance in international negotia-
tions on traded services. This will require some domestic liberalization of the 
services regime to ensure better access to international markets for the regions’ 
traded services.
Logistics and Infrastructure
Sri Lanka’s overall Logistics Performance Index (LPI) has improved from 
being ranked 137 out of 154 in 2009 to 81 out of 155 in 2012. This ranking 
is composed of six subcomponents: customs, infrastructure, international ship-
ments, logistics competence, tracking and tracing, and timeliness. Ranking is 
low because of the poor perception regarding clearance by border control 
agencies, most notably customs. The logistics services are also rated poorly 
because of limited capacity to track and trace consignments, as illustrated in 
table 2.5. Most notably, Sri Lanka’s ranking for all six categories is well below 
that of other comparable middle-income countries, such as Indonesia or the 
Philippines. It also has a significantly lower LPI than its regional competitors 
Bangladesh,9 China, and India but is close to the Dominican Republic, which 
is ranked 85th.
A comprehensive analysis of the relationship between competitiveness and 
logistics and infrastructure requirements is presented in Chan and Sieber. 
table 2.3 Difference in the Growth rates of modern and traditional services
Bangladesh 3 Percentage points higher
India 5.5 Percentage points higher
Nepal No difference
Pakistan 4 Percentage points higher
Sri Lanka 13 Percentage points higher
Source: Adapted from Ghani 2010.
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table 2.4 comparison of telecommunications infrastructure
Internet bandwidth 
(bits per person) 2011a
Voice (international calls traffic in minutes 
per person)b
ICT price basket 
2011
Bangladesh 146.2 6.4 (2006) 6.5
India 546.1 27.64 (2009) 3.8
Nepal 137.8 17.62 (2006) 27.2
Pakistan 427.7 37.89 (2010) 8.2
Sri Lanka 783.5 34.21 (2006) 1.8
Thailand 2,517.3 13.46 (2006) 3.4
Malaysia 6,497.2 110.7 (2008) 1.8
Source: International Telecommunications Union 2012a, 2012b.
Note: ICT = information and communication technology. The ICT price basket is composed of the prices for fixed telephone, mobile cellular, and 
fixed broadband services and is computed as a percentage of countries’ average gross national income per capita.
a. ITU 2012a. 
b. ITU 2012b. 
table 2.5 components of logistics performance index, 2010 and 2012
Customs Infrastructure
International 
shipments
Logistics 
competence
Tracking 
tracing Timelines
Panel A: score
Bangladesh 2.33 2.49 2.99 2.44 2.64 3.46
China 3.16 (3.25) 3.54 (3.61) 3.31 (3.46) 3.49 (3.47) 3.55 (3.52) 3.91 (3.8)
Dominican 
Republic 2.51 (2.53) 2.34 (2.61) 2.59 (2.83) 2.42 (2.74) 3.17 (2.49) 3.85 (2.97)
India 2.70 (2.77) 2.91 (2.87) 3.13 (2.98) 3.16 (3.14) 3.14 (3.09) 3.61 (3.58)
Indonesia 2.43 (2.53) 2.54 (2.54) 2.82 (2.97) 2.47 (2.85) 2.77 (3.12) 3.46 (3.61)
Philippines 2.67 (2.63) 2.57 (2.8) 3.4 (2.97) 2.95 (3.14) 3.29 (3.3) 3.83 (3.3)
Singapore 4.02 (4.10) 4.22 (4.15) 3.86 (3.99) 4.12 (4.07) 4.15 (4.07) 4.23 (4.39)
Sri Lanka 1.96 (2.58) 1.88 (2.5) 2.48 (3) 2.09 (2.8) 2.23 (2.65) 2.98 (2.9)
Panel B: ranking 
Bangladesh 88 71 60 95 91 69
China 31 (30) 25 (26) 26 (23) 28 (28) 28 (31) 35 (30)
Dominican 
Republic 62 (76) 89 (77) 106 (73) 98 (76) 47 (110) 38 (100)
India 51 (52) 46 (56) 45 (54) 38 (38) 52 (54) 55 (44)
Indonesia 71 (75) 68 (85) 79 (57) 91 (62) 80 (52) 70 (42)
Philippines 53 (67) 63 (62) 19 (56) 46 (39) 43 (39) 41 (69)
Singapore 2 (1) 4 (2) 1 (2) 6 (6) 6 (6) 14 (1)
Sri Lanka 142 (71) 137 (89) 117 (50) 141 (68) 141 (68) 124 (110)
Sources: International Finance Corporation and World Bank Group 2010, 2012.
Note: 2012 data are represented in parentheses. Bangladesh data for 2012 are not available.
The work uses published information and data to analyze the key features and 
performance of logistics systems and important characteristics of export indus-
tries of Sri Lanka. The study follows the guidelines promulgated in the World 
Bank’s Trade and Transport Facilitation Assessment toolkit (World Bank 2010b), 
adjusting the application to fit the resources available to conduct this study. 
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It thus goes beyond the LPI, which at times can be biased against certain coun-
tries, given its reliance on perceptions.
To illustrate the role of infrastructure in strengthening export competitiveness, 
the study focused on four commodities and one service—underwear for women 
and girls, surgical gloves, fish (chilled and frozen), insulated wires or cables, and 
tourism—selected from the list of priority sectors discussed above. A second 
round of more detailed interviews was conducted to provide an in-depth analysis 
of the supply chains identified during the initial interviews. An assessment of the 
supply chains of the four products and tourism reveals the following regarding 
the drivers of competitiveness:
•	 The evaluation of the supply chains for the selected commodities provides a 
broad overview of the logistics capabilities of Sri Lanka. The logistics services 
used in the domestic component of supply chains for imports and exports are 
relatively basic. In the case of garments, they are limited to a transfer through 
the port or airport, a relatively short movement by road to and from the  factory 
and storage of inputs at the factory, and exports at the nominated forwarder’s 
warehouse. The latter may include consolidation. The major cost incurred for 
inputs is the transfer through the port. For exports, the buyer assumes the cost 
for the port.
•	 The trade in women’s underwear represents a move up the garment sector’s 
value pyramid, but the products are not very time sensitive due to infrequent 
changes in styles. Given the high-value density of the product, a reduction in 
delivery time through the use of airfreight offers significant savings in terms of 
inventory-related costs. Sri Lanka’s airfreight connectivity is reasonable, given 
the size of its economy and the limited amount of tourism recently. Sri Lanka 
has also been able to remain competitive in the traditional export of low-value 
garments owing to favorable freight rates and delivery times to Europe and the 
United States.
•	 The success of the garment trade has been largely due to improvements in the 
logistics of the garment trade facilitated through the BOI. As the order cycles 
in the global garment trade have decreased, it has been incumbent on export-
ing nations to reduce the time for clearance of both inputs and products and 
to transport these in containers to and from the garment factory. This has been 
particularly important for underwear, which uses a large number of imported 
inputs often shipped as loose container load cargo, and for traditional low-
value garments with their tighter deadlines.
•	 The trade in surgical gloves is not sensitive to order cycles. However, a tighten-
ing of the inbound supply chain was necessary owing to the growing product 
diversity and the increasing proportion of imported inputs required for the 
new categories of gloves. These supply chains are largely managed by suppliers 
who also benefit from the connectivity between the Port of Colombo and 
ports elsewhere in Asia.
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•	 The trade in insulated wire between Sri Lanka and India is dependent on 
favorable trade agreements and lower manufacturing costs that offset the addi-
tional transport costs. The improvement in India’s port performance and 
improvements in the quality and availability of regional shipping services has 
allowed this trade to continue even as Sri Lanka’s advantage in terms of pro-
duction costs has decreased. If this trade is to continue, it will require further 
improvements in customs procedures and in the efficiency of the port and 
handling of local shipping.
•	 The ability to increase trade in frozen seafood exports is highly dependent 
on the ability to control the quality of the product from the time it is caught 
to the time it is loaded in the container for export. Beyond this point, the 
international logistics are well managed, and there are no significant problems 
with quality control. The critical component of the supply chain is the cold 
chain between the fishing boat and the processing plant. At present, this is not 
well managed and prevents the trade from growing significantly.
•	 With regard to tourism, the main bottleneck involves the movement of tour-
ists by road. However, despite the congestion and low travel speeds, the dis-
tances between tourist sites are relatively short and travel times are comparable 
to those in India. This may, thus, not be a major problem for the development 
of tourism for now but will become one as Sri Lanka gears up to realize the full 
potential of tourism in tourism destinations farther from Colombo.
Future Export Competitiveness and Infrastructure
Sri Lanka’s major exporters have been successful in moving to higher-value 
exports. They have focused on niche markets of products with relatively long 
order cycles, so that there is enough time for procuring imported inputs. In the 
future, it will be necessary to expand the product line and, at the same time, to 
shorten the order cycles. For instance, underwear manufacturers and exporters 
are already increasing their use of airfreight to reduce delivery times. They have 
also been able to maintain their competitive advantage in the production of 
lower-value exports through the use of available raw materials and the fast deliv-
ery of finished products. It will be necessary to change the mix of local and 
imported inputs to diversify the products more so as to maintain a competitive 
edge. This will require more sophisticated supply networks.
Manufacturers will have to significantly improve their logistics. The challenge 
lies primarily in the international component of their supply chains, since the 
domestic component is relatively simple and does not add much to the cost or 
delivery time. The international component needs to be restructured to increase 
the value of the delivered product. This includes capturing value-added logistics 
services that can be provided locally and improving the quality of the imported 
inputs to production.
Going forward, greater export competitiveness will require improving all 
components of trade logistics, including trade facilitation (for example,  improving 
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performance of customs and border agencies). On infrastructure, the following 
was found:
•	 Air cargo: Air freight is an increasingly important mode for Sri Lankan exports, 
especially for higher-value goods and more time-sensitive exports. The high 
air cargo costs need to be reduced by promoting greater competition that, in 
turn, requires attracting more scheduled cargo carriers (currently, there are 
five: China Airlines, Etihad Airways, Malaysia Airlines, Qatar Airways, and 
Sri Lankan Airlines, down from eight in 2000). Sri Lankan Airlines is the larg-
est cargo operator, accounting for 60 percent of the cargo movement, and is 
the sole ground handling agent at Bandaranaike International Airport.
•	 Ports: The success of Colombo Port in attracting container transshipment traf-
fic has been an important source of competitive advantage for low- to medium-
value exports. That is, it is important not only for generating employment and 
return on the infrastructure investment but also for improving market access 
for Sri Lanka’s exports. Transshipment attracts larger vessels and increases the 
frequency of shipping services to the markets in which Sri Lankan exporters 
compete. So far, the port has been successful in maintaining its market share of 
South Asian traffic. However, the port faces growing competition not only 
from the major hubs, for example, Dubai, Kelang (Malaysia), Salalah, Singapore, 
and Tanjung Pelepas (Malaysia), but also from increasingly efficient Indian 
ports, such as Chennai and Nhava Sheva.
Colombo’s ability to maintain its competitive position depends on the 
capability to provide quick turnaround for vessels and containers. In this 
regard, it has only been partially successful. The privately operated terminal, 
the South Asia Gateway Terminal, has demonstrated the gains in efficiency 
and quality of service that can be achieved through private terminal 
 operations. However, the Sri Lanka Port Authority has been slow to take 
advantage of this. As a result, the total capacity of the port has not been able 
to keep up with demand. Because investment in new facilities has been 
delayed, congestion has become a problem. This drives away transshipment 
business to Nhava Sheva, which will then be difficult to recover. The new 
facilities being  constructed in South Harbor will provide needed capacity and 
increase  competition among terminal operators. It is important that these 
facilities provide the same level of service as the South Asia Gateway 
Terminal. This will allow the port to compete effectively for transshipment 
business, despite growing traffic levels and more direct vessel calls at India’s 
major ports.
•	 Road and rail transport: There is significant competiveness eroding the current 
state of both the road and rail infrastructure. This includes the congested road 
access to the Port of Colombo, which delays the movement of trucks to and 
from the port and turnaround in port. There is also a problem related to the 
quality of the trucking services, since the industry is dominated by independent 
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operators of older trucks. Their impact on trade competitiveness will increase 
as Sri Lanka diversifies the export mix and accelerates the rate of export growth.
•	 Telecommunications: Export of computer and business services depends cru-
cially on how well the telecommunications sector performs. In Sri Lanka’s 
case, the main telecommunications sector issues concern regulation and policy 
rather than large new investment.
Urbanization
Dynamic Cities
Different from most economies, between 1960 and 2011, income per capita 
in Sri Lanka quintupled without a commensurate expansion of its urban 
population. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 provide snapshots of the relationship between 
urbanization and economic progress in selected developing countries. The 
sizes of the bubbles represent country population. Thus, China and India are 
represented by the largest bubbles. As  cities catalyze agglomerations, they are 
important engines for economic growth. In 1960, the selected Latin American 
countries were fairly distant from South Asian and East Asian economies not 
only in terms of urban population as a percentage of the total population of 
a given country but also in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. 
Figure 2.2 snapshot of the state of Urbanization, selected countries, 1960
Sources: gapminder.org 2012; World Bank 2012a.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; PPP = public-private partnership.
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Half a century later, the situation is significantly different. The Republic of 
Korea and Malaysia are not only as urbanized as Latin American countries 
but are also richer. The remaining East Asian economies are not significantly 
far from Latin American countries. Yet, South Asian countries lag behind on 
both variables. In the case of Sri Lanka, this may have been exacerbated by a 
definitional change in the early 1990s (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2011). 
Even if we recalculate the 2011 urban population to be 40 percent of the 
total (Lall and Astrup 2009), Sri Lanka would still remain clustered with 
other South Asian countries instead of closely following its middle-income 
country competitors.
Even though Sri Lanka has recently experienced reasonable economic 
growth, urbanization at 15 percent has remained low compared to 40  percent 
in countries with similar income per capita and long-term economic growth. 
This leads to the conclusion that the vast majority of the educated labor force 
of Sri Lanka live in rural areas and small rural towns and are engaged in rela-
tively low- productivity agricultural and service jobs. Urbanization of about 40 
percent is needed to move this workforce to higher productivity employment. 
Well-managed urbanization with proper infrastructure services results in 
 agglomeration economies in the urban centers. This results in higher returns to 
investment in manufacturing and modern services, making them more attrac-
tive to private investment. This, then, helps to balance both sides of the labor 
market equation, that is, a well-educated labor force employed in well-paying 
Figure 2.3 snapshot of the state of Urbanization, selected countries, 2011
Sources: gapminder.org 2012; World Bank 2012a.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; PPP = public-private partnership.
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modern service and manufacturing sector jobs, which in turn will result in 
sustained high economic growth to double the GDP per capita to more than 
US$4,000, as envisaged in the Mahinda Chintana.
The Current Situation10
Urbanization in Sri Lanka is predominantly a coastal phenomenon. More than 
25 percent of the Sri Lanka population live within 1 kilometer of the coast, a 
strip of land that constitutes only 5 percent of the country’s area. As many as 41 
cities, out of the 51 cities having a population of over 50,000, are located in 
proximity to the coast (Asian Development Bank 2010). The highest concentra-
tion of urban population is along the west coast, where a contiguous urban belt 
encircles Colombo as the major urban agglomeration in the country and spreads 
north and south (National Physical Planning Department 2006). The size distri-
bution of Sri Lanka’s cities is skewed toward small cities—there are only 16 cities 
with a population of more than 100,000; three cities with a population between 
100,000 and 500,000; and one, the capital city Colombo, with a population of 
more than 650,000. Based on the 2001 Census definition of urban areas, only 
15 percent of Sri Lanka’s population live in urban areas, suggesting that Sri Lanka 
is underurbanized relative to its level of income (US$2,800 in 2012).11
While the Western Province, where Colombo Metropolitan Region is located, 
covers only about 6 percent of the total land area of the country and has 
28  percent of its population, it now accounts for about 45 percent of national 
GDP and 65 percent of industrial value added. Mainly due to the Colombo 
Metropolitan region, industrial value added per worker and wages in the Western 
Province are on an average twice that in all other provinces of the country 
(World Bank 2010a). However, Sri Lanka’s unbalanced pattern of growth is not 
uncommon in the Asia region, and that economic density is expected to rise 
further as the country transitions to upper-middle-income status.12
The pattern of urbanization described above is about to change. With the end 
of civil unrest, the government estimates that urbanization will accelerate to 3 to 
4 percent per year, and by 2020, about 60 percent of the Sri Lankan population 
will be living in cities (Ministry of Finance and Planning 2010).13 As Sri Lanka 
urbanizes, it will amplify the transformation from a rural-based economy to one 
based on manufacturing and services. While rapid urbanization can bring about 
significant benefits and economic development, the expected increase in urban-
ization calls for effective urban management practices to be adopted across the 
whole country. Sri Lanka needs to ensure that the benefits of agglomeration 
economies are maximized while the country mitigates the problems associated 
with urbanization elsewhere in South Asia and other regions.
Sri Lankan cities are better served compared to other South Asian cities. 
They are endowed with world-class cultural and environmental assets of strate-
gic importance and, therefore, can act as magnets to tourism. Yet, a significant 
part of the urban population lives in underserved settlements. Sri Lanka’s 
underserved settlements tend to be relatively small in size and scattered within 
cities. In Colombo city alone, about half the population is estimated to live in 
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underserved settlements with limited access to services. The urban poor suffer 
from social exclusion, high vulnerability to environmental hazards, and limited 
access to basic services. Only 21 percent of households within Colombo’s low-
income settlements have individual sanitary facilities, while the remaining 
households depend on communal latrines (World Bank 2012a). During the 
heavy rains and floods of the monsoon season, health problems due to water-
borne diseases such as dengue affect the urban poor, mostly in the form of 
income loss due to illness and medical costs. In addition, firewood is widely used 
for cooking among the poor, indicating a potential indoor air-pollution problem. 
Urban poverty is particularly widespread in the Province of Sabaragamuwa in 
the Southwest, where the mean per capita monthly consumption expenditure 
is only 70 percent of that in the Western Province, compared to over 90 percent 
for other provinces. These are all early warning signs that Sri Lankan cities may 
not be prepared to deal with a high influx of migrants.14
The Mahinda Chintana Vision for Sri Lanka Urban Development
Sri Lanka needs competitive and dynamic cities to reach its aspiration of becom-
ing an upper-middle-income economy and a global hub by 2016. Accelerating 
growth to meet the aspirations of US$4,000 per capita GDP envisioned in the 
Mahinda Chintana will require a major shift in the structure of the economy, and 
a diversification of the economy into higher-value-added products. Such a pro-
found economic transformation calls for a massive leap forward in the productiv-
ity and competitiveness of Sri Lankan cities. As noted, the service sector has 
started diversifying into modern, export-oriented activities, such as IT and busi-
ness services, which highly benefit from the agglomeration economies character-
izing urban areas. Other service sectors with large growth potential—port-related 
services and tourism—are also highly dependent on the competitiveness of urban 
areas for growth, and the country’s most dynamic manufacturing exports—
value-added apparel, rubber-based products (tires and surgical gloves), and agro-
processing (teas and spices)—are either urban based or benefit from proximity 
to urban areas (World Bank 2012a).
The Mahinda Chintana’s vision for Sri Lanka’s “Cities of the Future” is to 
 create a system of interconnected regional growth poles. While the government’s 
expectation on the achievement of balanced regional development has not yet 
been realized, with the ending of civil unrest there is a strong potential for devel-
oping regional growth centers to complement and reinforce the positive growth 
contribution of the Colombo metropolitan region. To this end, the government 
plans to develop a systematic network of cities linked with each other and with 
the rest of the world—a vision that will be materialized by the formation of four 
metro regions (MRs): 
1. Colombo MR (Colombo metro city, Gampaha, and Kalutara) 
2. North-central MR (Anuradhapura, Dambulla, Trincomalee, and Polonnaruwa)
3. Southern MR (Hambantota) 
4. Eastern MR (Ampara and Batticoloa). 
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Each metro region will consist of principal cities and secondary cities. Principal 
cities will be endowed with high-quality urban services, and all cities will be inter-
connected, enabling each region to grow and evolve as an integrated system. Cities 
located within the north and east will be given priority to develop under the 
Reawakening of North and East programs, which are now being implemented, 
with a total planned investment expenditure of SL Rs 500  billion until 2012 
(European Institute for Asian Studies 2011). Map 2.1 illustrates the Mahinda 
Chintana’s cities of the future vision.
The GoSL recently launched an ambitious program of economic and 
 physical regeneration for metro Colombo and has taken steps to establish a 
metropolitan coordination agency (the Colombo Metropolitan City Corporation) 
to address the complex challenges of metropolitan management. With the end 
of the conflict, the GoSL has given priority to the revitalization of regional 
economies outside the Western Province by launching a number of regional 
development programs aimed at strengthening local comparative advantages 
and supporting productivity-driven industrialization. Among the most impor-
tant regional programs that are under way are the Greater Dambulla and 
Greater Hambantota programs, and the Greater Matara, Trincomalee, and 
Greater Galle programs.
Infrastructure Bottlenecks That Need To Be Addressed
The infrastructure of Sri Lankan cities is not adequate to meet the needs of 
its growing urban economies. Poor solid waste management and underdevel-
oped sewerage and drainage systems are bottlenecks to areas, such as tourism 
 development, which have great growth and employment-generation poten-
tial. On average, only 31 percent of the solid waste generated is collected, 
although the percentage varies significantly across regions.15 There are no 
environmentally and socially acceptable waste disposal facilities in Sri Lanka; 
therefore, inadequate dumping frequently blocks the natural drainage, increas-
ing the risk of flooding. The country has only a few small-scale landfills con-
structed on a pilot basis. A solution has yet to be found to the looming solid 
waste crisis in the Colombo metropolitan area. While access to piped water 
supply is high overall in urban areas, sewerage facilities are severely underde-
veloped. Inadequate sewerage  services result in uncontrolled discharge of 
sewage into waterways and marshes, and the discharge of pollutants by 
 factories is poorly controlled. Sewerage  network facilities were limited to the 
City of Colombo until recently, when the southern city of Hikkaduwa also 
introduced a sewerage network system. In Colombo city, the sewerage access 
rate is estimated at 80 percent, and part of the system is in need of urgent 
repair. Adequate sewage treatment facilities and adequate means of disposal 
are not available, causing major degradation of urban beaches. Moreover, the 
Colombo metropolitan area and other cities located on the coast are particu-
larly vulnerable to the effects of flooding. Improved flood and drainage 
 management is a high priority to reduce the economic costs of repeated 
 flooding in Sri Lankan cities.
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Urban transport promotes exchange and connectivity; it enlarges the labor 
market and promotes consistency in the polycentric structure of most of the 
large cities. Urban transport thus is a key contributor to city competitiveness. 
Much remains to be done to improve public transportation, road network 
maintenance, and traffic management in the main cities. Since the per capita 
map 2.1 national physical structure plan for 2020
Source: Based on National Physical Planning Department 2006.
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income is expected to continue to increase in Sri Lanka, most families will be 
able to afford a private vehicle. This will put enormous pressure on the trans-
port infrastructure, especially the road network in urban and suburban areas, 
where economic growth is concentrated. Although the share of public trans-
portation among the different vehicle modes remains very high in Sri Lankan 
cities compared to other South Asian countries, it has been decreasing over 
time owing to inadequate quality and reliability. While congestion and pollu-
tion are still not eminent problems, they could be in the future. Adequate regu-
lation of buses and three wheelers, which are the main public transport modes, 
and improvement of traffic management, could help reduce congestion and 
pollution, at low costs. A comprehensive approach is required to improve road 
safety that has been deteriorating over time for want of pedestrian facilities, 
road safety awareness, and enforcement of traffic signs. Accident costs in the 
Western Province are estimated to be high (Kumarage 2008). Most investments 
in urban roads should be used to improve and rehabilitate the existing road 
network.
notes
 1. The analysis is based on the four-digit International Standard Trade Classification that 
covers 1,004 product groups. The framework involves calculating the average annual 
growth rate of both Sri Lankan and world exports over the last 5 years, and the 
 average share of a given commodity in total exports. The means are calculated for 
2004–09 to capture the most recent export dynamics, while smoothing out any short-
term fluctuations. The average annual growth rates are then used to single out (a) the 
fastest-growing exports in Sri Lanka, which have an average annual growth rate that 
is higher than that of total Sri Lankan exports and (b) the fastest-growing industries 
in the world market using a definition analogous to (a).
 2. The Export Development Board is the premier government entity in charge of export 
promotion, product development, and provision of policy guidelines. Its export devel-
opment efforts are carried out in consultation with the private sector and other rele-
vant agencies of the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), including the Board of 
Investment (BOI). In fact, given the importance of foreign direct investment for 
national and export growth, BOI exercises substantial leverage in the formulation of 
export strategies. The Export Development Board’s efforts are thus often in line with 
the foreign direct investment promotion efforts.
 3. See Chan and Sieber for details.
 4. Authors’ calculations presented in Chan and Sieber.
 5. Most of the data available cover manufacturing. An analysis based solely on the num-
bers available would thus penalize services. Yet, services are a major share of 
Sri Lankan gross domestic product (GDP) responsible for a large part of the country’s 
economic growth. This is likely to remain in the future.
 6. This subsection is based on Maarten and Garretsen (2010).
 7. See Hapugalle, Raja, and Paradi-Guilford for details.
 8. See, among others, World Bank (2003).
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 9. Bangladesh data for 2012 are not available.
 10. This subsection draws on World Bank (2012b).
 11. The classification of Sri Lanka’s urban areas is based on their administrative definition 
of local government institutions and their functions, rather than on urban  characteristics/
indicators such as population size and density, access to services, or employment struc-
ture. Areas that were originally considered urban included municipal councils, urban 
councils, and town councils. The 13th Amendment of 1987, which created the 
Pradeshiya Sabhas (lowest level of government) by amalgamating rural and town 
councils, led to the reclassification of 87 town councils from urban to rural, with the 
consequent reduction in the country’s urbanization.
 12. The economic density of Colombo is US$15 million per square kilometer compared 
to US$73 million per square kilometer in Ho Chi Minh city, US$88 million per 
square kilometer in Bangkok, and US$269 million per square kilometer in Singapore 
(World Bank 2010a).
 13. The forecasts are twice as high as the estimates published by the Division of the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) of the United Nations 
Secretariat. DESA estimates that Sri Lanka’s urbanization will increase to about 
17 percent in 2020 and 21 percent in 2030.
 14. When considering urban areas only, Sabaragamuwa is the province with the lowest 
average levels of urban income and urban consumption (World Bank 2007).
 15. The Western Province had the highest collection efficiency, at 63.7 percent in 1998; 
in contrast, the North Western and North Central Provinces both collect less than 10 
percent of their waste. See Sieber for details.
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Infrastructure Constraints and 
Investment Needs
The growth-retarding impact of infrastructure constraints, shown in the 
 specific context of high-potential exports and urban development in chapter 2, 
would need to be addressed to enable Sri Lanka to move to a higher sustained 
growth trajectory. Redressing infrastructure constraints, however, cannot be 
piecemeal and product specific. Rather, a sectorwide approach is needed. 
Drawing on the detailed analysis presented in background papers #6 through 
#10, this chapter  analyzes key growth-promoting components of Sri Lanka’s 
 infrastructure, including government vision and targets as expressed in the 
Mahinda Chintana and other official documents. This allows infrastructure 
gaps to be identified and investment needs to be estimated to achieve higher 
growth, greater  international competitiveness, more livable cities, and more 
productive employment.
While connectivity infrastructure policies may need adjusting, there is 
remarkable evidence that infrastructure service access in Sri Lanka for key 
 infrastructure like power and water and sanitation is quite inclusive. Different 
governments in Sri Lanka have emphasized the provision of spatially blind infra-
structure, that is, direct benefits to households that have high welfare impact. 
District analysis where data are available indicates very low Gini coefficients—
adjusted by household spatial distribution—for power, water, and sanitation ser-
vices (0.04, 0.01, and 0.01, respectively).1 Access is widespread, and the quality 
of these services throughout the country is generally good. Discounting infra-
structure services such as cooking gas and  telephone landlines, the picture that 
emerges is of a country with inclusive infrastructure service provision.2
In Sri Lanka, key infrastructure services are generally not regressive. 
Three scoring methods3 were used for an initial analysis of the correlation 
between infrastructure service provision and poverty in the country. 
All methods yield similar results. Map 3.1 presents a spatial representation 
of the results corresponding to scoring method III. Sri Lanka is one of the 
few countries where key infrastructure services (power and water and 
c h a p t e r  3
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sanitation) do not appear to be regressive. For example, different from India, 
Sri Lanka’s lagging regions (outside the Western Province) are shown with 
green and gold even where the relative poverty “mountains” are high.4 
This implies the presence of the “principle of inclusion” regarding basic infra-
structure service provision since early in the  economic development of the 
country.
The “principle of inclusion” in the country’s infrastructure services 
 planning could guide the rehabilitation and possible expansion of infrastruc-
ture  services provision in the postconflict areas. As discussed, however, the 
“principle of connectivity” could be used to assist in fostering economic 
growth in the country as a whole. These guiding principles clearly need to be 
adjusted to specific regions in the country according to needs assessments, 
since choices of infrastructure investments and reform policies are made in 
the planning process. The remaining sections in this chapter discuss specific 
infrastructure subsectors, their investment gaps, their relation to economic 
growth, and specific sector policies that may be needed to address existing 
constraints.
map 3.1 relative poverty and access to selected infrastructure services in sri lanka
Source: Based on Ministry of Finance and Planning Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2009–10.
Note: Selected infrastructure services include water, sanitation, and power.
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transport
Transport plays a crucial role in helping Sri Lanka achieve the Mahinda 
Chintana’s targeted 8 percent annual growth rate. As an intermediate service to 
a wide range of production activities in almost all sectors, transport is widely 
recognized as central to economic growth.5 It facilitates the movement of inputs 
and goods from different locations to markets and consumers. In  addition, reduc-
tion in transport costs stimulates trade, makes specialization and economies of 
scale possible, and helps widen markets. Sri Lanka’s success depends on having 
not only efficient ports and airports to connect globally but also an integrated 
inland multimodal transport system. Sri Lanka is strategically located on the 
main international ship routes with great potential to consolidate its position as 
a maritime and aviation hub, and a world-renowned tourist destination. However, 
Colombo Port and Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA), which are central 
for international connectivity, are reaching their capacity. Moreover, the inland 
transport system is poorly integrated across transport modes and is under increas-
ing pressure because of the fast-growing transport demand. Investment in trans-
port infrastructure will also enhance the livability of cities, which will be the 
centers of economic growth. Reducing congestion and  pollution in urban areas 
will require an increase in the share of public transportation. Furthermore, the 
capacity of the road system must be enhanced through improved traffic manage-
ment, better control of intersections in urban areas, and making high-occupancy 
vehicles a priority. All of these measures are integral to the control of public 
“bads” that obstruct the benefits of agglomeration economies.
Government Vision and Targets
The Mahinda Chintana provides clear policy guidelines for the entire transport 
sector (Department of National Planning 2010). For instance, to develop 
Sri Lanka into a dynamic maritime and aviation hub, it recommends expansion 
of the Port of Colombo, development of the Port of Hambantota, modernization 
of BIA, construction of a second international airport at Mattala, and develop-
ment and modernization of 14 domestic airports. It reaffirms the importance of 
public transport and formulates an ambitious road rehabilitation and develop-
ment program. The Mahinda Chintana Randora (National Infrastructure 
Development Program) and the 10-year horizon development framework set 
out the vision of a high-quality mobility road network with universal accessibil-
ity. This framework recognizes that access to the road  network and its quality will 
improve if the following issues are addressed: (a) increasing road user costs, (b) 
insufficient coordination among sector institutions, and (c) low capacity of pro-
vincial-level authorities.
The Public Investment Plan for 2012–16 further indicates that the  transport 
sector will receive a total investment of SL Rs 218.5 billion (US$1.66 billion)6 
or 3.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)7 over the 5-year period. Out of 
the total planned investment on  infrastructure, 32.7  percent will be spent on 
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roads, 8.9 percent is allocated for railways and public transport, and 5.4 percent 
is allocated for seaports and airports.
Growth-Retarding Gaps
Roads
Sri Lanka has one of the densest road networks in the world, but as shown in 
table 3.1, this was achieved at the cost of inadequate maintenance. Historically, 
funding for maintenance has been given low priority compared to new projects. 
As a consequence, most of the roads are still awaiting rehabilitation. It will thus 
be necessary to increase maintenance funds substantially to ensure a high-quality 
road network. Moreover, difficulties in acquiring land affect design standards and 
inhibit road rehabilitation. The design of existing roads could be improved, par-
ticularly with respect to vertical and horizontal alignment. Correcting these in 
rehabilitation projects has been problematic because of the high cost of land 
acquisition and the difficulties associated with resettlement procedures. As a con-
sequence, some rehabilitation projects have not considered any realignment, 
which lowers the safety of improved roads at bends and intersections. Most road 
construction work is carried out through contractors who often have low capacity. 
In particular, the small- and medium-size enterprises contracted for local author-
ity and provincial roads lack technical and contract management skills. In addition, 
the industry is not large enough to meet the growing demand for road rehabilita-
tion following the government of Sri Lanka’s (GoSL’s) ambitious program.
Railways
The sector is in need of investment for rehabilitating the existing assets 
and expanding new rail lines. The delivery of quality service for both passengers 
and freight is severely constrained by the depleted assets base, obsolete signal and 
communication system, and aging rolling stock of the railway sector. Table 3.2 
summarizes the operational performance of the sector. As a result, freight 
 transport is continually being lost to road transport, which reduces avenues for 
profitability. There is also a need to restore the railway lines in the war-affected 
north and east and to build new railroads to emerging growth centers, free-trade 
zones, and the port of Colombo. Furthermore, the railway sector is a large 
 landowner. Adequate use of this land may help in the sector’s rehabilitation. 
table 3.1 condition of the core national road network according to the international 
roughness index (iri), 2011
Roughness (IRI m/km) Condition category Percentage of national roads
Less than 3 Excellent 16
2 to 5.5 Good 27
5.5 to 7 Fair 13
7 to 10 Poor 33
More than 10 Very poor 11
Source: Ministry of Ports and Highways 2012.
Note: The IRI is an international standard and comparable measure to assess the quality of roads.
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In addition, Sri Lanka Railway (SLR) has been unable to recover operational 
costs (table 3.3). A management and business plan for SLR is needed along with 
adoption of good commercial practices in house. Private sector participation is 
limited, because the Railway Ordinance does not allow outsourcing of opera-
tional activities. SLR recovers less than half of its operational costs and requires 
significant government subsidies. Overstaffing is also a problem that needs to be 
addressed. Safety is a major concern; there have been many fatalities due to 
derailments because of speeding, overcrowded trains, elephants crossing, and 
malfunctioning of the braking system. In addition, unsecured crossings have been 
a significant source of accidents in the country; of the 1,000 railroad crossings in 
the network, only 200 are secured.
Aviation
The sector needs to be better integrated with other modes of transport (road 
network, railways, and buses) in order to benefit from economies of scales and 
improve domestic connectivity. For instance, BIA is not well connected with the 
road network, railways, or buses. This low level of integration inhibits the flow of 
people and goods, and thus the growth of the industry and tourism sectors. BIA 
requires more investment to realize its potential as an aviation hub. One possibil-
ity to increase BIA’s attraction is to promote it as a stopover airport by marketing 
shopping, sightseeing, and getaway holidays in and around Colombo. BIA also 
needs a domestic terminal that facilitates speedy transition of passenger and 
cargo between international flights and domestic flights. An expansion of the 
airport should accommodate domestic civil flights, including helicopters and 
floatplanes. Passenger demand for domestic aviation services is low due to small 
coverage and low-quality domestic airports. More investment is needed to meet 
table 3.2 summary of annual railway operational Details, 2004–09
Annual operations 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total number of trains scheduled 116,051 116,024 115,281 122,132
Total number of trains operated 107,216 106,074 107,055 112,956
Cancellations 8% 9% 7% 8%
On-time arrivals ± 5 minutes at destination 41% 38% 37% 31%
Source: Sri Lanka Railway (SLR), Planning Division.
Note: Data include both passenger and freight trains.
table 3.3 railways operational expenditure, income, and subsidies, 2005–11
in million US$
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011a
Operational expenditure 48 57 64 72 77 54 62
Total income 17 22 26 32 35 30 32
Percent cost recovery 35 39 41 44 45 55 52
Total subsidy/loss 31 35 38 40 42 24 31
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2011.
a. Provisional.
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the renewed demand from tourism. New market entrants could further enhance 
the attractiveness of domestic aviation by lowering prices. However, private 
operators are at a competitive disadvantage, because they do not enjoy the same 
tax exemptions and concessions as state-owned airlines and face severe restric-
tions for getting government approvals.
Ports
The main challenge in the ports sector is to increase the productivity and thus 
competitiveness of the Colombo Port. This primarily implies lowering the overall 
transaction costs relative to the competition. This is not a simple matter of 
price—all factors that might affect cost need to be carefully monitored and con-
trolled, including vessel delays, port charges, and handling efficiency, as well as 
workers’ pay and labor productivity. The latter may be difficult to achieve 
because of extensive unionization. The Colombo Port also has to provide cost-
effective solutions for Indian exporters to retain its position as a transshipment 
hub. Owing to the limited capacity of the domestic market, transshipment alone 
remains the future of the Colombo Port. The Indian market is particularly impor-
tant since almost 39 percent of the containers are transshipped to the subconti-
nent.8 Just-in-time delivery is becoming increasingly important, which is why the 
Colombo Port should develop efficient and cost-effective transport solutions for 
Indian ports and shipping lines. Finally, to realize its full potential, port access and 
intermodal connectivity must be improved. The Colombo Port is located at the 
end node of the main commercial city center in the country and, thus, has major 
access problems. The port operations are not well integrated with other modes 
of transportation, particularly railways. Truck access to the port is inefficient, 
causing major congestion. City planning, railway access, and integrated logistics 
centers are required to ensure efficient port operations.
Transport Services
The quality and frequency of bus service need to be improved, including the 
quality of vehicles, driver’s conduct, value-added services, reliability, and comfort. 
Insufficient adherence to timetables has contributed to poor service quality and 
a deterioration of road safety. Integrated network planning would facilitate easier 
transfers and hubbing operations of buses at different locations. Facilities for the 
disabled also need to be improved. Transport services would be modernized 
through the use of information and communication technology (ICT). For 
instance, the introduction of intelligent transport systems could help (a) manage 
buses, passenger loads, and routes; (b) reduce vehicle wear; and (c) improve 
safety, transportation times, and fuel consumption. Finally, unregulated paratran-
sit, such as three wheelers, creates significant congestion, pollution, and safety 
problems. A significant proportion of three-wheeler drivers are unlicensed, and 
are frequently involved in traffic violations, accidents, and even crime. In addi-
tion, three wheelers create parking problems and increase prices through their 
collusive behavior. Regulation will be essential to manage the paratransit system 
and ensure clean, safe, and affordable transportation.
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Road Safety, Congestion, and Pollution
A comprehensive approach is needed to address road safety problems requiring 
better institutional coordination, including better enforcement of rules by the 
road police, greater safety awareness of both drivers and the public, and better 
road safety standards and norms. In addition, road projects do not always practice 
minimum safety standards, and rehabilitated roads tend to lead to higher and 
more serious accidents. The deregulation of the bus sector has led to a sharp rise 
in accidents because of weak regulation and enforcement. Congestion and pollu-
tion are increasing problems in urban areas owing to higher use of private vehi-
cles. Dissatisfaction with public transport sector buses and trains, coupled with 
rising incomes, has driven more people to use private vehicles (figure 3.1). As a 
consequence, congestion and pollution have increased rapidly in urban areas. 
Mass transit systems should be studied in depth to see how using public transport 
could be encouraged.
Estimating Transport Sector Investment Needs
The transport infrastructure needs for Sri Lanka are estimated using a bench-
marking approach.9 The benchmarking approach consists of identifying the 
physical infrastructure needed to meet specific connectivity targets.10 It allows 
the estimation of total investment by levels of connectivity (regional, national, 
rural, or urban), by mode of transportation (roads, railways, ports, or airports), 
and by expenditure category (improvement, upgrading, expansion, or mainte-
nance). The investment gap can be determined by applying a matrix of unit costs 
to the physical investment needs. To determine the unit cost of each type of 
investment, the World Bank’s road database was used. The data were fine-tuned 
with information from recent projects carried out in Sri Lanka and validated by 
transport experts. Since the unit cost depends on how the connectivity targets 
are defined, the results are presented for two scenarios: an upper- and lower-
bound scenario. The upper-bound scenario aims for a high level of connectivity 
comparable to that of developed countries, with all infrastructures maintained in 
good condition. A lower-bound scenario is also computed using more modest 
standards. While this methodology has drawbacks, it is the most appropriate, 
Figure 3.1 share of passenger-Kilometers, by mode, 1958–2007
percent
Source: TransPlan database, University of Moratuwa, Sri Lanka 2010.
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considering the limited data available. An important caveat is that while the esti-
mates can be disaggregated, the methodology is not designed to be precise at the 
subsector level.
For each subsector, targets are defined for regional, national, rural, and urban 
connectivity. Regional connectivity is concerned with internationally traded 
goods and international passenger movements. Since Sri Lanka is an island, tar-
gets are only set for air and maritime connections. National connectivity targets 
encompass the entire inland transport network, that is, roads, railways, and 
domestic airports. The urban connectivity targets largely focus on road density 
and railways, whereas rural connectivity is mainly concerned with access to roads.
Using this benchmarking model, an annual average share of 2.49 to 
4.16  percent of GDP should be invested in the transport sector (table 3.4). This 
is in line with the government plan for 2010–15, where 2.5 percent of the GDP 
per year is expected to be invested in these sectors.11 Approximately 31 percent 
of the investments in the sector should be allocated to the maintenance of assets. 
These allocations are substantially different from the government’s plans, where 
new construction and expansion take up the largest shares.
table 3.4 estimated transport investment needs under lower-Bound scenario, 2011–20
in million US$
New/Expand Improve Upgrade Maintenance Total
Lower-bound scenario
 National roads 0 2,265 477 772 3,514
 Provincial roads 0 2,714 0 565 3,279
 Rural/other local roads 0 3,935 0 700 4,635
 Urban roads 0 512 540 198 1,250
 Ports 128 336 0 450 914
 Airports 251 8 18 159 436
 Railways 0 231 48 399 678
 Total investment 379 10,001 1,083 3,243 14,706
 Annual investment 38 1,000 108 324 1,471
 Percentage of total 3% 68% 7% 22% 100%
 Percentage of GDP — — — — 2.49%
Upper-bound scenario
 National roads 0 2,718 1,350 2,185 6,253
 Provincial roads 0 3,257 0 1,598 4,855
 Rural/other local roads 0 4,722 0 1,982 6,704
 Urban roads 0 667 1,191 333 2,191
 Ports 1860 40 0 810 2,710
 Airports 424 10 22 207 663
 Railways 0 528 153 577 1,258
 Total investment 2,284 11,942 2,716 7,692 24,634
 Annual investment 228 1,194 272 769 2,463
 Percentage of total 9% 48% 11% 31% 100%
 Percentage of GDP — — — — 4.16%
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; — = not applicable.
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Issues Concerning the Provinces
To help prioritize investments, a multicriteria analysis is used to identify trans-
port interventions at the provincial level. The multicriteria analysis has identified 
the following:
•	 Three priorities for the Western Province range from improvements in  public 
transportation to multimodal transport access for BIA. The first priority is the 
electrification of railways in the Colombo metropolitan region, which would 
enhance the share of public transport and, in turn, lower congestion and 
 pollution. Second, the introduction of a rapid transit system in Colombo met-
ropolitan region is recommended, which would have a similar effect. Third, 
multimodal transport access to BIA is essential for enhancing Sri Lanka’s com-
petitiveness. Integrating BIA with landside transportation is thus a top priority.
•	 The key priority for the Southern Province is a “Multimodal Transport and 
Logistics Operations Study.” This study should aim to (a) identify the different 
infrastructure and services required; (b) identify the required points of inter-
modalism and interchange; (c) identify the functions of the degree of comple-
mentarities required; (d) design the required functionality and capacity for the 
future based on potential transport and traffic forecast; and (e) construct the 
required intermodal facilities.
•	 A similar study should be undertaken for the Northern Province to identify 
the transport systems and infrastructure needs for its new economic develop-
ment strategy. This analysis would (a) undertake a capacity assessment study; 
(b) design missing infrastructure for intermodal integration; (c) construct 
selected infrastructure facilities required as priority; and (d) provide institu-
tional capacity building for transport agencies in the Northern Province includ-
ing human resources development.
•	 For the Eastern Province, the multicriteria analysis has identified the develop-
ment of aviation for tourism as a key priority. To develop the aviation sector for 
tourism, it would be necessary to (a) study whether the airports in the Eastern 
Province could be integrated with tourism development and commercial 
 centers; (b) determine the landside integration; (c) design one or two selected 
airports as regional airports; and (d) implement projects along with develop-
ment of infrastructure for access modes and infrastructure.
•	 For the Uva Province, two priorities are needed to support its wider economic 
development strategy. First, the development of the road network is essential 
for tourism promotion. The aim is to (a) identify tourist locations and con-
straints for access, including scenic routes and connectivity between holiday 
resorts; (b) design and construct the key links with viewpoints and turnouts for 
vehicles; and (c) formulate a maintenance program for such facilities with 
tourist agencies and operators. Second, integrated supply chain development 
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should be promoted within the province for logistics processing and for value-
adding services. Such a project would increase employment and trade within 
the province.
To conclude, the efficiency of the transport system could be further enhanced by 
focusing on multimodal integration. The sectoral development plans have been 
crafted independently for each subsector, resulting in a lack of multimodal inte-
gration. The whole transport system would become more efficient, if the existing 
interface problems were addressed. These include rail-to-port and road-to-port 
links, feeder bus-to-rail services, a single ticketing system for road and rail trans-
port, and thorough documentation for road and rail freight services. Observers 
have also pointed out that the largest obstacle to improving integration and 
transport efficiency is the absence of a lead transport ministry.
Quality public transportation services will also increase efficiency and, at the 
same time, the livability of Sri Lanka’s cities. Congestion and pollution are 
increasing problems in urban areas. These problems can be addressed by improv-
ing the quality and frequency of public transportation services that have been 
neglected for three decades. In addition, it would reverse the trend of increased 
private vehicle and unregulated three-wheeler use. However, it is recommended 
that these issues be addressed after analytical assessments. Sri Lanka’s cities will 
also become safer and, thus, more livable if the Road Safety Action Plan is imple-
mented. There is a need to address the road safety problems with a comprehen-
sive approach, clear commitment of funds, and active involvement of all 
stakeholders. While it is appreciated that an action plan agreed to by all the rel-
evant government agencies has been launched, the challenge would lie in the 
efficient implementation of this plan.
Energy
An efficient, affordable, and clean energy supply is essential for ensuring the 
competitiveness of Sri Lanka’s economy. On the one hand, cheap and clean 
energy for households can increase labor productivity through multiple channels. 
These include better health due to reduced indoor pollution as well as improved 
education and employment outcomes. On the other hand, an affordable uninter-
rupted energy supply will enable firms to improve their production processes 
and delivery times. This will, in turn, enhance their international competitiveness. 
The energy sector in Sri Lanka is high cost and increasingly dependent on expen-
sive and volatile petroleum imports. Until the mid-1990s, most of the new 
 electricity demand in Sri Lanka was met by hydropower, but most of the 
 economically viable sites have now been exploited. The bulk of new energy has 
to be oil based. This has driven up consumer tariffs due to the high international 
price of petroleum products. Most of the price volatility has been absorbed by 
the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB), which has incurred considerable financial 
losses during the last decade.
Going forward, it is crucial that Sri Lanka raise sufficient funds to diversify its 
generation mix toward coal-fired power plants and renewable energies. While 
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funding has already been secured for the Puttalam Project (a 300-megawatt coal-
fired power plant), it is generally difficult to obtain financing for new projects. 
This is largely due to the high level of indebtedness of the CEB. In addition, the 
coal-fired power plants suitable for Sri Lanka are not attractive for investors, 
because they are less efficient and have higher greenhouse gas emissions than the 
alternatives used in bigger developing countries. Financing the supply from 
n onconventional renewable energies (NCRE)12 is equally difficult; large-scale 
generation from solar energy is not feasible, and wind power is too expensive.
Government Vision and Targets
The GoSL’s strategy for the sector was formulated in the 2006 National Energy 
Policy and Strategies and the Mahinda Chintana. It set several targets, most nota-
bly for household electrification and the diversification of the generation mix. In 
particular, the share of electrified households was to rise to 86 percent by 2010 
and 95 percent by 2016 (Ministry of Finance and Planning 2007). The current 
target of 100 percent electrification is within reach if sizable investments in 
 grid-extension and the transmission and distribution (T&D) network are made 
(figure 3.2). For the generation mix, the GoSL envisaged a four-fuel mix with an 
expansion in coal-fired power and NCRE. Goals were also set for tariffs and 
petroleum prices as well as demand- and supply-side efficiency programs. The 
initial targets for household electrification were achieved as the level of 
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electrification increased to 88  percent in 2010 (CEB 2010). By 2010, 88 percent 
already had e lectricity, with the majority being connected to the grid. Therefore, 
with the necessary investments in grid extension and off-grid service provision, 
the targets are within reach. Improvements of the T&D network are also neces-
sary, because losses are still high in the war-affected north and east.
The NCRE’s targets for the diversification of the generation mix are less likely 
to be met. The NCRE’s targets of 7 percent for 2010 and 10 percent for 2015 
have been determined without rigorous analysis. As a consequence, it is not sur-
prising that the current achievements fall short of this benchmark, with only 
6.94 percent on grid (table 3.5; Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority 2012) 
and 6.9 percent off grid in 2009. Furthermore, it is unlikely that they will provide 
considerable capacity in the future, for the following reasons: (a) the large-scale 
hydropower potential is already exploited, with only a few medium-size sites 
remaining unused; (b) large-scale power generation from solar energy is not pos-
sible; and (c) wind power is too expensive and unsustainable, because the current 
feed-in tariffs are too generous. Alternatively, the targets for coal-fired power 
generation will be achieved with only a year’s delay if the required financial 
resources can be raised. The GoSL’s targets for coal-fired power generation are 
20 percent by 2010 and 54 percent by 2015. As Puttalam I became operational 
in 2011, the target for 2010 was achieved with only a year’s delay. The target for 
2015 is also within reach, if the second phase can be completed by 2013 and 
financing is secured for the Trincomalee coal-fired plant. However, the latter has 
been difficult, because GoSL guarantees are needed to convince the National 
Thermal Power Corporation to sign the joint venture agreement with the CEB.
The targets for reforming tariffs have been achieved only for electricity but 
not for the petroleum sector. The National Energy Policy and Strategies stated 
that electricity customer tariffs and petroleum prices should be made more cost-
reflective. The new tariffs for 2011–15 set by the Public Utilities Commission of 
Sri Lanka (PUCSL) make a first step in this direction. They gradually restructure 
tariffs toward cost-effectiveness, while subsidizing low-income households. 
However, this restructuring process did not continue beyond its initial exercise 
in January 2011. Instead, the government had to impose a fuel-adjustment 
charge—25 to 40 percent for domestic consumers and 15 to 25 percent for 
industrial and other consumers—to cover the losses incurred due to revised oil 
prices in February 2012.13 Similarly, the GoSL reintroduced direct price controls 
in the petroleum sector in 2004 and resumed full control over the liquefied 
table 3.5 Gross Generation to the Grid, 1980–2010
gigawatt hours; percent
Gross generation 1980 1990 2000 2010
Large hydropower 1,480; 88.7 3,145; 99.8 3,154; 47.0 4,989; 46.18
Oil-fired thermal energy 189; 11.3 5; 0.2 3,512; 52.3 5,064; 46.87
Small renewables, largely hydropower 55; 0.81 750; 6.94
Total 1,669; 100 3,150; 100 6,721; 100 10,803; 100
Source: Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority 2012.
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petroleum gas subsector in late 2010. Yet, a decision was taken in September 
2012 to place the Petroleum Corporation under the PUCSL, which will regulate 
pricing and quality of petroleum products.
Finally, supply- and demand-side efficiency programs have been partially 
implemented to meet the GoSL’s targets. On the supply side, the aim was to 
reduce T&D losses to 13.5 percent by 2009 and to 12.1 percent by 2015. This 
target has almost been achieved owing to the extensive rehabilitation of the 
Lanka Electricity Corporation’s network (Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority 
2007). On the demand side, appliance-labeling targets for 2007 have not been 
met, but some achievements had been reported by the end of 2010. These 
include the mandatory energy-efficient building code and labeling regulations for 
compact fluorescent light bulbs.
Growth-Retarding Gaps
Updating the Mahinda Chintana’s data, table 3.6 illustrates that, on average, 
US$683.86 million to US$1.285 billion, or 1.16 to 2.17 percent of GDP per 
year, will have to be invested in the energy sector. This is slightly higher than the 
investments earmarked under the Mahinda Chintana, largely owing to higher-
than-expected NCRE and T&D network development costs for 2011–15. In 
contrast, the investment requirements for diversifying the generation mix are 
slightly lower for 2011–15 but higher for 2016–20. The diversification of the 
generation mix makes up a third of the total investment figures followed by 
expenditures for NCRE and T&D development.
table 3.6 investment requirements with 10 percent ncre target, 2011–20
in million US$
2011–15
2016–20Low High
Electrification of households—grid 80.5 80.5 22.8
Electrification of households—off grid 26 26 10.2
Tariff rationalization, debt restructuring, and targeted subsidies 70 209
Fuel diversity, energy security, and reliability in bulk power 
generation 1,296.6 1,296.6 3,906.1
Renewable energy for power generation 849.5 849.5 1,615.5
Transmission and distribution network development 859.7 859.7 862.3
Supply-side efficiency 38 38 9
Demand-side efficiency 9 9
Energy sector knowledge management, planning, and funding 190 190
Total 3,419.3 3,558.3 6,425.9
Annual investment 683.86 711.66 1,285.18
Annual investment as a share of GDP 1.16% 1.2% 2.17%
Sources: Compilation based on Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB 2008), Ministry of Finance and Planning (2007), World Bank 
(2010), and authors’ calculations using average incremental cost and load growth estimates.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; NCRE = nonconventional renewable energies; T&D = transmission and distribution. The 
transmission costs include the costs for the T&D network, transmission, and grid substations development; the connection of 
new power plants; and other costs associated with the transmission systems.
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The main challenge in the energy sector is the mobilization of the investment 
for electricity generation, which falls into three categories: medium hydropower, 
NCRE, and coal. In the case of rural electrification and the development of the 
T&D network, securing finance from the existing sources should not be prob-
lematic. Bilateral donors are willing to assist the CEB in rural electrification 
programs, whereas international financial institutions (IFIs) often finance T&D 
projects, since they do not raise contentious climate change issues. Electricity 
generation projects fall into three categories: medium hydropower, NCRE, and 
coal. Each poses different challenges for mobilizing investment, whether through 
equity or debt:
•	 Medium hydropower projects: These face the lowest hurdles. The remaining 
hydropower projects are relatively small and demonstrably additional under 
Clean Development Mechanism rules. They should thus be able to secure at 
least some carbon finance. Most of the hydropower projects have so far bene-
fited from bilateral assistance under concessionary terms. Even if Sri Lanka is 
no longer eligible for concessional finance, IFIs and bilateral sources (especially 
Japan) should be available for medium-size renewable energy projects.
•	 Coal projects: Completing the coal projects will be difficult. Since financing 
for the Puttalam II has now been secured, it is crucial to avoid further 
delays; oil-based generation will already need to fill the gap in 2012 and 2013 
even under the present schedule (World Bank 2010). The problems facing the 
next coal project at Trincomalee are more serious. Negotiations of the joint 
venture agreement have proven difficult and time consuming. Whether these 
new arrangements (with the PUCSL as regulator) will provide a more sustain-
able system remains to be seen.
•	 Generation mix: It will be crucial to balance public expectations about tariff 
decreases against the financial realities of the CEB. The assumption that the 
fuel cost component of the tariff will decline rapidly once the system moves 
from oil to coal is correct (World Bank 2010). However, it should be the first 
priority of the CEB to rebuild its finances and ensure a sound and transparent 
tariff footing, including automatic fuel cost adjustments. In fact, the CEB will 
need many years of solid earnings before it will be considered creditworthy 
enough for commercial financing of its proposed joint ventures. Therefore, the 
PUCSL must avoid the temptation to reduce tariffs with the coming of the 
first coal projects. The revised set of tariffs is a first step in this direction, since 
they introduce cost recovery by 2014.
•	 PUCSL: The PUCSL should be made fully operational. The Petroleum 
Industry Act has not yet been enacted, so the PUCSL cannot assume its regula-
tory jurisdiction over all aspects of the petroleum industry. More specifically, it 
cannot assume responsibility for pricing in the partially privatized distribution 
sector. In the meantime, the energy and petroleum ministries act as regulators 
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without any predetermined performance or safety standards. The PUCSL 
should thus continue to focus on tariff rationalization, the effective targeting of 
subsidies, and the development of planning guidelines and regulations.
•	 Petroleum sector: The challenge in the petroleum sector is to avoid the temp-
tation of investing in a new refinery. A new refinery seems attractive from an 
energy security perspective. However, it is unclear whether a heavy depen-
dence on Iranian crude oil will provide greater security than the reliance on 
petroleum products, whose sources are more diverse. Any investment decision 
should be based on an objective evaluation of all the options, with a clarity of 
assumptions and technology alternatives that currently does not exist. The 
investment requirements for the distribution infrastructure and storage tank 
farms are also modest and easily financed by domestic banks. The same is true 
for the needs of the liquefied petroleum gas subsector.
Water and sanitation
“Improved” access to water and sanitation is crucial for enhancing the livability 
of Sri Lanka’s cities. International rankings of livability usually consider a range 
of factors, including the city’s stability, health care, infrastructure, education, 
culture, and environment. According to the 2011 Economist Intelligence Unit 
report, Colombo ranked among the 10 least-livable cities. One reason for this 
poor performance is its 90-year-old sewage system, which is close to collapse. To 
enhance the livability of urban areas and, in particular, of Sri Lanka’s economic 
center, investment in “improved” access to water and sanitation will be essential. 
Average measurements of improved access to water and sanitation are encourag-
ing, yet vary greatly. By 2009, Sri Lanka achieved the 2015 Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) for improved access to water, with an estimated 
average of 87.66 percent, while sanitation still lags at 89.45 percent (table 3.7). 
The MDG targets are 86 percent and 93 percent, respectively. These statistics 
mask the uneven development across the urban, rural, and estate areas. In addi-
tion, access is often inadequate, since water and sanitation services can be too far 
away or insufficient to meet the household’s needs. Sizable investments in both 
rehabilitation and greenfields will be necessary to ensure livable cities. The largest 
costs will be associated with the rehabilitation or replacement of the water and 
sanitation network. Significant greenfield investments will also be necessary in 
the water sector to meet rural water coverage targets, especially if the access 
table 3.7 population access to Water and sanitation services, 2009–10
percent
Urban Rural Estates Total
Improved water 97.42 87.6 60.33 87.66
Improved sanitation 86.4 90.89 74.02 89.45
Adequate water 87.33 65.9 34.17 67.37
Source: Based on the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2009–10 (Department of Census and Statistics 2008).
64 Infrastructure Constraints and Investment Needs
Investing in Infrastructure • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9927-9
definition includes sufficiency of water and distance to water sources. However, 
depending on future urbanization trends, more investments may be required in 
urban areas than in rural areas.
Government Vision and Targets
The GoSL ratified a national policy for rural water supply and sanitation in 
2001, in which “adequate” as opposed to “improved” access to water was 
defined. According to the definition of the World Health Organization and of 
United Nations Children’s Fund’s (UNICEF’s) Joint Monitoring Program for 
Water Supply and Sanitation, improved water and sanitation sources are essen-
tially protected from outside contamination. “Improved water” sources are 
defined as sources that are protected from the exterior (that is, piped water into 
dwelling, to yard/plot, to public tap or standpipe, tube well or bore hole, pro-
tected dug well, protected spring and rainwater). The GoSL’s new sector policy 
further restricts this definition by stating that a water source is “adequate” if it 
is within 200 meters of the household’s premises and yields at least 40 liters per 
person per day (Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Division 2001).14 About 
87.66  percent of the population has access to improved water supply and 67.37 
percent has access to adequate water. Improved sanitation facilities separate 
people from contact with excreta and are exclusive for each household. The 
facilities that are included in this category are flush toilets, piped sewer system, 
septic tank, flush or pour flush pit latrine, ventilated improved pit latrine, pit 
latrine with slab, and composting toilet. As far as improved sanitation is con-
cerned, Sri Lanka has yet to achieve its goals. However, if the more stringent 
access definitions are applied, Sri Lanka needs to invest significantly in the water 
and sanitation sector (figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3 current improved Water and sanitation access and Future population targets
in ’000s
Source: Based on the Household Income and Expenditure Survey, 2006–07 (Department of Census and Statistics 2008).
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Growth-Retarding Gaps
The estimation of the infrastructure gap and associated investment needs is based 
on international data and information from World Bank projects. For instance, 
the estimates for greenfield investments in rural areas drew on the monitoring 
database of the ongoing World Bank–supported Second Community Water 
Supply and Sanitation Project. In contrast, the cost of extending urban water and 
sanitation infrastructure was based on international benchmarks. Similar 
approaches were used to determine the connection, rehabilitation, replacement, 
and maintenance costs. Preliminary estimates shown in table 3.8 suggest that 
US$75.5 million to US$154 million, or 0.13 to 0.26 percent of GDP, need to be 
spent annually on sector improvements. Infrastructure investments were calcu-
lated for Sri Lanka to meet its 2015 MDG targets evenly across its urban, rural, 
and estate populations. Additional goals were formulated for 2020—90 percent 
coverage for water and universal coverage for sanitation—and corresponding 
investment needs were computed. Investment requirements were estimated for 
both the “improved” and “adequate” access definitions, amounting to 
US$56.4  million to US$139.8 million annually for the 2015 MDGs and 
US$94.5 million to US$168.2 million annually for the 2020 targets.
Rehabilitation or replacement costs make up the largest share of the cost 
estimates, closely followed by greenfield investments and maintenance costs. 
Rehabilitation or replacement costs range from 40 to 60 percent, depending on 
the access definition and time period. In contrast, maintenance costs always sub-
sume about a third of all expenditure irrespective of the scenario considered. The 
share of greenfield investments rises over time to keep pace with the population 
growth and increased coverage targets, especially in the rural areas for water. 
Connection costs, on the other hand, are negligible. The estimated costs could, 
however, be lowered considerably if services were delivered more efficiently. 
table 3.8 cost of the service Gap, 2011–20
in million US$ and percent of GDP
Improved water Improved sanitation Total
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Total cost (in million US$)
 2010–15 163.4 378.1 118.7 321.0 282.1 699.1
 2015–20 144.3 347.3 209.1 493.6 353.4 841.0
 2010–20 307.7 725.4 327.8 814.6 635.5 1,540.1
Annualized cost (in million US$)
 2010–15 32.7 75.6 23.7 64.2 56.4 139.8
 2015–20 28.9 69.5 41.8 98.7 94.5 168.2
 2010–20 30.8 72.5 32.8 81.5 75.5 154.0
Share of GDP (percent)
 2010–15 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.11 0.1 0.24
 2015–20 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.28
 2010–20 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.14 0.13 0.26
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
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There are two potential efficiency gains that could bring about savings and an 
improved allocation of scarce resources. First, already-created assets can only be 
sustained if service delivery is streamlined in rural areas and capacity is built in 
local institutions to maintain these services. Second, hidden costs or implicit 
subsidies associated with nonrevenue water (NRW), bill collection efficiency, and 
tariffs below cost could save the National Water Supply and Drainage Board 
(NWSDB) up to US$41.6 million annually.
The key challenge ahead is to maintain the achievements of the past, while 
extending services to a growing population and to people not yet serviced. 
Despite many years of conflict, Sri Lanka’s water and sanitation infrastructure 
has continuously improved, as demonstrated by the high access rates. However, 
sizable investments will be necessary to maintain the existing assets, which make 
up a third of the total investment cost. In addition, service needs to be delivered 
and extended for the growing population and to people not yet serviced. In fact, 
access is lower in districts with a higher estate population or a drier climate. With 
respect to investment priorities, the war-affected provinces in the north and east 
should be brought at par with the rest of Sri Lanka, requiring a consolidated 
effort. Nonetheless, less investment will be needed, because access rates are 
already similar to the national average.
The performance of the NWSDB has improved remarkably in recent 
decades, but there are still areas for improvement. A key challenge for the 
NWSDB will be to address the high NRW, especially in Colombo, which was 
assessed at US$12 million annually. However, the NWSDB reported operating 
revenue of US$14.2 million (SL Rs 1.9 billion; Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
2011) in the financial year 2011, mainly due to the increased number of con-
nections and significant reduction of NRW. The NWSDB incurs an even higher 
annual revenue loss of US$24 million, because the average tariff is below cost. 
As in most countries, nondomestic users cross-subsidize domestic consump-
tion; yet, among the domestic users, not all need a subsidy. Revising the tariff 
structure to ensure only lifeline consumption is subsidized would target the 
subsidy better and promote water conservation. The PUCSL also needs to play 
a role here.
The costs associated with the duplication of service delivery, though they 
could not be quantified, are likely to be sizable. Service delivery is often dupli-
cated in rural areas but cannot be quantified for lack of data. However, these 
costs are likely to be sizable, given the number of deconcentrated and decentral-
ized government entities in the country. Another cost of duplication, also not 
assessed in this report, relates to the lost economies of scale and scope in deliver-
ing local services. There has been a missed opportunity to create a professional 
cadre in local institutions that are effective in delivering local services. More 
comprehensive reviews, beyond the scope of this chapter, are needed to sharpen 
Sri Lanka’s strategy on the institutional service delivery front. This includes not 
only clarifying the roles of the different government institutions in rural areas but 
also the definition of a regulatory framework that encourages private invest-
ments in the water and sanitation sector. Moreover, if Sri Lanka wishes to move 
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toward upper-middle-income standards and extend its sewerage network to 
other urban centers, the institutional arrangements for operation and mainte-
nance of the sewerage systems need to be revisited as well as the way costs are 
recovered.
solid Waste
Urbanization and income growth significantly increase solid waste generation, 
which is a great challenge to local authorities in developing countries. Several 
empirical studies have shown that solid waste generation increases with 
income growth (for example, Cole, Rayner, and Bates 1997; Johnstone and 
Labonne 2004; Karousakis 2006).15 In addition, more solid waste is generated 
in cities, because urban households consume more store-bought items and 
reuse and recycle less solid waste. Managing these growing volumes is chal-
lenging for local authorities in developing countries, which typically only col-
lect 30 to 60 percent of the solid waste generated (World Resources Institute 
1996). The rest is dumped haphazardly along the streets and on vacant lands, 
which leads to  environmental and health damage (UNEP-IETC-HIID 1996). 
The solid waste management (SWM) sector in Sri Lanka is no exception, since 
it is characterized by ineffective collection and inadequate solid waste dis-
posal. On average, only 31 percent of the solid waste generated in Sri Lanka is 
collected by the local authorities. However, this statistic masks considerable 
variation, since collection efficiency is typically much higher in urban centers 
and rich provinces. In addition, the collected solid waste is usually not dis-
posed of in an environmentally sound manner because of a lack of sanitary 
landfills. The solid waste is instead disposed of in open dumping sites or 
burned, buried, or used as fertilizer. In addition to the negative health and 
environmental impacts, poor SWM is damaging Sri Lanka’s growth prospects; 
poor SWM has also been identified as one of the main constraints to the sus-
tainable development of the tourism sector (World Bank 2010). This could be 
damaging to Sri Lanka’s growth prospects, because the tourism sector has 
great growth and employment-generation potential, especially since the end 
of the 30-year civil war.
Government Vision and Targets
The National Strategy for SWM has promulgated key operational guidelines for 
achieving collection efficiency. These involve solid waste reduction, reuse, and 
recycling activities (the so-called 3Rs); source separation; and the provisions of 
technical guidelines for structuring public and private partnerships in solid waste 
collection and disposal. It further emphasizes the importance of integrating 
SWM with urban planning and economic development strategies. One of the 
main operational issues in implementing the national strategy is poor interagency 
coordination. In particular, vertical integration of SWM functions across local 
authorities and provincial and national governments is inadequate. This is 
 discussed in detail in chapter 4.
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Growth-Retarding Gaps
The average solid waste collection efficiency of 31 percent is low compared to 
other comparable lower-middle-income countries, which on average collect 
about 68 percent of the generated solid waste (Ministry of Environment and 
Natural Resources 2005; Sieber, background paper #9). However, this national 
average masks large geographic variation, since collection efficiency is generally 
higher in urban areas and richer provinces, reaching 65 percent. The inefficiency 
of solid waste collection can be explained by the low levels of both physical and 
human capital. There were only 2,300 collection vehicles for the 311 local 
authorities in 2004 (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2005). 
More than half of the transport vehicles were handcarts and merely 8 percent 
were compactor trucks. Efficiency is further reduced by poor operation and 
maintenance, narrow roads, wrong placement of collection bins, lack of transfer 
stations for storing and disposing of solid waste, and use of garbage vehicles for 
other activities. In addition, the solid waste collection and transportation sector 
is characterized by high absenteeism and an unwillingness of staff to work nights. 
Figure 3.4 provides a snapshot of solid waste collection in Sri Lanka.
There are no significant environmentally and socially acceptable solid waste 
disposal facilities in Sri Lanka. Some small-scale sanitary landfills were con-
structed on a pilot basis, but they absorb only a small fraction of the collected 
Figure 3.4 share of municipal solid Waste collected 2007 and GDp 2011
percent
Sources: Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2011; National Solid Waste Management Support Center 2008.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. Solid waste management data are for 2007; GDP data are for 2010.
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solid waste. Solid waste processing is also negligible.16 The vast majority is, hence, 
tipped haphazardly in open dump sites without any environmental controls or 
in open spaces (Abeysundra and Babel 2005). Many of the open dumping sites 
are in low-lying areas, such as marshes or abandoned paddy fields, and none of 
them has been engineered to control the pollutants that are released as the solid 
waste decomposes (United Nations Environment Programme 2001). This also 
has consequences for local drainage systems. The construction of new sites is 
hindered by the lack of public lands and considerable public debate surrounding 
the location of new solid waste dumping sites. For instance, locations close to 
residential areas, sensitive natural resource basins, historical and cultural monu-
ments, national parks, and other ecosensitive areas are always contentious. 
Recourse to legal and political pressures to relocate designated disposal sites away 
from private lands owned by “politically connected people” add to the institu-
tional challenges experienced by most local authorities. Disputes between local 
authorities on the location of dumping sites and landfills are also common.
The estimation of the SWM service gap is based on forecasts of solid waste 
generation and two scenarios of collection efficiency. First, the analysis forecasts 
the amount of solid waste generated by households, tourists, industries, and hos-
pitals. A further distinction is made between rural and urban areas. Second, 
the amount of solid waste collected is forecast for business-as-usual and service 
improvement scenarios. The latter assumes that Sri Lanka would achieve the 
c ollection efficiency of the average upper-middle-income country by 2020. 
The SWM service gap is then captured by the difference between the two 
 scenarios. The infrastructure gap and associated investment needs are calculated 
based on the estimated SWM service gap. First, the SWM service gap is used to 
determine the infrastructure gap, that is, the number of transport vehicles (and 
workers) and sanitary landfills needed to meet the additional demand. Second, the 
investment needs are calculated based on the annual operating and capital cost for 
collecting, transporting, and disposing of the solid waste. The capital investments 
for the appropriate disposal facilities and vehicles were also computed.
Sizable investments in infrastructure are necessary to meet the SWM service 
gap by 2020. Using the predictions of the amount of waste collected in the 
business-as-usual and service improvement scenarios, the SWM service gap in 
2020 is estimated to be 5,170 tons per day. To meet this gap, infrastructure and 
manpower requirements are necessary, including the construction of more than 
100 sanitary landfills (table 3.9). Moreover, the workforce has to double by 2020, 
and more than 1,700 vehicles have to be purchased. These investments will on 
average cost US$25 million to US$182 million per year, or 0.04 to 0.31 percent 
of GDP, with disposal costs making up to 30 to 40 percent.
A national SWM policy framework needs to be developed. One of the main 
issues of the national SWM strategy is the difficulty implementing it at the local 
level without significant modifications. Since the institutional, technical, and 
financial capacities of rural Pradeshiya Sabhas are very different from those of 
local authorities in urban areas, the country needs to formulate a national SWM 
policy framework. This would enable local authorities to prepare strategies based 
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on their solid waste profiles and technical and fiscal capacities. Fiscal and 
 management improvements at the local level will also be essential. Some of the 
recommended operational improvements suggested at the local authority level 
are (a) the creation of a separate SWM section or department, (b) the revision of 
the budget format to include a separate SWM head, (c) scaling up the solid waste 
reduction and recycling practices and increases in service coverage, (d) the cre-
ation of community groups for social mobilization and awareness creation, 
(e) the provision of incentives for the 3Rs, and (f) improved solid waste data 
management.
In the long term, there should be fundamental improvements in the SWM 
budget and expenditure management processes. Possible fiscal initiatives include 
(a) revising the property tax and trade license rates and (b) introducing cross-
subsidies or differential solid waste collection charges. In addition, local  authorities 
should manage their manpower, machineries, and equipment more efficiently to 
raise more revenue. One way to incentivize a more efficient use of the budgetary 
support would be to decouple the subsidy from the amount spent on wages and 
link it to operational efficiency parameters instead. To help finance effective 
SWM at the local level, a two-window funding mechanism should be introduced: 
a technical capacity-building grant and a capital-financing window. Local authori-
ties not eligible at present for capital loan financing should receive technical 
assistance to build capacity, improve their fiscal and solid waste data management, 
and reform their SWM operations. Local authorities with the necessary fiscal and 
technical capacities should instead be supported via the capital financing window. 
SWM issues pertaining to public-private delivery of services and improvement in 
coordination of different tiers of government are discussed in chapter 4.
table 3.9 cost of the service Gap, 2015 and 2020
in million US$/year
2011–15 2015–20
Low High Low High
Waste collection and transportation cost
 Rural Pradeshiya Sabhas 2.29 13.17 3.28 23.09
 Urban councils + urban Pradeshiya Sabhas 9.53 54.76 14.59 102.71
 Municipal councils 2.36 13.59 3.57 25.15
 Total 14.19 81.52 21.44 150.95
Sanitary landfill cost
 Rural Pradeshiya Sabhas 0.93 8.71 1.26 11.82
 Urban councils + urban Pradeshiya Sabhas 3.86 36.22 5.60 52.57
 Municipal councils 0.96 8.99 1.37 12.87
 Total 5.75 53.92 8.24 77.26
Total cost 19.93 135.44 29.68 228.21
Total cost as an average share of GDP 0.03% 0.23% 0.05% 0.39%
Source: Based on Environmental Resources Management 1997, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 2005, United 
Nations Environment Programme 2001, and stakeholder consultations.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
Infrastructure Constraints and Investment Needs 71
Investing in Infrastructure • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9927-9 
telecommunications
The telecommunications sector is one of the backbones of the Sri Lankan econ-
omy and shows potential to benefit from the growth of the services sector and 
the untapped global ICT market. In Sri Lanka, international connectivity and 
access to high-speed and inexpensive Internet services are sine qua non in the 
development of a vibrant innovation system. The impact goes beyond the ICT 
market, expanding into more traditional sectors such as agriculture and manufac-
turing. The growth and development of the telecommunications sector led by 
the private sector is an impetus for the national economy. As discussed in 
 chapter 2, Sri Lanka has great potential to benefit from strengthening economic 
fundamentals and tapping into the global ICT market.
Liberalization, competition, and private investment spurred development in 
the sector, but the agenda is not over. Regulatory reform, deregulation, and pri-
vate investment have improved affordability, increased coverage, and widened 
adoption of telephone services (World Bank 2010). However, tariff wars, slow 
economic growth, increased inflationary cost pressures, and interest rates have 
led to the erosion of profits and the inability to reinvest in new technology and 
expand the network capacity. Over 80 percent of the population now has mobile 
telephone subscriptions. However, large differences remain between rural and 
urban areas and across provinces, leaving roughly 18 percent of Sri Lanka’s 
 territory uncovered. Low penetration levels are a result of acute supply con-
straints due to a weak policy and regulatory framework and little competition.
Sri Lanka should address the remaining infrastructure gaps through reforms 
rather than fiscal means, with the government merely assuming a regulatory role. 
The growth strategy for the telecommunications sector depends on sustained 
private investments, with little to no public financing. It is critical to identify and 
address any gaps in the policy and regulatory framework that might constrain 
private investment. Sufficient private investment could be facilitated by (a) clari-
fying the telecommunications policy, (b) completing the liberalization process, 
(c) simplifying the tax and licensing regimes, (d) strengthening the regulatory 
framework, and (e) rethinking the approach to universal service. The preeminent 
role of the private sector in telecommunications precluded the need to estimate 
an investment gap. Rather, the analysis focused on policy issues.
Government Vision and Targets
The GoSL’s strategic objective, as stated in the Mahinda Chintana, is to turn the 
country into a technology hub for which a modern telecommunications infra-
structure is essential. In the Mahinda Chintana, the GoSL identifies a “modern 
telecommunications infrastructure” as “an essential requirement for rapid eco-
nomic and social development of the country” (Ministry of Finance and Planning 
2007). Therefore, the government’s objective is to promote the development of 
an affordable, high-quality telecommunications network, with equal access in 
both rural and urban areas, and across provinces. The targets for Sri Lanka’s 
 telecommunications sector are realistic but require updating and specification. 
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The policy targets for the telecommunications sector were outlined in the 
Mahinda Chintana and 2006–16 development plan of the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka (TRCSL). The current indicators for fixed 
telephone subscription and the number of data communications are steadily 
approaching or have exceeded their respective 2016 targets, while cellular tele-
phone subscriptions have yet to near the 2016 target (table 3.10). Furthermore, 
targets need be updated to new technological realities; for example, new targets 
need to be specified for broadband penetration.
Growth-Retarding Gaps
There is a need to update the telecommunications policy to lay the foundation 
for the next generation of network developments. The current policy dates from 
1998 and focuses on the principles of competition, high-quality service, and 
universal service. However, it was developed to address the concerns of the tele-
phony era, not the Internet and broadband age. A key constraint has been the 
lack of a strategic approach to universal telecommunications services. In the cur-
rent context, such a strategy would define goals for universal telephone service, 
expanded broadband services, and universal access to Internet services, with a 
specific focus on rural areas. In addition, the regulatory agency is weak, because 
it lacks independence and faces internal capacity constraints. First, steps need to 
be taken to minimize the opportunities for regulatory capture and strengthen the 
independence of the TRCSL. The risk for regulatory capture is primarily due to 
political appointments and the absence of conflict-of-interest rules. Second, the 
initial practice of hiring TRCSL staff from the state-owned enterprises has low-
ered its technical capacity, constraining its ability to manage this fast-evolving 
sector. Stricter service guidelines and streamlined internal processes are also 
necessary to ensure a high standard for the regulator’s activities and interactions 
with stakeholders.
The existing tax regime also places a high burden on the telecommunications 
sector. First, the government has imposed sector-specific taxes that impose a rela-
tively high burden on telecommunications service providers. Second, the GoSL 
taxes multiple stages in the value chain of telecommunications services, thereby 
inhibiting the growth of the sector through limiting both the demand and the 
supply side for connectivity. Third, telecommunications companies face prob-
lems in the administration of the tax regime, which involve fines for minor 
table 3.10 the telecommunications regulatory commission of sri lanka’s targets for 2016 
and status as of December 2011
Indicator Target for 2016 2011 Status 2010–11 Growth rates, %
Fixed telephone subscriptions 18.2 per 100 17.5 per 100 3
Cellular telephone subscriptions 32.5 million 18.3 million 5
Data connections (Internet and 
e-mail)
252,000 
connections
359,000 
connections
28
Source: Telecommunications Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka 2011.
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 disputes and uncoordinated levy setting. The government has begun reforming 
the tax regime for the telecommunications sector, a process that should engage 
all stakeholders.
Sri Lanka Telecom (SLT) still dominates the international connectivity 
 markets, which has significant potential for further liberalization. Owing to the 
partial liberalization of international connectivity—SLT still holds a monopoly on 
the international gateway facility—high fees have been sustained. As a conse-
quence, improving the competition at the service level and licensing 32 external 
gateway operators had only a limited effect. It is thus critical that the gateway be 
managed as an essential facility with open-access regulation and nondiscrimina-
tory pricing. Moreover, a regulatory framework should be created that brings the 
prices of international connectivity closer to costs through pricing international 
leased lines. Sri Lanka lacks a stable interconnection regime that specifies that 
calls are carried and paid for between different networks. In fact, there is no 
framework within which specific rates could be defined. This creates uncertain-
ties, because it is not clear how revenue for calls between networks should be 
shared. TRCSL has made some progress in imposing new guidelines. Continuing 
consultations with stakeholders—including the private sector and consumers—
will be necessary.
The existing licensing regime for telecommunications is overly complex and 
not aligned with the latest technological developments. There are currently at 
least 10 markets in Sri Lanka’s telecommunications sector, each with its own 
licensing regime. Such a setup does not ease the introduction of new 
 technologies and business models. In addition, the licensing regime is not 
aligned with the latest technological developments. First, it distinguishes 
between the fixed  wireless and mobile telephone, which is problematic since 
both technologies are inherently mobile. Second, there are different licenses for 
data communications and telephone services. However, the introduction of 
Internet-protocol-based networking has eliminated technical constraints in pro-
viding Internet services. Both distinctions create opportunities for arbitrage. 
There is a lack of service-level competition, since SLT dominates the broadband 
market. SLT accounts for 85 percent of broadband subscribers, because it 
 controls the wireline telephone network that is a key channel for broadband 
delivery. It would be possible to mandate the opening of the subscriber lines 
through a process commonly known as “unbundling.” This would allow alterna-
tive service providers to get access to subscribers at mandated cost-plus pricing 
and would increase service-level competition.
The existing funding mechanism for universal service is inefficient and has 
created distortions in the market. The universal service fund is created through a 
per-minute levy on incoming international calls. Not only is this based on an 
outdated notion of international telephone services as a luxury service, but it also 
distorts international trade in telecommunications services and creates a gray 
market for international call services. Funding problems are exacerbated by a 
slow disbursement of collected funds. To promote service coverage, public funds 
should help connect the remotest and least-served regions. The spectrum policy 
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should also be reviewed to accommodate recent evolutions in the market. There 
have been three important evolutions in the spectrum market. First, the rise of 
wireless broadband requires the identification of new ranges of spectrum that 
can support high-speed and mobile data services. Second, advances in technology 
mean that older assumptions about the need to divide and tightly regulate spec-
trum are being overturned. Third, the convergence of technologies means that 
spectrum policy and licenses should be technology and service neutral. There is, 
thus, an opportunity for Sri Lanka to clarify its spectrum policy, with a focus on 
the availability of spectrum for advanced services.
Sri Lanka lacks a widespread domestic backbone network. Backbone connec-
tivity in Sri Lanka is currently expensive, limiting the access of businesses and 
individuals to affordable broadband services in less “Colombo-centric” locations. 
In addition, there is no clear regulatory framework for leased-lines pricing or for 
nondiscriminatory access to existing backbone infrastructure. Extending the 
 current network is also difficult because of the high cost of civil works. These 
problems could be resolved if the telecommunications network used already 
existing passive infrastructures (for example, railways) as is planned under 
e-Sri Lanka. A more direct engagement of TRCSL is now required to create a 
simple mechanism for coordinating such activities in the future. The important 
demand-side problems in growing the broadband market are affordability and 
unclear  attractiveness of Internet services. First, Sri Lanka’s broadband Internet 
plans are among the most expensive in the region (World Bank 2008). Second, 
the attractiveness of Internet services, especially in rural areas, is not clear. While 
mobile telephone services are nearly ubiquitous and have a clear value proposi-
tion, the same is not the case for Internet services. Even in media-rich and devel-
oped markets such as the United States, half of those who do not have broadband 
say it is because they do not find it relevant (Home Broadband 2010).
International experience has shown that visionary yet actionable strategies are 
necessary for strong telecommunications growth, which Sri Lanka currently 
lacks. These strategies often address both supply- and demand-side concerns and 
lay out long-term objectives backed up with specific action plans. They are also 
developed through consultative approaches to both ensure high quality and 
 generate support and visibility (Kim, Kelly, and Raja 2010). Such consultation 
may be enhanced through the creation of an industry association that serves as a 
balanced representative of various service providers’ viewpoints. As a first step, 
the GoSL should encourage the creation of such an association and update its 
sector strategy. The government will also need to focus on creating the appropri-
ate incentives to make telephone services ubiquitous and to accelerate the 
expansion of broadband networks. The dual objectives of the reform agenda are 
universalizing telephony and expanding broadband Internet services. The reform 
agenda should thus focus on (a) clarifying the telecommunications policy; 
(b) completing the process of liberalization; (c) simplifying the tax and licensing 
regimes; (d) strengthening the regulatory framework, especially in interconnec-
tion and spectrum management; and (e) rethinking the approach to universal 
service.17
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concluding remarks
The total estimated investment needs of the major infrastructure sectors in 
Sri Lanka are summarized in table 1.2. Excluding the telecommunications  sector, 
for which estimates are not available, the needed investment ranges from about 
0.04 percent of GDP (solid waste sector) to as high as 4.16 percent of GDP 
(transport sector). The total needed investment (excluding telecommunications) 
ranges from 3.84 to 6.9 percent of GDP. As previously discussed, investment 
levels as high as roughly 7 percent of GDP (more if telecommunications is 
included), if carried out entirely by the public sector, will pose serious fiscal 
 challenges, given the country’s low revenue generation, chronic fiscal deficit, and 
high debt. Thus, prudent management of the infrastructure program will require 
measures that produce higher returns from any given level of investment. 
Improving the regulatory and institutional enabling environment discussed in the 
context of specific sectors in this chapter will help mitigate the need for higher 
investment, keeping the needs closer to the lower bound. Other important cross-
sectoral complementary measures to achieve this goal are discussed in chapter 4.
notes
 1. Authors’ calculations.
 2. The adjusted Gini coefficient for cooking gas is 0.33 and for landlines and mobile 0.03. 
The Gini coefficient for gas reflects the widespread use of firewood for cooking in the 
country, which may have severe health consequences in terms of indoor air pollution 
(not analyzed in this study but a possible topic for future work).
 3. Score I: simple average (sum of the points for each indicator divided by the number 
of indicators); score II: weighted average using predetermined weights to capture that 
water and sanitation and power are important direct benefits to households; score III: 
weighted average using weights obtained from a principal component analysis—a 
statistical procedure.
 4. Height represents relative poverty (number of poor individuals in each district/total 
headcount of each district). Each district is then ranked between 1 and 4. This ranking 
is dependent on the quartile the aggregate scores fall into. If a district falls in the 
 bottom quartile, it ranks 1 (red in the map), which indicates poor accessibility to 
infrastructure, while a district that scores in the top quartile ranks 4 (gold in the map) 
and indicates highest accessibility.
 5. Liu (2001) presents a literature review of the links between transport and economic 
growth.
 6. Exchange rate on September 26, 2012, was SL Rs 130.9657 (Central Bank of 
Sri Lanka 2012).
 7. 2011 Gross domestic product (GDP) of SL Rs 6,543 billion at market prices 
(Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2011).
 8. According to the chief executive officer of the Sri Lanka Shippers’ Academy and the 
secretary general of the Asian Shippers’ Council, 4.3 million 20-foot equivalent 
 container units are currently handled by Sri Lanka. Seventy-five percent of this is 
transshipment, of which 39 percent goes to India.
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 9. See Rajapaksa and Ruiz-Nuñez for details.
 10. A detailed discussion on the estimation of the transport investment needs in Sri 
Lanka (including methodology selection and the assumptions behind the model) 
can be found in Carruthers and Krisnamani (2010). Other relevant literature 
includes Bogetic (2006), Bogetic and Fedderke (2006), Euijune (2002), and 
World Bank (2006).
 11. This comparison does not include investment needs in transport services (that is, rail-
ways and buses for public transportation), since the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) 
accounting system does not disaggregate investment in infrastructure from investment 
in rolling stock and buses.
 12. Nonconventional renewable energies (NCRE) is defined as small hydro (less than 10 
megawatts), wind, biomass, and other energy sources (for example, agricultural solid 
waste, landfill gas, and municipal solid waste).
 13. See PUCSL 2012 for further details.
 14. The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Division also prepared a rural sanitation 
 policy in 2006, which has not yet been ratified (Rural Water Supply and Sanitation 
Division 2006).
 15. A relative delinking of income and solid waste generation was found only at high 
income levels in developed economies (Mazzanti, Montini, and Zoboli 2006).
 16. The main solid waste processing practices followed in the country are composting, 
recycling, and biogas generation. Composting is a popular practice in estate and 
urban areas, while commercial composting has become popular in some local 
authorities in recent years. In fact, the number of compost plants has grown from 
one plant in 1997 to 56 plants in 2009. Some small-scale solid-waste-to-energy 
projects were also initiated on an experimental basis, but they had only mixed 
success.
 17. See Hapugalle, Raja, and Paradi-Guilford for details.
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Financing Infrastructure Investment
In chapter 3, it was estimated that an additional 3.84 to 6.9 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) would be required to modernize infrastructure to 
 sustain high GDP growth in the future in Sri Lanka. This will pose a challenge 
for fiscal sustainability, given the high level of public debt. The regulatory and 
institutional reform discussed in the context of specific sectors in chapter 3 will 
help to increase returns to infrastructure investment in terms of the quantity and 
quality of services. This will help lower the need for total investment in 
 infrastructure and thus help mitigate the impact of the Mahinda Chintana 
 targets on the budget. This needs to be complemented by efforts to reduce the 
losses of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), delivering infrastructure services to 
release resources for investment, promoting public-private partnerships (PPPs), 
improving coordination among different tiers of government, and taking 
 advantage of sectoral synergies to increase returns to investment.
reducing losses of soes
Reducing the losses incurred when SOEs provide infrastructure services can 
make a significant contribution to freeing the resources required to achieve the 
Mahinda Chintana infrastructure and growth targets. The losses incurred by 
SOEs providing major infrastructure in 2011 are shown in table 4.1.1 The net 
losses amount to 1.74 percent of 2011 GDP, and their elimination would release 
as much as 23 percent of the resources required to meet the lower bound of the 
financing for infrastructure investment. To eliminate SOE losses, the authorities 
would need to streamline tariffs and make them more transparent and responsive 
to costs in the energy and water and sanitation sectors. Electricity tariffs have not 
passed on the fluctuations in international petroleum prices to customers since 
the government reintroduced price controls in 2004. However, the recent 
 electricity tariff restructuring by the Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka 
(PUCSL) is intended to make them fully cost reflective by 2015, while 
 subsidizing low-income households. Nonetheless, tariffs are still below cost in 
the water and sanitation sector, and the subsidies are poorly targeted, with the 
 bottom quintile receiving only 14 percent.
c h a p t e r  4
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The Sri Lanka Transport Board (SLTB) and Sri Lanka Railway (SLR), for their 
part, need to address extremely high-cost structures. Cost-reflective pricing and 
efficiency measures can make a major contribution to sustainable mobilization 
of the financing required to meet Sri Lanka’s infrastructure target. Rationalizing 
poorly targeted fiscal subsidies would need to be an important aspect of reforms 
to improve the operational efficiency of SOEs to release resources for new 
investments in infrastructure. In addition, reforms in some sectors would bring 
much-needed increases in efficiency via newer technologies, better pricing 
mechanisms, and incentive signals to promote innovation. The associated increase 
in productivity would not only promote economic growth but also facilitate 
mitigating the infrastructure gap. Financial assessments of key infrastructure 
SOEs listed in table 4.1, and also Sri Lanka Telecom and Sri Lanka Ports 
Authority, are presented in Coomaraswamy and Samarajiva, along with a discus-
sion of the steps needed to improve financial performance.
encouraging ppp in infrastructure provision
PPP Advantages
PPPs for infrastructure financing have the overarching objectives of allowing the 
public sector to share risks with the private sector in the provision of public 
services, and alleviating pressures on public budgets. PPPs have the added 
 advantage of tapping into new technologies and increased efficiencies that the 
private sector may provide. More than 20 years of PPP experience indicates that 
efficiency/productivity gains from PPP-executed projects over purely publicly 
delivered projects can range from 10 percent to over 70 percent, and there have 
also been significant improvements in the quality of service. Under optimal risk-
sharing contracts, PPPs can also contribute to significant reduction in costs and 
delays in construction. A review of construction projects by the UK National 
Audit Office has shown that, on average, PPP arrangements were responsible for 
only 22 percent of cost overruns for the public sector compared to 73 percent 
under traditional procurement arrangements. PPPs also increase the capacity of 
local industry and bring more innovation to a specific sector. This is advantageous 
table 4.1 losses and Gains of infrastructure-providing soes, 2011
in billion SL Rs and million US$
SOEs
Losses/gains in billion 
SL Rs Losses/gains in million US$
Sri Lanka Transport Board −2.03 −15.5
Sri Lanka Railway −4.10 −31.30
Ceylon Petroleum Corporation −94.51 −721.64
Ceylon Electricity Board −19.27 −147.14
National Water Supply and Drainage Board 6.23 48.57
Total −113.68 −867.01
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2011; Ministry of Finance and Planning 2011.
Note: SL Rs = Sri Lankan rupees; SOE = state-owned enterprise. Exchange rate on September 26, 2012, was SL Rs 130.9657 
(Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2012).
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because by bringing in international construction companies, investors, and 
 advisors, Sri Lanka can quickly adopt international best practices. For example, 
when applied to road construction and management, this could mean improving 
the technical quality of not only the road assets but also the expertise of local 
staff, institutions, and companies involved. Yet, it should be noted that PPPs are 
not a guarantee of knowledge transfer. Knowledge transfer comes if international 
companies are willing to bid and have the incentive to build capacity in the local 
contracting industry.
PPP Experience in Sri Lanka and Future Potential
The government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) has implemented a policy framework 
(Procurement Guidelines for Development of Infrastructure Projects on a PPP 
Basis, 2010, and Procurement Guidelines on Goods and Works, 2006) that is 
currently under review. The legal framework provides specific guidelines on 
solicitation, drafting, short listing, procurement, litigation, conformity, and 
 unsolicited proposals to ensure transparency. A formal institutional framework 
for PPPs such as in Chile, Korea, Peru, or South Africa does not yet exist but can 
be created by integrating the functions of several government departments 
involved in the PPP process. Guided by the PPP framework, Sri Lanka is 
 beginning to accumulate valuable experience in executing PPPs. The leading 
 sectors that have adopted PPPs so far include the telecommunications sector 
(five mobile and four fixed line), power (hydro and thermal), seaport terminals 
(South Asia Gateway Terminal [SAGT] with John Keells Holdings and Asian 
Development Bank support), housing (Millennium City, Nivasi), real estate 
development (World Trade Center), and the services sector. The full list of PPP 
projects is discussed in Biller, Guasch, and Madawela.
The experience with PPPs so far has been good. There have, of course, been 
difficulties, but none that were not eventually surmounted. The performance of 
recent important PPP projects is as follows:
•	 SAGT is one of the largest foreign investments in Sri Lanka, and all reports 
indicate that it is also an extremely successful one. Data up to May 2010 indi-
cate that cargo volumes handled by the port terminal have risen by 22.3  percent 
year-on-year up to 175,514, 20-foot equivalent container units. This  number 
increased by 24.4 percent in December 2011 year-on-year. Volumes handled 
by all terminals have been rising, thanks to improved global trade.
•	 Asia Power Sapugaskanda, funded jointly by an international consortium of 
funders and technology partners, has proceeded without any major problems, 
and appears to have secured effective cooperation from all stakeholders, 
including the Board of Investment (BOI), Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB), and 
Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) in implementing the agreements.
•	 In the case of Ace Power’s proposed plant for Anuradhapura, a protest and 
mass opposition based on environmental concerns surrounding the project led 
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to its abandonment in 2001. Following negotiations with the CEB, the Ministry 
of Power and Energy, and the BOI, it was agreed to relocate the power plant 
at Horana. Despite the loss of 11 months, the project was successfully 
 completed in December 2002 on a revised schedule. The experience  represents 
a good example of the need to pay attention to different regulations, including 
environmental ones, and the power of civil society in defense of public goods.
•	 The Applied Energy Services Corporation (AES Corporation) Kelanitissa 
plant that operates under a build-own-transfer agreement with the  government, 
CEB, and CPC reports that a number of factors slowed the completion of the 
project, and the consortium management was of the view that future 
 participation in similar PPP infrastructure projects will depend on the 
 government’s ability to spell out a clear policy on its position with regard to 
private sector participation.
The PPP experience thus far suggests that Sri Lanka remains underserved by this 
important source of financing investment in infrastructure. The Mahinda 
Chintana guidance on sector-specific potential PPPs and those given in other 
documents allow a sectorwide listing of ongoing and potential PPPs.2 Table 4.2 
compares Sri Lanka with similar middle-income countries with respect to their 
ability to attract PPP projects. Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines are larger 
economies than Sri Lanka and, as expected, other things being equal, have more 
PPP projects. The Philippine economy is not as large as that of Indonesia or 
Malaysia but still has more projects. This may be due to a friendlier environment 
for attracting private sector involvement, caused by fiscal constraints, search for 
efficiency, risk sharing, greater infrastructure needs, and other factors. Given 
Sri Lanka’s infrastructure needs and fiscal constraints, it is reasonable to expect 
that Sri Lanka would need to attract more PPP projects in the coming years. Yet, 
figure 4.1 also illustrates how PPPs remained stagnant throughout the last decade 
in Sri Lanka. If the GoSL wants to achieve the goals of the Mahinda Chintana, 
addressing this imbalance is sorely needed.
Realizing the PPP Potential in Infrastructure
Several countries, including Brazil, Chile, Peru, South Africa, and the United 
Kingdom, have developed comprehensive frameworks for encouraging PPP in 
table 4.2 ratios of level of population, GDp (ppp), and number of private participation in 
infrastructure (ppi) projects in sri lanka
Country Population GDP (PPP) Number of PPI projects
Dominican Republic 0.48 0.85 0.83
Indonesia 11.61 9.64 3.07
Malaysia 1.38 3.84 3.27
Philippines 4.55 3.35 3.70
Sri Lanka 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; PPP = public-private partnership.
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infrastructure provision. Experience shows that a strong PPP framework that 
clearly states the policy, legal, and institutional aspects of contracting PPPs goes 
a long way in creating the enabling environment for attracting PPPs. Based on 
lessons learned from 20 years’ experience with PPPs around the world, sugges-
tions are offered on salient features to strengthen the PPP process in Sri Lanka 
(for the full discussion see Biller, Guasch, and Madawela).
PPP Policy Framework and Execution Modalities
Institutional Anchor and Jurisdiction. Leadership of PPP/Infrastructure Initiative: 
Best practices recommend the establishment of a lean delivery unit with high 
convening power by virtue of being linked to the highest levels of government, 
like the Office of the Prime Minister. The major roles of the delivery unit are 
solving problems in  implementation and ensuring effective coordination among 
the various relevant institutions (line ministries, agencies, subnational govern-
ments, and so forth). Backed by skilled professionals, the delivery unit also should 
monitor progress of salient PPP projects and anticipate problems and find 
 solutions before they become too expensive to set right. Other important 
 agencies include:
•	 Line ministries (infrastructure/others) should be in charge of the planning, 
priorities, and identification of PPP projects (technical analysis/design) and 
submitting the projects for approval to interministerial committees.
•	 Interministerial committees (led by finance/treasury) review PPP projects 
 submitted by line ministries, decide on and select and prioritize projects, 
Figure 4.1 private participation in infrastructure total investment commitments, selected countries, 
1990–2011
in million current US$
Source: Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility database. http://ppi.worldbank.org.
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 validate key objectives/indicators of projects, filter for quality and impact of 
project, and approve projects for government support.
•	 PPP unit receives the projects and designs the contract and executes the 
 transaction (and also provides advice); it supports and advises other relevant 
entities and the state and municipal governments on PPP design and 
 disseminates PPP best practice.
•	 Treasury/finance ministry leads the discussion in the Inter-Ministerial Cabinet 
on PPP projects, validates economic impact analysis, assesses fiscal impact and 
contingent liabilities, and authorizes PPP transactions.
•	 Superintendence/regulatory agency oversees execution of project and compli-
ance with contract.
•	 Observatory (linked to the delivery unit) does ex-post impact evaluation and 
derives lessons for future PPPs.
Needs and Typology of Government Support. Not all projects are viable as 
PPPs, and they are likely to require support from the government (financial or 
guarantees). Government support could be  financial and nonfinancial, and 
understanding their links and overlaps is important to minimize the fiscal 
burden of financial support. PPPs cannot be considered as an additional source 
of revenue, because the private sector is ultimately paid from the same 
sources, that is, by users and taxpayers. Nonetheless, it is often considered as 
such for fiscally constrained countries and where the  alternative is no project 
at all. PPPs allow for the acceleration of the infrastructure program and, at 
least in the short term, help release the fiscal constraints. As shown in 
 figure 4.2, the private sector will still need to recover its investment and make 
a profit (but through the life of the project) and expects to be funded through 
Figure 4.2 Financing sources for highways through public Funds or ppps
Note: PPP = public-private partnership.
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the same sources, as budgets often are tolls, fuel taxes, or government 
 contribution ( general taxes). Sri Lanka would like to consider a strategy and 
procedures to (financially) support worthwhile projects that are not fully 
financially viable. Biller, Guasch, and Madawela present various options for 
doing this depending on the specific nature of the project.
Eligibility Criteria. Countries with successful PPP experience have established 
eligibility criteria particularly for government support.3 Concerns about long-
term fiscal impacts of PPP projects prompted governments such as South Africa 
to establish rules to ensure that projects demonstrate (a) value for money, 
(b) optimum risk transfer to the private sector, and (c) affordability for govern-
ment/users (cost recovery). The remaining key risk is that countries cannot afford 
basic services or undertake future investments if payment levels become unsus-
tainable. Brazil, for example, has established limits on future payments for PPP 
projects to protect future investments.
Awarding and Accounting for Government Guarantees. Guarantees can be trig-
gered, but it is important to establish rules to ensure that the staff in charge of 
PPP projects has the right incentives, information, and capacity to evaluate and 
account for the costs and risks of contingent liabilities. Below are some rules to 
achieve those objectives:
•	 Use cost-benefit analysis to select projects and use value-for-money analysis to 
choose between PPPs and public finance.
•	 Quantify costs and risks of contingent liabilities.
•	 PPP approval should occur at the level of the cabinet, or Ministry of Finance, 
or a government body with an interest in future spending. The Ministry of 
Finance should review proposed PPPs.
•	 Governments should bear only those risks that they can manage through 
 control or influence.
•	 Modern accrual-accounting standards should be adopted for financial report-
ing to reduce the temptation to use PPPs to hide fiscal obligations.
•	 PPP contracts and cost/risk information on financial obligations imposed on 
government should be disclosed.
•	 Budgetary systems should be modified to capture the costs of contingent 
liabilities.
•	 A guarantee fund should be used so the cost of guarantees is recognized when 
they are granted and to help with payments if guarantees are triggered.
•	 Government should charge fees for guarantees (this may not be possible at the 
early stages of a PPP program), which are passed on to the users by the 
operator.
•	 Coherent and longer-term sectorwide strategies and policies are needed to 
support the strategies.
•	 The government should have the capacity to implement PPPs and to antici-
pate and address problems well before they become costly delays.
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•	 A conflict resolution process, especially a legal framework for resolving 
 conflicts quickly, is needed.
strengthening coordination among Different tiers of Government
Sectors That Involve Three Levels of Government
Solid Waste
In the solid waste “value chain,” processing facilities/landfills require most 
 investment. They may be fully outsourced to private companies, but based on 
experience, it appears that PPPs would be a better solution. This is the case for 
two reasons. First, the contracts to manage the relationships with solid waste sup-
pliers may be excessively complex. Second, public resistance to the location and 
operation of solid waste facilities may be easier to manage if the government is 
involved. In Sri Lanka, each provincial government, through its Commissioner of 
Local Government (and in the case of the Western Province, through the Waste 
Management Authority), should assign local authorities to one or more solid 
waste processing facilities in a manner compliant with the national policy. Ideally, 
the institutional design should not lock in local authorities to specific solid waste 
processing facilities, allowing for competition at the margin among facilities. For 
example, there should be an obligation to deliver, say, 60 percent of a local 
authority’s solid waste to the assigned facility, but not 100 percent. The  minimum 
commitment will reduce uncertainty in the design of the facility. However, the 
possibility that 40 percent may go to another approved solid waste facility within 
or outside the province will create incentives for efficiency and responsiveness to 
the local authority and/or their agents among the operators of solid waste pro-
cessing facilities.
Local authorities may choose to collect solid waste using their own personnel 
and equipment or to outsource these functions, in the same way that street 
 cleaning and similar functions have been successfully outsourced for a long time. 
Indeed, the Sri Jayewardenepura Kotte Municipal Council is currently using its 
own personnel and equipment to collect solid waste in one part of its territory 
and has outsourced these functions in the remainder to a private entity. 
The  efficacy of these arrangements depends on a number of factors, including (a) 
the capacity of the local authorities to draft and monitor outsourcing contracts 
that adequately address problems of commitment, (b) the transparency of the 
grant of the contract, and (c) the number of existing employees and existing 
 investment in equipment. Outsourcing may be applied to collection of solid 
waste from households and commercial establishments; it can be applied to the 
operation of depots and the hauling of sorted solid waste from depots to the solid 
waste  processing facility; or it can be applied to both. Ideally, outsourcing con-
tracts will be structured so that benchmarking can be done, for example, by giv-
ing multiple haulage contracts instead of one covering the entire local authority.
Benchmarking can be embedded in the contracts, creating incentives for good 
performance and penalties for poor performance. There are 330 local authorities 
in Sri Lanka. Given the lack of capacity to draft and enforce outsourcing  contracts 
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within even the largest of these, an outsourcing support cell within an existing 
organization would appear a useful investment. Model contracts that include 
incentives for efficiency and gradually higher standards for separation can be 
provided. Moreover, assistance in modifying them to the circumstances of differ-
ent local authorities can be offered for a fee or on a subsidized basis. Well-crafted 
contracts that minimize ambiguity and rest on objective indicators are essential 
to smooth operation and minimization of conflicts. Currently, a cloud of suspicion 
about rent seeking hangs over outsourcing contracts and their enforcement. The 
main reason for this is that the contract has to be enforced by the local authorities, 
which is one of the interested parties. One alternative would be to resort to the 
courts. However, their remedies are time consuming and all-encompassing.
A solution would be to apply the natural justice principle that is an integral 
part of Sri Lankan administrative law and states that a party cannot judge its 
own case. Since the local authority is one of the parties, an entity other than 
the local authority must be responsible for settling disputes. The PUCSL has 
extensive mediation powers (PUCSL 2002) and will hopefully accumulate 
experience and expertise over time. It may serve as the first stop when conflicts 
arise with respect to solid waste contracts. Binding arbitration could be the last 
resort. The regulatory manuals of the PUCSL include detailed procedures for 
conflict resolution, such as Med-Arb (mediation with arbitration as a last 
resort) and Arb-Med (arbitration with the decision in a sealed envelope, to be 
followed by mediation, with the envelope being opened only when 
mediation fails).4
Water and Sanitation
The greatest investment in water and sanitation is required for the pipe networks 
that distribute water and carry away sewage. Sewerage treatment plants also 
require significant investment. The major investments that are required for 
building new pipelines, the refurbishment of the existing deteriorated pipelines, 
and modern sewerage treatment plants are beyond the resources of the local 
authorities. The funds cannot be raised from development partners or through 
PPPs, unless there are viable sources of revenue. A possible solution could be a 
concession contract that would lock in revenue streams from users of water and 
sanitation services. However, in a rapidly urbanizing country like Sri Lanka, this 
is not necessarily a feasible short-term option, but a long-term one. The contract 
should be between the provincial governments or a multilocal authority entity 
such as the proposed Metro Colombo Corporation on one side and the PPP 
operating the system on the other. The contract can include whatever grant 
 elements exist in the financing arrangement and any subsidy or concessional 
 elements that are built in to benefit designated classes of users. Contractual 
 safeguards are possible to address these uncertainties. However well crafted, 
concession contracts can be interpreted differently by parties over time and may 
require a conflict-resolving body. The conflict-resolution and interpretation 
 function cannot be given to either party of the concession contract, because 
that would violate the principles of natural justice. The natural candidate, again, 
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is the PUCSL. If foreign investors are involved, there may be a need for an 
 international-arbitration clause.5 However, it is in the interest of all to have a 
lower-cost, local solution as the first screen.
Sectors That Involve Two Levels of Government
Authority over roads, road passenger transport, and electricity are divided 
between the central government and the provincial governments.6 The minor 
roads that fall under the authority of local authorities are excluded from the 
present discussion.
Roads
Currently, all main roads are built, owned, and maintained by the central 
 government. Therefore, there is no obvious need for regulation in that govern-
ment supply can be directly controlled. However, regulation will be required if 
the national policy on roads, which is assigned to the central government by the 
Constitution, is changed (either at the national or provincial level) to allow or 
encourage private investment. Such regulation should create an environment 
conducive to investment and ensure that suppliers with significant monopoly 
power do not abuse such powers. The Constitution gives the central government 
undivided authority over national roads, including limited-entry, limited-exit 
highways such as the Southern Expressway. It is advisable that the national policy 
permit private investment through PPPs to build and operate the national roads 
as toll roads, thereby creating incentives for adequate maintenance. Toll roads 
generate revenues from users that can be directly applied to maintenance, 
 avoiding the perennial problems of underexpenditure on maintenance. Concession 
contracts can specify minimum standards such as the International Roughness 
Index7 and build in penalties if they are not met. Sri Lankan conditions may not 
be conducive for toll roads that are fully private except in a few cases, for 
 example, the Katunayake (Airport) Expressway, where demand characteristics 
are such that tolls are likely to yield adequate returns (Yatanwala and Jayasena 
n.d.). Therefore, PPPs with significant public investment are likely to be the 
norm. This would enable the setting of affordable tolls that would attract 
 adequate volumes of traffic to justify the investments.
Concession contracts with significant built-in subsidies would be a solution to 
increasing investment in road infrastructure. Public investment would be reduced 
and used to leverage additional private investment. Nonetheless, the interpreta-
tion and conflict resolution problems discussed above in relation to water and 
sanitation services will apply to toll concession contracts, as well. The PUCSL, 
backed up by international arbitration in the case of foreign investment, comple-
ments the solution. In the case of major roads that fall within the complete or 
partial jurisdiction of provincial governments, the PPP and concession contracts 
can be applied with modifications if tolling can be justified. The current approach 
has as its centerpiece the Road Maintenance Trust Fund. The Road Maintenance 
Trust Fund is expected to come on stream in 2011. It can be focused on the roads 
that involve no private investment.
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Road Passenger (Bus) Transport
There is private investment in bus transport at present but adequate regulation 
and institutional clarity are lacking. The sector is rife with problems: ownership 
is highly fragmented, timetables are not respected, oversupply at peak times 
coexists with undersupply at off-peak times, and there is inadequate  articulation 
between public and private bus services. The private operators on interprovin-
cial routes are subject to regulation by the National Transport Commission that 
is not independent of the central government and lacks capacity to resolve 
problems. Intraprovincial operators are instead subject to the authority of 
 provincial road transport ministries and agencies. Further, the constitutional 
changes effected in 1989 (the 13th amendment) have not been properly 
 integrated into the overall regulatory system, and an unclear division of labor 
between the National Transport Commission and provincial regulatory author-
ities remains.
The most critical issues that must be addressed by policy are (a) the overfrag-
mentation of the industry on the private side and (b) the hemorrhaging of losses 
exceeding total revenues by the public supplier. Excessive fragmentation of the 
industry makes regulation quite difficult. A majority of private suppliers operate 
one or two buses and very few of their own fleets. These structural problems can 
be addressed only by an overall policy that clearly demarcates authority between 
the national and provincial authorities, provides incentives for private operators 
to coalesce into companies or cooperatives, and introduces organizational reform 
of the public supplier. Without these structural reforms, simply improving the 
capacity or powers of the National Transport Commission will do little to 
improve sector performance. A draft National Transport Policy has been subject 
to public discussion8 but has yet to be formally adopted. It does not address the 
above concerns adequately.
Bus fares are highly politicized. The best efforts to introduce formula-based 
tariff regulation that would depoliticize the process by automatically adjusting for 
increases or decreases in fuel costs have failed to transcend the political pressures. 
A policy decision to adopt formula-based tariff regulation under the authority of 
the central and provincial bus transport ministries or to create independent regu-
latory authorities with clear jurisdiction over tariff regulation must be taken. If the 
latter option is chosen, the GoSL may consider new legislation on interprovincial 
bus transportation that would pass authority to the PUCSL. The modular design 
of the PUCSL is capable of accommodating interprovincial bus transportation; 
however, this subject was not addressed in the PUCSL Act. A center-province 
coordinating committee that would ensure articulation of regulatory procedures 
and decisions would be a necessary element of such legislation.
Electricity
Electricity reforms have been discussed in depth in Sri Lanka, since the late 
1990s. In 2002, legislation reflecting the stakeholder discussions was adopted by 
Parliament but not gazetted. Electricity reform was also ruled on by the Supreme 
Court. The 2002 legislation was replaced in 2009 by an act that finally gave 
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regulatory authority over the sector to the PUCSL. The earlier planned 
 unbundling of the CEB was abandoned, though the process led to a functional 
unbundling within the monolithic organization. In these deliberations, scant 
attention was paid to Article 32 of the Concurrent List of the 13th amendment, 
giving both levels of government concurrent jurisdiction over, “extension of 
 electrification within the Province and the promotion and regulation of the use 
of electricity within the Province.”9 Read in conjunction with the provisions that 
reserve for the central government subjects not specifically included in Lists 
I and III,10 this indicates that electricity generation and transmission are central 
subjects, while distribution, supply, and extension of services are provincial sub-
jects. The central government has authority to set national policy and is active in 
this area.11 Nevertheless, such policy cannot override constitutional provisions 
that assign the regulation of distribution to the provinces.
The de facto reality, however, is that the PUCSL is in charge of electricity 
regulation, and another central government agency, the Sri Lanka Sustainable 
Energy Authority, is in charge of renewable energy, with its powers defined by 
the Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority Act, No. 35 of 2007.12 It would 
appear that actions at the constitutional/legislative level are required to unravel 
the confusion and restore coherence, especially with regard to distribution and 
supply, perhaps the politically most sensitive components of the electricity value 
chain. The central government has clear authority over generation and 
 transmission. In the implicit single-buyer model that has been implemented 
under the 2009 Act, the most critical relationships are those between the CEB, 
which controls transmission and is the de facto single buyer, on one side, and the 
operators of generators, on the other. The 2009 Act requires all generation 
 licensees above 25 megawatts to have some shareholding from an entity 
 controlled by the government, though the shareholding is not specified. The 
most effective instrument for ensuring investment under these conditions is a 
power-purchase contract with the single buyer, which is subject to interpretation 
and conflict resolution by the PUCSL. The 2009 Act requires only accounting 
separation among the generation, transmission, and distribution units within the 
CEB. The hope, implicit in the original reform plans, of creating different incen-
tives among the managers of different functional units, is unlikely to be realized. 
However, the potential for extracting reliable information, which is crucial for 
effective  regulation and management, does exist. This can be realized only by 
judicious action on the part of the PUCSL backed up by the owner of the CEB, 
the government.
Sectors That Involve the Central Government Only
Major ports and all airports are solely within the jurisdiction of the central gov-
ernment, according to the 13th amendment to the Constitution.13 Railways, 
petroleum (and possibly also compressed natural gas [CNG], liquefied natural 
gas [LNG], and liquefied petroleum gas [LPG]) and telecommunications are 
also under the central government jurisdiction.14 Ports that are not declared as 
major ports by Parliament may fall under the provincial jurisdiction. They are not 
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discussed, because they do not exist at present and are unlikely to be of 
 significance in the foreseeable future.
International Ports and Airports
International ports and airports have monopolistic elements, but with regard to 
transit traffic they compete with ports and airports in the wider region. Policy and 
regulation should balance these two aspects. The monopoly power derives from 
the fact that shipping lines and airlines terminating and originating local traffic 
have no economically feasible alternatives, especially in a small island  lacking land 
links to nearby territories. Ports and airports require high capital investment and 
are economically difficult to replicate, thereby constituting essential facilities. 
Networking effects that reward the more connected with more connections rein-
force these characteristics, though they are also present in the competing regional 
hub of ports and airports. As recent European Commission actions against Maersk 
and other major shipping lines demonstrate (Hansegard 2011), shipping lines are 
also powerful players capable of collusive behavior.
The current arrangements in the port sector, where shipping lines have inte-
grated downward to port terminals (World Cargo News Online 2003), create an 
environment in which a small number of powerful liner operators are arrayed 
against the geography-derived power of governments. The terminal in the South 
Colombo Port has been concessioned out to a consortium that includes China 
Merchants Holdings, a Chinese government company that has shipping interests 
and from which China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) was spun off. 
Therefore, shipping line–port terminal integration exists in the Colombo Port, 
too. The optimal structure would involve the government acting as landlord and 
terminals that are operated as PPPs, preferably with different terminals operated 
by different entities. Competition among the terminals would then create 
 incentives for efficiency and good performance in terms of price and quality. An 
independent, resourced agency that can maintain oversight in terms of mergers 
and acquisitions and anticompetitive behavior in the port sector is all that is 
required. Tariff regulation has been tried with little success in India and is being 
discontinued (Pillay 2011). The present practice at the Colombo Port of the 
landlord operating two terminals and mandating that the prices offered at the 
third ( private) terminal are identical to its prices is suboptimal.
The airport should similarly be subject to oversight in competition terms, 
without direct regulation of tariffs. However, the government’s present policies 
appear to be going counter to this principle. In May 2011, the government 
extended the Sri Lankan Airlines’ monopoly on ground handling and catering 
services at the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA) by another 10 years 
(Lanka Business Online 2011e). This is despite the evidence that BIA’s ground 
handling charges are higher than those of its peers (Civil Aviation Authority 
2005). Prior to any actions on the regulatory side, a policy change conducive to 
efficient operation of the airport appears in order. There does not appear to be 
any interest at the present time on the part of the GoSL in operating airports as 
PPPs, as is done in India.15
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At present, noneconomic considerations appear to govern the civil aviation 
sector, comprising the government-owned existing international airport, the 
 second international airport under construction, and the two airlines on the 
 government side and around 30 foreign airlines. The government operates two 
airlines, both running at considerable loss for several years (Lanka Business 
Online 2011c, 2011e). If there is interest in reducing losses and improving per-
formances, PPPs may be considered. As long as the airlines are government 
owned and operated at a loss, it is unlikely that conditions will be created for the 
entry of Sri Lanka–based privately owned airlines, because they will only exacer-
bate the losses of the government airlines. Private investment and management 
even in the form of PPPs do not appear to be desired. In this light, the creation 
of conditions conducive to investment through the unbundling of elements ame-
nable to forms of competition (in the market or for the market) and regulation 
of the remaining elements in ways that allow a level playing field for private 
entrants to compete in requires a sea change in policy. It is, of course, highly 
 desirable that this take place, if the logistics requirements of Sri Lanka’s highly 
trade-dependent economy are to be met at low cost and adequate quality.
As chapter 2 suggests, and especially as the Logistics Performance Index 
results reported therein indicate, high port and airport charges are beginning to 
act as drags on Sri Lanka’s export industries, because they face both increasing 
competition abroad and higher input costs. If the GoSL wishes to enhance the 
competitiveness of Sri Lanka’s goods and services sectors, it should consider 
adopting the landlord-port model for the container ports at least, along with 
PPPs for the operation of the terminals. In addition, a disarticulation of airport 
operation from the loss-making government airlines would be necessary, 
 preferably converting the current fully government-owned airport management 
company, Airport Aviation Services Sri Lanka Ltd. (AASSL), to a PPP to enable 
greater investment and efficiency. The government may wish to continue the 
operation of Sri Lankan Airlines and Mihin Lanka as fully government-owned 
entities. The historical record indicates that government-run airlines have not 
done well and that during the brief period in which Sri Lankan Airlines was oper-
ated as a PPP, its performance was better even under the extraordinarily adverse 
circumstances due to the destruction of half the fleet by the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2001. But the most important issue is to free the airport 
from the yoke of subsidizing the airlines (which was the case even during the 
time Sri Lankan Airlines was operated as a PPP). The open-skies agreements 
being pursued by the government will not only open foreign airports to 
 Sri Lanka–based airlines but will also increase the number of flights by foreign 
airlines to Sri Lanka, thus improving competition not only for passengers but also 
for air freight.
If the above policy changes are made, the PUCSL can play a significant role 
in competition regulation and in the smooth operation of the concession agree-
ments. For example, it may be necessary to have competition for the market 
(periodic concessioning out) in some or all ground handling services, given the 
relatively small size of the airport. The PUCSL should have oversight of these 
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agreements to ensure that they do not contain anticompetitive provisions. In 
addition, it can serve as the mediator of conflicts among the parties, even if more 
rigorous international arbitration options exist. It can also ensure that port termi-
nal and airport operators treat all shipping lines and airlines without undue dis-
crimination. It is unlikely that there will be many international airports with 
passenger and freight volumes large enough to be of interest to investors in PPPs. 
The exception might be Jaffna, which serves an area with extremely high outmi-
gration and may become a source of high-value exports that require air transpor-
tation. Since it is the major city that is most distant from Colombo, there has 
always been demand for domestic air service in Jaffna. This airport, and possibly 
others, may require regulatory oversight by the PUCSL.
Railways
The railway system is a fully government-owned and operated integrated 
monopoly, except for marginal private involvement in cement transport and a 
tourist train. It began to operate as a government department after the repeal of 
legislation to convert it into a fully government-owned corporation. It is among 
the government organizations that are racking up large losses, year after year 
(Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2010). It operates fewer route kilometers than at 
independence, and its share of passenger and goods transport is miniscule (5 
percent and 1 percent, respectively; Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2011) and declin-
ing every year. It has enormously valuable assets in the form of large amounts of 
land in urban centers and rights-of-way linking almost all the major population 
centers. The “main line” up to Jaffna was the most profitable route prior to the 
conflict and could well be restored to profitability if institutional reforms accom-
pany the rebuilding of the track destroyed by the LTTE (Samarajiva 2009).
Restoring the railway system as an integral part of the national transport sys-
tem will require major policy changes and reforms. The double-tracked routes 
that extend in multiple directions out of Colombo will have to be carved out and 
developed as a metropolitan rail transport system, possibly with electrification. 
This could include an airport express service. Dedicated rail tracks can link con-
tainer yards and dry ports in the interior to the currently highly congested 
Colombo Port. The main line from Ragama to Jaffna can be carved out and 
developed separately under a PPP. It could also include spurs to the port and to 
the planned export-processing zone in Trincomalee (Lanka Business Online 
2011a) and Talaimannar, the closest point to India, the terminus of a ferry service 
in the short term and potentially of an international bridge in the long term 
(Samarajiva 2010). The carve-outs may be operated as integrated track-and-train 
operations or with the operation of trains separated from the building and main-
tenance of track. In the former instance, there is little need for regulation, except 
possibly in terms of price and quality regulation.
Given the current weakened state of railway transport, intermodal competi-
tion will, for the most part, moderate monopolistic behavior by the railway. The 
solution that separates train operations from the building and maintenance of 
track has been tainted by the UK experience.16 However, if the correct lessons 
94 Financing Infrastructure Investment
Investing in Infrastructure • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9927-9
are drawn from the UK experiment and a properly designed model is 
 implemented, the opportunities for greater efficiency gains exist. In this case, 
there can be competition among different train operators on the same track. If 
this option is chosen, the regulator’s role will be much larger, ranging from 
 ensuring nondiscriminatory treatment by the track operator to prevention of col-
lusion among train operators. The PUCSL has the necessary powers. However, if 
railway reforms of this magnitude are undertaken, there may be merit in creating 
a separate transport regulatory authority that will have railways, interprovincial 
buses, and perhaps even ports and airports under it. This will advance intermodal 
articulation and allow for the effective leveraging of intermodal competition for 
the benefit of consumers.
Petroleum, LPG, and CNG/LNG
The petroleum sector was partially liberalized in 2002–03, with the sale of one-
third of filling stations previously operated by the government-owned CPC to the 
Lanka Indian Oil Corporation (LIOC), a company controlled by an Indian 
 government-owned oil company. LIOC was also given the World War II oil tanks 
and associated facilities in Trincomalee, while the CPC retained control of the 
storage facilities in Kolonnawa and elsewhere as well as the pipelines  serving them. 
Plans to sell half the filling stations remaining with CPC and to initiate a law that 
would introduce a new framework conducive to competition were not followed 
through. The formula for automatically raising or lowering retail prices based on 
international price movements was also abandoned in 2004. In the absence of 
legislation, the PUCSL could not regulate the sector as intended, and the Ministry 
of Power and Energy became the regulator. The entry of the LIOC to the Sri 
Lankan market allowed relatively lower-cost imports of refined products from the 
nearby refineries in South India. However, the recurrent losses experienced by 
LIOC (Lanka Business Online 2006, 2011d) as a result of politically determined 
retail prices may cause LIOC to exit or at least not invest more in the sector.
Restoring the formula for the pricing of fuel at the retail level will be an 
improvement in multiple aspects. It will greatly improve the investment climate 
by preventing administrative expropriation of private investors by politically 
determined price regulation. However, it has a weakness in that both CPC and 
LIOC will offer the same prices and only compete in terms of quality and service. 
LPG is an industry that is integrally tied to petroleum. The government priva-
tized its poorly performing LPG supplier and promised a regulatory agency, but 
this was not done. The only constraint was the language in the privatization 
agreement that allowed a number of price increases without the periods between 
the raises specified. Shell, the private operator, raised prices repeatedly in a short 
time. The LPG privatization was quickly labeled the worst privatization in 
Sri Lankan history. Despite this misstep, the privatization succeeded in rapidly 
raising the number of urban households using LPG as a cooking fuel to about 
48 percent (Department of Census and Statistics 2009–10).
After the renationalization (Lanka Business Online 2010), the Petroleum 
Ministry, under presidential direction, set quotas for the two LPG operators based 
Financing Infrastructure Investment 95
Investing in Infrastructure • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9927-9 
on its direct control of the CPC (Lanka Business Online 2011b). Shell imported 
LPG using a dedicated terminal in Kerawalapitiya that was built to satisfy a condi-
tion of the privatization agreement. A new entrant, Laugfs, was allowed to 
 purchase LPG from the CPC refinery. The two companies constituted a duopoly 
in the industry, except for a short period when a third operator sought entry in 
2003. LPG was declared an essential service and subject to rigid price control by 
the Consumer Protection Authority (CPA). As a result of factors including the 
resulting administrative expropriation (Lanka Business Online 2007), Shell exited 
the market and the government renationalized the major LPG supplier in 2010. 
After the renationalization (Lanka Business Online 2010), the Petroleum Ministry, 
under presidential direction, set quotas for the two LPG operators based on its 
direct control of the CPC (Lanka Business Online 2011b). The private operator, 
once favored by the government, is now at its mercy. Ideally, the LPG industry 
will be allowed to function under competitive conditions, driving up performance 
by getting more households converted to LPG, a more efficient and environmen-
tally superior fuel. This would require the freeing up of government control over 
the input of LPG from the CPC refinery on one side, and the making available of 
the Kerawalapitiya unloading terminal to competitors under nondiscriminatory 
conditions and cost-oriented rates on the other. Politically determined tariff 
 setting must be replaced by tariff determination by an independent regulatory 
agency. The logical candidate is the PUCSL. At present, Sri Lanka uses no LNG/
CNG. Yet, there is much talk about introducing LNG, in light of increasing sup-
plies and its environmentally superior qualities. If it is introduced, it will require a 
greenfield distribution system. It presents an extraordinary opportunity to define 
an industrial structure and regulatory system starting from scratch.
Telecommunications
Telecommunications is the success story of infrastructure reform in Sri Lanka. 
Connectivity has increased to extraordinary levels. Voice prices are among the 
lowest in the world (Nokia 2009). Data prices are also low (LIRNEasia 2010). 
Even though prices of the privatized fixed supplier were raised by the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka (TRCSL) as part of a 
rate rebalancing exercise (Samarajiva 2000), privatization continues to be 
 popular. The legislation that constituted the framework for the reforms, the 
Sri Lanka Telecommunications Act, No. 25 of 1991, is still in force, 20 years later, 
albeit with some amendments made in 1997. It is normal to update legal frame-
works in rapidly changing industries before so much time has passed. The 
National Telecommunications Policy goes back to 1994, again an unacceptably 
long time ago. The TRCSL is not in compliance with the country’s commitments 
made under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), especially 
those regarding public availability of licensing criteria and the publication of the 
 spectrum allocations.17 The regulatory risk is said to be among the highest in the 
region (Lanka Business Online 2009).18
Implementing laws and a national policy appropriate for the present circum-
stances would be useful steps. Even without that, several actions can be taken to 
96 Financing Infrastructure Investment
Investing in Infrastructure • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9927-9
improve the conditions for the additional investments needed for rapid rollout of 
broadband networks and to assist the information technology–based services to 
become internationally competitive. The highest priority is to modernize market 
entry by making the procedures more transparent, including the specification of 
procedures for market exit. It is claimed, based on the fact that many operators 
including the incumbent have suffered losses in recent years, that opaque licensing 
has resulted in ruinous competition. The TRCSL has attempted to remedy this by 
setting floor prices, especially for mobile voice services. The better solution is to 
make clear the conditions under which operators unable to make profits can exit 
the market, including the permitting of mergers and acquisitions. A related prior-
ity is to make transparent and rationalize the spectrum assignments. Sri Lanka is 
one of the few developing countries to have refarmed spectrum (Dutta and Mia 
2009; Samarajiva 2006). However, this was 7 years ago and action is needed to 
clear and make available more frequencies for wireless broadband on the basis of 
a broadly consulted and adhered to roadmap and timetable. The obsolete prohibi-
tion against any operator other than Sri Lanka Telecom (SLT) laying wire guides 
to customer premises, a remnant of temporary measures to mollify trade unions 
when licensing new entrants in the 1990s, needs to be removed.
The rapid take-up of broadband on wireless platforms using smart phones and 
other devices is likely to increase pressure on domestic and international  backhaul 
capacity. There is a significant amount of domestic fiber in the country, but it is 
poorly used. Five undersea cables are operational, though there are difficulties in 
the use of the main cable station by operators other than SLT. Regulatory action 
to ensure all operators are able to use domestic and international backhaul capac-
ity at cost-oriented rates and under nondiscriminatory conditions is needed. Over 
70 percent of households in the country have been connected without the help 
of universal service funds. The current universal service fund was originally 
intended to be closed by 2009, based on the levies on international calls being 
stepped down annually. It should be closed because the disbursements are too 
slow and the levies encourage gray market termination of international calls.
Changing perceptions of high regulatory risk is not easy. It will require depo-
liticization of the TRCSL by creating the necessary conditions for independence, 
such as staggered terms for members and the appointment of the director general 
by the commission based on advertisement and competitive selection rather than 
the present method of appointment by the Minister of Telecommunication and 
Information Technology. In addition, a period of sustained good regulatory 
enforcement will be needed to change ingrained perceptions. It was true until 
2011 that the sector was affected by layers of complicated levies and taxes. The 
ideal solution would be to treat the sector as any other, giving it no special favors 
or penalties, that is, simply subjecting it to the normal value-added tax (VAT) 
regime. The 2011 budget has removed the VAT from telecommunication ser-
vices and has cleared the underbrush of multiple taxes and levies, including an 
ill-advised environmental levy on mobile calls (Lanka Business Online 2010). 
The end result has been a decrease in taxes collected from consumers and trans-
mitted to government, and a slight increase in the tax burden on the operators 
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who no longer can claim credit for VAT payments made to suppliers. Of all the 
 infrastructure sectors, telecommunications is the one that requires zero invest-
ments of public funds. It is also the sector that has seen the greatest improvement 
in performance. These are great achievements, despite the shortcomings of the 
policy and regulatory regime described previously. Therefore, the government 
could commit to further improving the policy and regulatory environment, since 
this is of even greater importance in a sector that depends solely on private 
investment.
Sectoral Trade-Offs and Synergies
Prioritizing infrastructure investment across sectors raises important issues. The 
fundamental policy challenge is to address the trade-offs and strike a balance 
between the provision of economic infrastructure that directly increases the 
growth and employment-generating potential of the economy (such as transport, 
power and energy, and telecommunications) and delivery of basic services (such 
as water supply, sanitation, and solid waste management). At present, the highest 
priority is attached to improvement of roads, since this is expected to generate 
substantial economic and social benefits. In densely populated areas, the freeing 
up of rights-of-way for infrastructure poses many difficulties because of the resis-
tance of private landowners. Therefore, there is a natural tendency for electricity 
and telecommunications cables, especially for access networks that directly con-
nect to business and residential consumers, to be laid along and under roadways. 
The issue here is that in the absence of properly dimensioned conduits that are 
constructed as part of the roadway, the required digging and covering up results 
in damage to road surfaces. The ideal solution is for all new and rehabilitated 
roadways to include conduits and for an entity other than the Road Development 
Authority to set the rules for accessing the conduit. The rules will be based on the 
principle of nondiscrimination among competitive suppliers (especially  relevant 
to telecommunications) and cost-oriented rates. The entity will ideally be the 
PUCSL, because the conduits can be used for multiple infrastructure sectors.
In the case of telecommunications backhaul networks (optical fiber), synergies 
exist not only with roads but also with railways and high-voltage electricity 
 transmission lines. As noted, railways, for example, are a major landholder and 
therefore could alleviate land property rights issues in the country with respect 
to infrastructure. Multiservice infrastructures such as bridges are also an 
 interesting option. Poor regulatory enforcement has resulted in underutilization 
of fiber optic cables laid by the incumbent telecommunications operator SLT 
and the use of less-efficient microwave links by competitors. Regulatory action 
to ensure nondiscriminatory and cost-oriented access to the SLT backbone 
 network is the first-best solution. The embedding of dark fiber within conduits 
owned by the Road Development Authority, the SLR, or the CEB is the second-
best solution. The lighting and the operation, on nondiscriminatory terms, of the 
dark fiber can be given on concession. This concession will have to be supervised 
by a third party, again, ideally, the PUCSL. Less obvious, but still with consider-
able potential, is the use of sewerage networks carrying electricity and 
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telecommunications. Here, the original design and construction would have to 
include purpose-built conduits and access points. There would also have to be 
rules for nondiscriminatory access set and enforced by the PUCSL.
notes
 1. The Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) surplus excludes debt and arrears. The CEB 
received a subsidy on furnace oil, which is reflected in the losses incurred by Ceylon 
Petroleum Corporation (CPC). A number of local authorities and government depart-
ments have debts to CEB. The same appears to be the case with the National Water 
Supply and Drainage Board.
 2. See Biller, Guasch, and Madawela for details.
 3. See Biller, Guasch, and Madawela for details.
 4. See http://www.pucsl.gov.lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=164
&Itemid=126&lang=en.
 5. See UNDP (n.d.) for a case study on water and sanitation reforms that involved inter-
national arbitration.
 6. The 13th Amendment to the Constitution, 9th Schedule, List I, Article 6, assigns 
roads, bridges, and ferries, thereon, within the province to the provinces. National 
highways, bridges, and ferries, thereon, are assigned to the central government. 
National policy on roads is reserved to the central government under List II.
 7. See http://www.dot.state.mn.us/materials/smoothnessdocs/IRIIntroduction.pdf.
 8. See the Pathfinder Foundation (2009) and Ministry of Transport (2008).
 9. The 13th Amendment to the Constitution, 9th Schedule, List III, Article 32.
 10. The 13th Amendment to the Constitution, 9th Schedule, List II.
 11. The current policy, described as the Sri Lanka Energy Policy of 2006, was adopted in 
2008 (Ministry of Power and Energy 2006). May 2011 news reports indicate that the 
Power and Energy Minister informed Parliament of his intention to revise the policy 
(Colombo Page 2011).
 12. http://www.energy.gov.lk/. See http://www.energy.gov.lk/pdf/SLSEA%20Act-E.pdf 
for the enabling legislation.
 13. The 13th Amendment to the Constitution, 9th Schedule, List II.
 14. The 13th Amendment to the Constitution, 9th Schedule, List II.
 15. http://www.pppinindia.com/ppp-centre-civil-aviation.php.
 16. The UK railway sector model separates train operators from building and maintaining 
tracks. This model is criticized for being unnecessarily complex, because it involves 
extensive coordination among multiple companies (and their subcontractors), causing 
confusion and raising prices for both operators and passengers.
 17. Reference paper of the Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS).
 18. See also http://lirneasia.net/2011/05/2011-telecom-policy-and-regulatory- 
environment-tre-survey-results-released-in-dhaka/, where Learning Initiatives on 
Reforms for Network Economics Asia (LIRNEasia) (2011) and Business Monitor 
International (BMI)  rankings are discussed.
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Concluding Remarks and 
Recommendations
Sri Lanka’s prospects are positive, and the country may well be on its way to 
achieving high-middle-income status in the next decade. In this sense, the experi-
ence of countries that share similarities with Sri Lanka may shed light on how to 
address certain obstacles in Sri Lanka’s development path. Malaysia and 
Sri Lanka share many similarities and, at different points of time, similar develop-
ment challenges. Both countries are richly endowed with natural and human 
capital, and transforming these forms of capital into man-made and social capital 
in a sustainable manner remains a key challenge. There are, however, notable 
 differences. Malaysia generated rents from extracting its natural capital via hydro-
carbon, timber, and palm oil exploitation, reinvesting them in a sustainable way 
primarily in human capital, and ensuring that the country’s social compact does 
not collapse.1 Sri Lanka’s dependency on extractive forms of natural capital via 
agriculture and gems is likely to decrease in the future, and its dependency 
mainly on nonextractive forms of natural capital (for example, its natural beauty 
potential for tourism) should increase. This can be well associated with its exist-
ing human capital since an educated population can better provide high-end 
services and skilled manufacturing. The way the country uses these forms of 
 capital efficiently to sustain economic growth and development in the medium 
and long term remains the main challenge.
Sri Lanka’s future remains in increased services and manufacturing, but better 
infrastructure is needed. The services sector is splintering, and the modern, 
higher-productivity segment is increasing its share. Efforts need to continue to 
improve the investment climate for investing in modern services. This includes 
upgrading local standards to facilitate the export of services, further improving 
infrastructure (increasing Internet bandwidth and lowering the cost of calls to 
match East Asian levels), expanding the provision of reliable electricity, and tak-
ing a more proactive role in international negotiations on traded services. This 
also includes building high-end tourism infrastructure that allows tourists to 
enjoy the country’s beauty and cultural heritage in a sustainable manner.
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Internationally competitive manufacturing and services sectors will create 
demand for high-productivity, high-wage jobs, which will have to be matched 
with improved worker skills to take advantage of higher-income opportunities. 
Given its geography, Malaysia actually had more of an obstacle to address its 
distance problem than Sri Lanka has at the moment. Malaysia invested in mul-
tiple clusters of economic activity and improved the networks of roads that 
facilitated migration/commuting to work and exchange of goods in areas of 
dense economic activity. It extensively uses toll highways involving the private 
sector, which at the moment are nonexistent in Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, shorten-
ing of distance to promote economic activity in areas other than the Western 
Province will require lowering transportation costs. This, in turn, will require 
improving both the quality of road surface and easing congestion by connecting 
the already dense rural road network with main markets. Given its fiscal situa-
tion, it is difficult to perceive how this can be attained without private sector 
involvement.
The path of sustained high economic growth lies open ahead. It is up to 
Sri Lankan society to take it. To conclude, seen through the lens of Malaysia’s 
successful economic transition, Sri Lanka has the basis to reap a peace dividend 
and move into a higher growth path that would help it achieve high-middle-
income status in 15 years. Providing better connectivity; rolling out efficiency-
enhancing reform to different sectors of the economy, especially infrastructure; 
and strengthening the competitiveness of manufacturing and modern services 
will increase the demand for productive workers and will put Sri Lanka on a 
course for sustained high economic growth.
note
 1. See Biller and Nabi for details.
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